Policy Research Group - Strategic Insight: US `Jamaat’ policy hurts Hasina’s Bangladesh US `Jamaat’ policy hurts Hasina’s Bangladesh ================================================================================ editor on 20 September, 2009 04:10:00 Three years ago in January 2006, the then US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca visited Dhaka for three days on 26, 27 and 28. That visit was significant in several respects and in a way sealed the US policy of tilt towards the Jamaat. Today, the moderate leadership of the country finds itself at odds with the policy and in fact it has been hampering its moves to check elements that had a free run literally under Khalid Zia’s five –year rule. Rocca had described Bangladesh as a moderate Muslim democracy. She said Bangladesh is a ‘shining example’ as one of the few Muslim democracies’ in the world. And said in the US view Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) was a progressive political party. The American official met the JEI Amir Matiur Rahman Nizami who was a minister and conveyed the position of her government. She used the occasion to inquire whether there was any involvement of JEI cadres with other Islamic radical groups like Jamiatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) or Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B). Nizami denied any such involvement. According to information available on the meeting, Rocca had sought an assurance albeit indirectly, from Nizami that the Islamic groups, particularly JEI would refrain from targeting US and Western interests in Bangladesh. She said the assurance was necessary as JEI had connections with Al Qaeda, Taliban, Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Toiba and other international terrorist groups. The response of JEI Amir was not known. Also whether he gave the assurance the American interlocutor had sought. Shortly after Rocca returned to Washington, another high ranking official arrived in Dhaka with a mandate from the State Department. The mission of Congressman Joseph Crowley, who also heads the Bangladesh Caucus, was to assess the situation in Bangladesh in the context of Hamas victory in the Palestine elections. The State Department viewed Hamas a little more favourably. In fact, the strategists at the State Department appeared happy to see the victory of Hamas. In their view the Hamas was strong, nationalistic, and free of corruption unlike PLO under Yasser Arafat. From this assessment flowed the considered opinion that ‘religious parties in Islamic countries are more or less free from corruption, which greatly appeals to the people’. Though much water has flown into the Padma, the US position remains unaltered on JEI that it is ‘a moderate’ Islamic party and that if there is any connection between the party and the extremists ‘it is at individual level’. Prior to December 2008 election that brought Sheikh Hasina’s Awami Party to power, the US Embassy officials in Dhaka were talking with the various political parties in including Awami League and BNP. These interactions were used to convey the American views on domestic scene. One view they freely expressed during these meetings was that the JEI was better placed to tackle the problem of terrorism as the party had the required credibility and wherewithal to put down the terrorists in the name of religion. The US diplomats went on to say that any political group other than JEI would find it difficult to contain the Islamic terrorists and avoid allegations of anti-religious bias. The post 9/11 (New York, September, 2001) period saw resurgence in activities of religious extremist elements in Bangladesh. Islamic groups including JEI staged several anti-American demonstrations and took out processions through out the country condemning the US action in Afghanistan and glorifying Taliban and Al Qaeda. The most scathing attack on the US, however, came from Maulana Obaidul Haque, the Khatib of the Baitul Mukarram National Mosque and a spiritual leader. Addressing an Eid congregation (Dec 16, 2001), he described America as a ‘terrorist state’ and urged his followers to destroy American interests the world over. BNP-led Govt of the day in which JEI was a partner distanced itself from the Khatib’s remarks. But senior JEI leader and a former law maker, Delwar Hossain Syedi issued a statement justifying the Khatib’s remarks. He said the Maulana was reflecting the opinion of the JEI and Muslims of the country and added these views ‘need not necessarily converge’ with the Govt’s official stand. Syedi now finds a place in the ‘US No Fly’ list by. The US Administration told the Bangladesh Biman, the national carrier of Bangladesh not to include Syedi in any of its flights to America. This action is taken because of his links with international terrorist network of Al Qaeda and Taliban, the State Department said, which has also designated HUJI-B as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist. HUJI-B has a pronounced anti-US agenda. Many of its cadres joined the Afghan war to assist the Taliban. Its leader Fazlul Rahman was one of the five signatories to Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa that had declared a ‘Holy War’ on the US. A year after the fatwa, President Bill Clinton was on a visit to Dhaka. But the visit was cut short as the FBI perceived grave threat from the HUJI-B. Apart from HUJI-B, other Bangladesh militant group which has a strong anti-US orientation is JMB. Abdur Rahman, Bangla Bhai and other top leaders of the outfit had revealed their links with international terrorist groups before their execution in 2007. When they were still in police custody, the US made no attempt to interrogate them. Now with their execution many vital clues related to international terror campaign seem to have been lost. Before their execution, Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai had disclosed the name of their patrons that included many senior JEI leaders including its chief Matiur Rahman Nizami. Both HUJI-B and JMB are patronized by JEI which is the fountainhead of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh. Maulana Md Abu Taher and Md Kamruzzaman, both Assistant Secretary Generals of JEI, are associated with militant activities. Kamruzzaman has been maintaining close links with the US based “Islamic Council of North America” (ICNA) and the US based mosques besides Middle East countries to generate funds for HUJI-B and JMB activities. JEI Chief Matiur Rahman Nizami visited the UK in Nov 2007 on invitation from JEI sympathizers at the East London Mosque and Muslim Center. The visit generated much heat. In fact, a section of the British media criticized the UK government for issuing a visa to him. A group of British lawyers even demanded Nizami’s deportation told the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith that Nizami’s presence in the UK was ‘not in public interest due to his active participation in perpetuation of war crimes that resulted in killing of millions of civilians in 1971’. Bangladesh emerged as a free country at the end of 1971 war that broke Pakistan into two. The British MP David Cameron raised the war criminal issue in the House of Commons. He also called for Nizami’s deportation. The Government, however, remained non-committal. Trial of 1971 war criminals is an important component of ruling Awami League’s agenda. Indeed, it is a national demand but Prime Minister Sheik Hasina plan has evoked a lukewarm response from the US. Washington has, in fact, issued a guarded statement on the issue urging Bangladesh "not to politicize" the trial of 1971 war criminals, saying that any politicization of the process could ‘weaken’ the country’s democratic fabric and progress Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake conveyed this view to Bangladesh when he visited Dhaka in June (2009). For reasons unclear, the American authorities appear to be not very keen on the trial of the war criminals of 1971. JEI had played a heinous role during the war of Bangladesh Independence. It collaborated with the Pakistani occupying forces in unleashing a reign of terror in the erstwhile East Pakistan to annihilate the freedom fighters. JEI crimes are well documents. Yet, the reluctance of Washington to side with Dhaka lends credence to the view that Pakistan had the tacit US support in the carnage. Many strategists have cautioned the US administration against unfettered support to JEI in Bangladesh as it would be difficult to deal with the party in future. They pointed out that the US-backed move of former Pak President Musharraf to remove Pakistan People’s Party leader Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif from the political scene had created a vacuum enabling the Islamic fundamentalist forces including JEI (Pak) to occupy the vacant space. The covert patronage and support of these fundamentalist forces had enabled emergence of Taliban in the Swat region, where the Islamist militants have created a ‘liberated zone’ and use that base to unleash a reign of terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan itself. Continued US support to Jamaat-e-Islami- Bangladesh could lead to a similar situation in Bangladesh as well in near future. Yet, the State Department is ignoring the ground reality. It means the American Administration is looking at Bangladesh through the Pakistani prism. Pakistan army and Bangladesh army are not of the same mould. Unlike in Pakistan, in Bangladesh is mostly apolitical. It doesn’t call the shots. While Pakistan has no history and culture of people’s movement (the recent lawyers movement is at best an aberration with some overseas patronage), all major political movements in Bangladesh were spearheaded by the Civil Society - political parties and students – both before and after the independence of the country. Obviously, the American stand on Pakistan and Bangladesh Islamic radical groups is a sequel to the growing perception that the war against terror, particularly the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, has been countenanced as war against Islam in the Muslim world. The presidency of George W Bush Junior has coincided with surge in pro-Islam and anti-US sentiments in all the Muslim countries. Islamic groups the world over have eulogized international terrorist leaders like Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar. This could encourage Islamist and terrorist groups to target US interests the world over. The prime concern of the US is safeguarding its interests in the Muslim countries by placating the major Islamic groups in these countries. It has also dawned on Washington that its interests would be better protected by mending fences with the Islamic radical groups across the world and not by antagonizing them any further. But such a policy has never paid dividends. Indeed it was time and again proved wrong as the very organizations, which were engaged by consecutive US administrations in the false hope of moderating their views, had turned around to condemn American policies and prompted extremist elements to attack US targets. American engagement encouraged the fundamentalist and extremist groups to go berserk in imposing their pan-Islamic terrorism against vulnerable democratic states like Bangladesh. The Obama administration’s policy of al Qaeda alone is its `enemy’ is not going to give any `comfort’ to its allies in Europe and Asia, who are victims of Islamist violence of various categories.