TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction, Kanti P. Bajpai and Harsh V. Pant
PART I: IDEAS AND CAPACITY
1. Beyond Non-alignment, C. Raja Mohan
2. The World View of India’s Strategic Elite, Stephen P. Cohen
3. Indian Strategic Culture, Kanti P. Bajpai
Part II: POWER AND CAPACITY
4. Major-power Status in the Modern World: India in Comparative Perspective, Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul
5. The Strategic Consequences of India’s Economic Performance, Sanjaya Baru
6. Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software’, Daniel Markey
PART III: BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS
7. Why Has the India-Pakistan Rivalry Been So Enduring? Power Asymmetry and an Intractable Conflict, T.V. Paul
8. Re-collecting Empire: ‘Victimhood’ and the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Manjari Chatterjee Miller
9. Rising China and Emergent India in the Twenty-first Century: Friends or Rivals, Surjit Mansingh
10. The Transforming US-Indian Relationship and Its Significance for American Interests, Ashley J. Tellis
11. The India-US Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics, Harsh V. Pant
12. India’s ‘Extended Neighbourhood’ Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power, David Scott
PART IV: GLOBAL DIPLOMACY
13. Defending ‘Differentiation’: India’s Foreign Policy on Climate Change from Rio to Copenhagen, Sandeep Sengupta
14. India and the Word Trade Organization, Amrita Narlikar
Indian foreign policy has made tremendous progress since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Today, India is being seen as an important regional power and a responsible global player. It is the goal of India’s foreign policy to achieve major power status for the country in the international arena.
This ambition has been a common thread in the policies of all political dispensations to have ruled the country. To achieve this stated goal, India needs to be pragmatic and instead of being guided by the past, it has to look at safeguarding its interest in the future. However, as Bajpai and Pant point out, the common view, even in India, is that the country acts in an ad hoc manner, has no overarching view of its interests or policies
that might serve those interests and lacks what might be called a ‘strategic culture’.
The end of the Cold War witnessed India questioning the relevance of its foreign policy of non-alignment. It has been pointed out by C. Raja Mohan in the reader on foreign policy, that the policy of non-alignment and the movement, though related, are two different ideas. This distinction is not understood and even today the relevance of the policy is equated to the importance of the movement. It is very significant to note that the movement was a product of the policy and came much later.
The transition from non-aligned to an acceptance of the United States’ (US) dominance, economic reforms and the beginning of coalition politics at home are some of the changes that India has adjusted to. India is expanding its strategic reach and to widen this space, it is accepting the role of alliance—albeit in a limited manner—by crafting alliance like relations with the US, while not giving up on its special ties to Russia or exploring deeper relations with the European Union and Japan and managing its complex ties with China. Having established a need for a strategic culture, Kanti Bajpai describes it as ‘consisting two parts. The first is an assumption about the orderliness in the world and the second is the assumptions about operational policy that follows from the prior assumptions.’
India has ambitions of becoming a major power. Some would even say that this ambition is rooted in a self-image that as a grand civilization, India is entitled to be recognized as a global and regional power. However, this self-proclamation needs to be pushed by certain resources and capabilities. Sanjay Baru has brought forward the need for economic performance from India. India’s declared nuclear power status notwithstanding, there is a gap between credibility and capability.
This gap, between current strategic capabilities and potential as a major power, can be bridged through sustained economic growth. Fiscal growth would lead to increased investments in health, education, urban services and rural development. These are all aspects of India’s overall national security concern. Economic growth, to a large extent, will shape the way India is able to harness and utilize as well as deploy its strategic assets to project power and influence. For any state vying to be a major power, it is imperative that her military be supported by indigenous technology and hardware. This is a critical area where progress has been very slow and it is reflected in our conduct of foreign policy, especially with respect to the major powers.
India’s relations have changed greatly with the major powers. ‘From estrangement to engagement’ is the term that is often used to describe the changes in India–US relations. As pointed out by Ashley Tellis, the transformation in the relations has [had] enormous consequence for both countries and the future ‘balance of power’ in Asia. The end of the Cold War provided the US with an opportunity to re-engage with India and to pursue the relationship without the pressure of the politics of the previous decades. Convergence of ideas has added value to this relationship.
However, the two are aware that this does not translate into supporting each other on all issues. India is not an alliance partner of the US, nor is it an uncritical partner. India’s size, history and her ambitions mean that she will voice her opinion to safeguard her interests. The US–India nuclear pact is an example of India negotiating a deal that provides the necessary foreign technology and also protects Indian interests. The deal, while cementing the partnership, is also an indicator that India will not be submissive to the US interests. The other major power that the reader has focussed on is China.
Whether India and China are rivals or friends is a question for which we are still searching for answers. Both countries are expected to mark the present century as the ‘Asia century’; they are the challengers, expected to shape international geopolitics and economics in the foreseeable future.
The two chapters on India and China are compact yet comprehensive in their views on the relations between the two countries. They study the Sino-Indian war and the reasons the war continues to shape India–China relations. The war was not simply a dispute on the border but involved historical heritage, the trauma and humiliation inflicted as a result of colonialism as well as the politics of the Cold War. The chapters bring to the readers the various stages leading up to the war and the points at which India could have avoided military action, such as the failures of the border negotiating talks. The chapter is not a judgement on the political leadership of India; in hindsight, it has been acknowledged that their understanding was flawed. India was not militarily in a position to fight with the Chinese Army, and this is a fact that was accepted in 1962 as it is accepted now.
India’s relations with Pakistan are perhaps the most studied and debated topic in India. The rivalry between the two has continued unabated over a long period of time and involved wars and conflicts and has cast a shadow over relations with other states as well. T.V. Paul’s chapter is a study of this enduring rivalry and the reasons for its continuation.
The most important contribution of the book is perhaps in highlighting the reforms that are required to develop and overcome the structural problems of India’s foreign policy. Foreign policy is a strategy that is thought, implemented and executed by members of the Indian Foreign Service. The members of the service are chosen after a tough examination; however, the number is highly inadequate to represent India and her interests across the various missions and consulates around the world.
It is high time that the service expands its intake of officers as well as reforms itself to retain and attract high-calibre officers. The service should increase its reach to bringing in non-career officers from universities and Indian think tanks. The service has to invest in the development of world-class social science research and build partnerships with institutions. As India starts to play a more proactive role in international affairs, the foreign service of the country has to be able to match to the new challenges.
– Review by Stuti Banerjee,Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi
coutesy:Journal of Defence Studies
