Myanmar-China

Anti-corruption campaign in China

The on-going anti-corruption campaign in China targets three "tigers". They are the “Security Gang,” the “Petroleum Gang,” and the “Shanxi Gang.

President Xi Jinping’s government is continuing with its anti-corruption campaign within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Last weekend, state media denounced the existence of factions within the party, a well-known fact but one rarely discussed.

Xinhua news agency named three factions with ties to powerful government figures—dubbed “tigers”—that Xi has targeted for purges. These are the “Security Gang,” the “Petroleum Gang,” and the “Shanxi Gang.” An editorial in the People’s Daily stated: “Some cliques of officials are, in fact, parasitic relationships for the conveying of benefits.”

Corruption is rampant throughout the Chinese bureaucracy. The entire Chinese leadership enriched itself by looting state-owned properties as it oversaw the restoration of capitalism from the 1980s. However, the three factions being targeted have close ties to “tigers” that represent a power threat to President Xi and his drive to open up Chinese state businesses to greater private and foreign investment.

Zhou Yongkang, who was expelled from the party and arrested in December, has close connections with the Security and Petroleum factions. Zhou was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee until retiring in 2012. He also served as the country’s security chief.

When Zhou retired in 2012, Chinese oil companies, such as the Sinopec Group and China National Petroleum Corp, were considered more powerful than some government ministries. His retirement saw a decrease in the power of the Petroleum faction. Cheng Li, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, stated that year: “In the long term, the end of such a faction-based group will likely benefit economic reforms in general.”

Another recently targeted figure, Ling Jihua, is believed to be the founder of the Shanxi faction. 

Ling was the chief aide to former President Hu Jintao, as well as a member of Hu’s “Youth League” faction. On December 22, Xinhua announced that Ling was being investigated for “suspected serious discipline violations.”

Ling was a candidate for the Politburo until his sudden loss of influence in September 2012. He was accused of corruption after covering up a car accident caused by his 23-year-old son Ling Gu that left the young man dead and two women with him seriously injured, one of whom later died from her injuries. Ling allegedly paid off the families of the women to keep silent about the crash, while not even acknowledging in public that his son had died.

The Shanxi faction derives its name from the coal-rich Shanxi province. 

Many of Ling’s family members have held positions in the local government, including his older brother, Zhengce. In June, the government placed the elder Ling under investigation, citing violations of discipline. Ling Zhengce served as Shanxi’s director of the development and reform commission. This body oversaw the local economy and development projects.

Dozens of Shanxi officials close to Ling Zhengce, including some involved in coal mining development have been investigated or removed from their positions since 2013. A diplomatic source in Beijing quoted by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun said the probe into Zhengce “is likely to dismantle the existing structure of coal concessions in the province or accuse the Ling family (of wrongdoing).”

Beijing is further opening up China’s state-owned enterprises, such as those controlling coal and oil, to private and foreign investment. The agenda is opposed by sections of the ruling elite. Accelerated pro-market restructuring policies were adopted at the central committee’s 2013 plenum and new measures were announced at the 2014 plenum.

Zhou and Ling are just the latest in a series of high-profile investigations and purges from the CCP that are related to conflicts arising from Xi’s economic agenda.

Former Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai, an ally of Zhou, was purged in August 2013. Xu Caihou, formerly the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, the military’s top decision-making body, is currently awaiting trial after admitting to taking bribes. He was expelled from the party in October. Six other officials, three of whom were close to Zhou, were expelled from the party at last October’s plenum.

The removal of Bo, Xu, Zhou and Ling eliminates potential rivals to Xi and paves the way for the Chinese president to stack the Politburo Standing Committee with political allies at the 19th party congress in 2017, when five of the current seven members are expected to step down. 

Says Zhang Lifan, formerly of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: “The so-called ‘New Gang of Four’ represented a very strong political group that covered every aspect of power from the military to the party.”

Social unrest is also playing a large role in the CCP purges. Chinese workers are increasingly hostile to the corrupt leadership that enriches itself by offering the working class as a source of cheap labour for international capital. There are concerns in Beijing that the deepening social inequality between the rich and China’s 400 million-strong workforce could threaten the CCP’s hold on power. 

Protests overseas, as well as those in Hong Kong last year, are heavily censored.

“Corruption is ruining the Chinese Communist Party, causing a serious legitimacy crisis. This is the 25th anniversary of Tiananmen. If there was a similar event would the public and the military support the party? No, because they are too corrupt,” said Cheng Li of the US Brookings Institute last July.

In 1989, protests by students in Beijing’s central Tiananmen Square became a trigger for a widespread public anger against the regime. By Ben McGrath, wsws.org

While on this subject, Russell Leigh Moses, Dean of Academics and Faculty at the Beijing Centre for Chinese Studies has an interesting take. Writing in the Wall St Journal blogs ( Jan 15, 2015) he remarked thus:
 China’s Communist Party has been trumpeting the successes of its corruption campaign with unusual vigor this week as the organization’s main anti-graft body, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, holds its annual meetings.

In addressing the meeting on Tuesday, Chinese President Xi Jinping touted the take-down of powerful former security czar Zhou Yongkang as evidence the party “dares to face questions head-on.” It was the first time Xi had discussed Zhou’s case in public.

While it’s tempting to see triumphalism in Xi’s discussion of Zhou, there’s also an edge of anxiety in the party media’s recent anti-corruption rhetoric. There appears to be mounting concern about resistance to the anti-graft crusade, raising the possibility Beijing could extend its crackdown to target not just corrupt officials, but also officials who are insufficiently loyal to Xi’s program.

A signal of that anxiety appeared in a strongly-worded commentary, first carried by state news outlets on Sunday and getting strong play across major media, in which Beijing slammed those “whose understanding of the anti-graft campaign is either shallow, confused or ill-willed, and who see the effort as overdone.”

The commentary provided a sharp point-by-point rebuttal of some of the largest criticisms of the campaign.

One such criticism is that the campaign has become so onerous and intrusive that even clean officials are often sitting on their hands for fear of being accused of malfeasance – a “ridiculous notion,” according to the commentary, because the fight against corruption cannot be pursued only part way. The “tigers”—senior officials—being pursued in the campaign, it argued, “aren’t soft-hearted, but steadfast and determined.”  There’s no reason for Beijing to be anything but the same.
 
To those who worry that the campaign is smearing the party’s image by giving the appearance that the entire apparatus is corrupt, the essay conceded that the press coverage doesn’t always look good. Yet, it said, the crackdown also “demonstrates the courage and determination of our party to expose our wounds, cut out the corrupt and unhealthy elements and thereby win firmer support among people.”

Meanwhile, the commentary had zero patience for those who suggest that, given the scale of the problem, the anti-graft drive may be pointless. The central leadership is aware that “getting to the root of corruption is a long road,” it said, and its strategy aims to “build a discipline system in depth that will produce cleaner government.”  What’s needed now from those trying to judge the efforts made thus far is “a little more time and patience and a little less sarcasm and discouragement,” the commentary admonished.

 The essay, illustrated with a photo of anti-corruption czar Wang Qishanpointing vigorously while making a speech, indicates that disquiet in the Communist party ranks about President Xi Jinping’s crusade isn’t going away.  The current attempt to address criticisms by assaulting them also illustrates how sensitive Beijing has become to the potential for political harm to Xi should complaints become organized.

“There are some would seek to discredit the combatting of corruption under the guise of protecting the image of the party,” the commentary warned, adding “we all must be aware that these erroneous arguments could spread.”

Lashing out at those who have other views about how to best move China forward has become a major political trademark of the Xi leadership.  But up to now, taking direct action against opponents has been largely confined to political dissidents.  This commentary represents something new:  A signal to officials that the Xi leadership is increasingly unwilling to tolerate dissent within its own ranks either.
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