On 5 May, Myanmar’s Parliament approved enhanced military co-operation agreement with Russia. Lawmakers cutting across party lines supported the deal, not just the Tatmadaw (military) representatives.
This April, Myanmar purchased three Yak-130 fighter jets from Russian state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport. Last year, both sides resolved to cooperate in the fields of energy including nuclear energy, and health, despite objections from the United States and the European Union.
The increasing frequency of co-operative announcements between Russia and Myanmar reflects highlights strong and enduring diplomatic ties between the two countries. It also reflects the strong push that Russia is currently attempting to make into the South-East Asian geostrategic and economic arena.
Mirroring the “Pivot to Asia” of the United States, Russia has sought to expand its influence and ties in the region. The upcoming Russia-ASEAN Summit (19-20 May), to be held in Sochi, is reflective of this focus. Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed the hope that that the summit will focus on ‘regional security architecture’, as well as economic opportunities.
Security and the provision of military hardware have traditionally been areas of Russian strength but, with an economy being hit by the weight of European and US sanctions, Moscow will also be looking for new markets to help revive its stagnating economy. An increasing fear of being behind left in the wake of China and the United States, whose proactivity in the region has been well noted, must also inform Russia’s relatively newfound enthusiasm for South-East Asia.
Despite the status of Myanmar as one of the world’s last “frontier markets”, the United States has committed to renewing the legal framework for its sanctions against the country. The easing of trade and investment sanctions is set to continue, however, despite the continuation of the general framework. Some commentators argue that this duality allows the Obama Administration to retain leverage over the Myanmar military and political élites while allowing the private sector to benefit from trade and investment.
The Rohingya factor remains a thorny issue for US-Myanmar diplomacy, something it evidently does not for Russia. Nonetheless, the United States is likely to continue to step up its economic engagement, ensuring that neither Chinese domination of the Burmese market, nor a greater Russian presence there, are foregone conclusions.
Myanmar is still the host to one of the longest-running civil conflicts in recent history. The complex conflict involves numerous and ethnically diverse insurgent groups, the opium trade and the alleged involvement of external state actors, such as China.
Although ceasefire negotiations were finalised between eight insurgent groups in October 2015, seven groups had pulled out of negotiations. Russian military hardware and training is likely to aid the Tatmadaw in quelling this ongoing dissent. In considering this possibility, the 5 May agreement might be seen as an indication of unified political support for the swift pacification of the country by military means.