Like President Bush, President Baran Obama is unlikely to achieve his Af-Pak policy objective as he is ignoring the true character and composition of the Pakistan army, says the author, whose latest work on radicalisation of Pak Army, ‘Coming Blowback-How Pakistan is Endangering the World’ is due to be released on May 1, 2009. His monograph on Pak Army giving a comprehensive account of the use of irregular forces and terrorist groups as instruments of State policy is due for release in 2010.
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Despite three reviews and a mother of all reviews carried out by CIA veteran and policy analyst Bruce Riedel for the new President, the US has refused to acknowledge the simple fact that it is their strategic ally, Pakistan Army, which is responsible for protecting the al Qaida-Taliban group by sheltering them in the tribal areas. It is equally clear to everyone outside the Beltway at least that the Pakistan Army is not the solution but the problem in Afghanistan.
There is no doubt it is not easy to deal with Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army, it is often said, quite erroneously though, is the only institution which keeps the country together. It cannot, however, be discounted, that it is not merely an armed force– it is the biggest employer, a powerful corporate entity with investments in industries as varied as cereals to petrochemicals to missiles, a influential social welfare organisation, running schools, colleges and other educational institutions and a supra-political party, always in the kingmaker’s seat without the need of going to the public for approval.
The November 2008 Mumbai attack and the July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul, among other terrorist incidents in the recent past, have clearly underlined the Pakistan Army’s active alliance with terrorist groups. This alliance is not merely indicative of the Army’s use of terrorist groups as strategic instruments but, more worrisome, the tendency towards becoming a religious army. This slow but inevitable transformation has serious implications not only for Pakistan but for the entire world, including the US which might find its interests in the region, especially in the Muslim countries, in direct conflict with that of Pakistan Army.
Two characteristics of Pakistan Army in this context are relevant to study, and understand. First is the increasing fundamentalist orientations of its officer cadre and troops and second, the use of terrorist groups as instruments of State policy. Although both the Indian and Pakistan armies were born out of the British Indian Army, the latter chose to use religious as a key weapon to gain legitimacy as the `defender of the faith` among the people in the midst of ideological and political turmoil over the nature and characteristic of `a nation for Muslims`. The Indian Army chose to be secular and follow the professional traditions of the British Army, keeping the country’s honour and sovereignty above everything else to defend and protect.
The first instance was the Pakistan Army’s use of religion to launch a military offensive within months of independence when Major General Akbar Khan and some of his colleagues, with the knowledge of the political leaders like Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, to launch an “irregular“ offensive to wrest Kashmir from India. It was not a religious war but a political one to correct what the Pakistan Army felt was a grossly erroneous demarcation of the political boundaries. General Khan invoked the cause of Islam and the Muslim community to gather an army of tribals from the tribal areas to infiltrate into Kashmir as far as possible, making way for the regular troops to hold the ground thereafter. The move succeeded only partially as Khan did not anticipate a determined counter-offensive by the Indian Army, a mistake which many of Khan’s successor Generals would continue to make.
Even though the Kashmir raids had failed to achieve its primary objective, it taught some key lessons to the Pakistan Army Generals. Two most critical lessons were the immense potential of exploiting the power of religion which was the sole binding factor for Pakistan and the use of `irregular forces` to act as the first line of offense and soldiers of a proxy war. In a study commissioned by General Ayub Khan, in the early 50s, to craft a military strategy, one of the major recommendations was to use `irregular` force to supplement the regular army which was comparatively smaller to the Indian Army.
Contrary to popular belief, it was not General Zia-ul Haq who began the process of Islamisation of Pakistan Army but General Ayub Khan, known as the more liberal of Pakistani Generals. The process of Islamisation of the armed forces had begun in right earnest during the 1965 war, especially when, according to Brigadier AR Siddiqui, `Pakistan’s military gains in the Rann of Kutch against India swept the country with an overwhelming Islamic sentiment and pride`. Sindh was renamed `Babul Islam` to revive the great dream of an Islamic (Pakistani) re-conquest of India. The Army, later that year, launched Operations Gibralter and Grand Slam “to reinforce the Islamic orientation of an armed conflict with India“. When the Indian forces reached the doorsteps of Lahore, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, in a broadcast to the nation, declared ‘we are at war’, invoking the Kalima-e-Tayyaba “to project the war as a virtual jihad: a conflict between Islam and Kufr“. This was the first time that the jihadi theme found place in the soldier’s vocabulary.
There were other quite visible signs of radicalisation taking place within the armed forces. Brigadier Siddiqui was witness to such changes: “During my own extensive tours of the operational areas after the ceasefire, I found the front-line soldiers resonant with the Kalima-i-Tayyaba and the Kalima-i-Shahadat. Nothing uncommon for a Muslim soldier or civilian, only practised and recited louder than usual. More bearded faces were in evidence than normal on the battle fronts….A number of officers I happened to meet would be reluctant even to have their pictures taken for the I.D. Cards. One of them carried an I.D. without the regulation photograph“.
The influence of religion among the ranks has been strong since the beginning, as most of the soldiers came from rural, orthodox families in northern Punjab. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Afghan jehad only reinforced the influence of religion in military matters, at least for the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and those officers who were not exposed to training in western military colleges.
Although the Army under General Yahya Khan retained its secular professional image with religion given importance only as a personal faith, things changed with the appointment of retired Major-General Sher Ali Khan as the Minister of Information and National Affairs. Sher Ali, a fundamentalist in his belief and a strong Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) supporter, took it upon himself to work for the glory of Islam. The military recruited `volunteers` from JI and its student wing, Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba (IJT) to fight the Bengali insurgency in East Pakistan. A large number of these ` volunteers` were drawn from IJT cadres from Punjab University and were well-educated; these men were trained by the Army to crush secessionists—political leaders, journalists, artists, writers, activists and judicial officers—in the nation’s eastern wing. JI also formed peace committees in East Pakistan to facilitate intelligence gathering for the Army. In return, the Army rewarded JI with seats in the East Pakistan Assembly.
The Army had also begun using Islamic slogans during the East Pakistan crisis. “For instance, during the fight for East Pakistan, the local commander, Lt. General Tikka Khan, quoted freely from Islamic texts in his talks to the beleaguered west Pakistani garrison reminding his forces of the great battles against infidels a proof of what Muslims could do“.
As some analysts have remarked, even the much anglicised Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was not averse to exploiting religion when it suited his political aims and encouraged the use of Islamic symbols and themes like “Islam our Faith, Democracy our Polity and Socialism our economy“. Vali Nasr has pointed out that Bhutto “openly championed Islamisation so that he could co-opt part of the opposition party“. Bhutto allowed regulations which let officers keep beards, short pants were discarded from the uniform, and official functions began with a `dao`(ritual) invoking Allah’s blessing. He prohibited alcohol from the military mess and changed the day off from Sunday to Friday. Bhutto picked up an obscure, orthodox General, Zia-ul Haq, over other more deserving officers to be his Chief of Army Staff.
Nicknamed `maulvi` among his peers, it was General Zia-ul Haq, son of an Imam, who systematically and openly changed the character of the Army by invoking the triple motto of Taqva (piety), Iman (Islamic faith) and Jehad-fi-Sabil-Allah (Fight in the name of Allah). The post of army `mullahs` was created to act as a bridge between profession and faith. The mullahs accompanied units into combat zones. Zia was the first army chief and head of State to attend the annual meeting of the Tablighi Jamaat at Raiwind in Punjab, which encouraged officers and troops to frequent Tablighi meetings more openly. Tablighi Jamaat, an organisation engaged in preaching and practicing Islam, has often been accused of encouraging radicalisation of Islam. A known Tablighi General was Lt. General Javed Nasir, the first General with a full beard, who took over as the Director General of ISI in 1992. Nasir extended patronage to Deobandi jehadi groups to launch a proxy war in Kashmir and authorised ISI collaboration with Dawood Ibrahim, a mafia don from the Bombay underworld who organised an attack on the Bombay Stock Exchange on March 12, 1993.
Changes were made in the curriculum at staff colleges where new officers began studying and researching Islamic military practices, doctrine and strategy. Zia openly encouraged his men and officers to pray, fast and distribute Islamic literature within the force. Those who prayed five times a day, though it was not mandatory, found themselves in the shortlist for promotions more easily than others. Religious fervour became a passport to higher ranks and membership of JI and IJT brought won browny points. In selection boards for officers, religious knowledge and habits received positive marks. According to a keen Army watcher and analyst, Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, “public display of Islamic orthodoxy and conservatism was an asset“ and even “ a method of career enhancement“.
In his attempt to Islamise the army, Zia saw it to it that: new mosques were built within cantonments and training areas; Islamic texts introduced into training courses; staff college libraries stocked with books on Islam, Islamic military ideology and practices and; middle-level officers were made to study and give examinations on Islam and Islamic military doctrine. Islamic teachings were introduced in the Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, in addition to regular subjects.
The Islamisation influenced ISI men and officers more as a number of them, at least in the lower ranks, were recruited from the madaris immediately after (1990-1993) the Afghan jehad. Recruits during this phase were made to take oath on the Koran and taught Islamic subjects. They were also tested regularly for their grasp of religious knowledge to “raise the level of religious awareness among Pakistani troops and ensure indoctrination“ . Many officers in the Army became attracted to JI’s ideology and Mawdudi’s teachings. Zia in fact used to reward men and officers with a copy of Mawdudi’s books.
Zia also incorporated religious groups like JI and JUI as part of Pakistan Army’s broader strategic objectives, both at home and abroad; at home to control ethnic and sectarian separatists who challenged the Army’s writ and outside, specifically in India, to initiate a proxy war to annex Kashmir as part of an `unfinished agenda`. For JI, which was under tremendous army pressure to restrict its activities in Punjab and elsewhere, Zia’s campaign to reinvent the idea of Pakistan by Islamising the society “from above“ came as a great relief. It subsequently brought the party and its ally IJT immense power and influence not only in politics and bureaucracy, but in the army as well. In 1977, after Taraki’s coup in Afghanistan, Zia met with the JI leaders and discussed the party’s possible role in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. JI already had links with Afghan warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Islamic drive in the armed forces fulfilled part of its un-stated objective of gaining control of the State.
Though successive Generals did not actively pursue the jihadi agenda as Zia, only a handful of them made cursory attempts to undo the fundamentalist strain which the radical General had introduced into the ranks and officer cadre during the Afghan Jihad. All of them, however, used terrorist groups to pursue the Army’s agenda in Kashmir and other parts of India. These terrorist groups acted as frontline troops who infiltrated into Kashmir and different parts of India to set up terrorist cells, create a wide network of supporters and carry out sabotage, espionage and terrorist activities.
General Pervez Musharraf deserves to be mentioned specifically for brazenly pursuing the duplicit policy on terror groups while aligning himself, and his country, with the US in the so-called Global War on Terrorism. Musharraf was singularly instrumental in creating a new terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and supporting LeT despite a global sanction besides allowing Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM) and the Taliban to take shelter in the tribal areas and other parts of Pakistan following the US bombardment of Afghanistan. He not only allowed JeM and LeT to expand their networks across Punjab and Sindh but also let the Taliban and al Qaida establish a virtual sanctuary in the tribal areas. His officers, from the Army as well as the ISI, actively supported the Taliban fighting the NATO forces led by the US Army which, ironically, was supporting Pakistan’s military build up.
His successor, General Ashfaq Kayani, was no different although he managed to get a better press than Musharraf who was forced to step down under mounting public pressure within the country and from the international community, including his friends in the Bush administration.
Both, however, pursued anti-India agenda vigorously since 1999 when Musharraf as the Chief of Army had ordered a clandestine incursion into India with the help of LeT and al Badr terrorists. Kayani was at that time a Major General and headed the Divisional HQ at Murree under the Rawalpindi Corps which controlled the operations. Both have since remained closer with Kayani taking over as the Director General of Military Operations and Rawalpindi Corps Commander when Musharraf became the President after the 1999 coup. Both the General have overseen the expansion of the Taliban and al Qaida into Pakistan’s own backyard and sheltered Punjab-based groups like LeT and JeM despite India’s protests and demand for shutting down the terrorist infrastructure.
In this context, it would be useful to understand that there are no rogue elements in Pakistan Army; the so-called rogue elements (like Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul) are in fact are an integral part of the Army’s policy of pursuing its primary agenda of inflicting `a thousand cuts` on India through jihadi groups like LeT and their affiliates while denying it publicly. The Mumbai attack, which closely followed the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, is only a probing operation to test the Indian tolerance level in taking hits.
These are the issues which the Obama administration should factor in if the Afpak strategy has to achieve its objectives.
