Indian officials’ assessments have routinely pointed at the IM’s connections with Pakistan, contending that without the continuing assistance that IM leaders receive from India’s western neighbor, the outfit’s potency would have been far more limited. Indian Home Ministry’s description of the IM says that it draws "motivation and sustenance from inimical forces operating from across the Western border." India claims that two of the IM’s founders, brothers Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, are based in Pakistan under the protection of state agencies including the ISI. Indeed, both Bhatkal brothers, along with top IM leaders such as Abdul Subhan Qureshi and Sadiq Israr Sheikh, have undergone training in the LeT camps in Pakistan. Their names are regularly included in the list of persons, both Indian and Pakistani nationals, whom India wants Islamabad to deport from Pakistani territory. Interrogations of arrested IM cadres have revealed that several persons within Pakistan have extensive connections with the IM outfit. The Indian home minister has claimed that a number of IM cadres "were sent to Pakistan for training in weapon and explosives" and investigations "will throw valuable light on the role played by elements based in Pakistan in fomenting acts of terrorism in India."
Pakistani nationals have taken a direct part in a few of the IM’s operations in India. Among the six IM cadres arrested in the 2010 Jama Masjid attack in Delhi was a Pakistani operative. Zia-ur-Rehman (alias Mohammad Waqas), who served as the principal explosive assembler for the IM and was arrested in the Indian state of Rajasthan on 21 March 2014, also is from Pakistan. Inversely, the IM’s Pakistani connection is a natural corollary of the fact that its leaders are based in Pakistan and their actions are believed to be directed by the state and by allied non-state agencies like the LeT. According to a report, the LeT and the ISI could have influenced individuals and modules within the IM, even to the point of promoting specific attacks. However, whether such nexus, safe haven, and ad hoc support translates into "strict command and control over the entire IM network, which is significantly decentralised," as the report claims, remains a matter of debate.
Contrary to the definitive official assertions linking the IM to its Pakistani sponsors, some recent accounts have pointed to a significant level of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the IM ranks and to the outfit’s ability to carry out attacks without any external help. Stephen Tankel’s extensive 2014 report on the IM suggested that this jihadist movement constitutes "an internal security issue with an external dimension." Indian media reports have also underlined that the IM "works on its own and recent attacks have shown that they have carried out blasts with no support from Pakistan." Theories about the functional independence and self-sufficiency of the IM explain, to an extent, the IM’s unique operational dynamics and success.
At the same time, however, none of the reports and theories points to a severing of ties between the IM and its Pakistani mentors. On the contrary, the IM’s achievement of a level of self-sufficiency indicates the fruition of the LeT/ISI strategy to portray the IM as a wholly homegrown terror formation—a key ingredient of Pakistan’s clandestine destabilization project, known to Indian officials as the Karachi Project. In the words of an unnamed intelligence official, "While it would not be right to say that there is no Pakistan patronage any more, the fact is that Inter Services Intelligence, the Pakistani spy agency, and the Lashkar-e-Tayiba have ensured that the IM becomes self-sufficient."IM cofounder and senior leader Syed Mohammed Ahmed Zarar Sidibapa (alias Yasin Bhatkal, hailing from the same village as the two Bhatkal brothers), following his arrest on 29 August 2013, revealed that the IM wished to become a part of the global jihad. The realization of such an arguably pretentious and grandiose dream can only be facilitated by the LeT.
Cadre Recruitment, Modules, and Linkages
IM modules comprising both tech-savvy and illiterate individuals sprang up in many of the medium-size and smaller cities of India. Each module is based on a formula: keep the cadre profile small and maintain a mixture of new and energetic as well as experienced individuals. The modules’ cadres come from rural as well as urban areas, such as Azamgarh in the state of Uttar Pradesh, which is known to have contributed a large number of jihadists to the Indian theaters of conflict, and Seethio, a nondescript village in Jharkhand state that is far away from the radar of the Indian intelligence agencies. The IM had set up a module in Ranchi, Jharkhand, code-named Machhli-5 (Fish-5), to assassinate Narendra Modi, the (then) prime ministerial candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). According to intelligence sources, a module had also been planned in Nepal.
Each IM module replicates the model popularized by al Qaeda: it is functionally independent, although finances are centrally disbursed by the IM’s top leadership. Such functional independence maintains a regime of insularity between the modules, protecting the other modules and the IM in the event that a particular module is compromised.
The IM’s seemingly uncomplicated organizational model, however, achieved some degree of complexity with reports of a three-way split within the IM in late 2008. On 14 May 2008, a day after the IM executed serial explosions in the city of Jaipur, killing 80 people and injuring 216 others, an e-mail sent to the media claimed that the IM now had three wings: "the Shahbuddin Ghouri group to attack southern India, the Mahmood Ghaznavi group operating in north India, and the Shaheed Al Zarqawi group that executed suicide attacks." The IM’s identification of the three groups, which were named after historical Muslim invaders and al Qaeda leaders, was mostly a propaganda exercise. Later in 2008, however, the IM is known to have split into three factions in actuality.
Following the Batla House encounter in New Delhi in September 2008, in which two IM cadres were killed and two others arrested, IM founding members Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, based in Pakistan, are believed to have tried to gain complete control over the IM’s operations. This initiative, which was accompanied by allegations of improper spending of funds by Iqbal, created a rift between the Bhatkal brothers and senior member Amir Reza Khan. Khan decided to operate separately with his own set of people and formed the second IM faction. The third faction of the IM is headed by Mirza Shadaab Beg and Mohammad Sajid, both hailing from Azamgarh. Beg and Sajid are part of the first IM module that executed blasts from 2006 onward at various places, including in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Mumbai, and Delhi. Beg is also accused of having participated in the 2007 blasts in Gorakhpur and Varanasi. Despite the divisions among the IM factions, available evidence suggests that the factions’ top leaders maintain their independence while remaining in constant communication with one another, seeking advice and assistance.
Although the SIMI effectively disbanded itself in 2001, following its official proscription in India and subsequent governmental actions targeting SIMI cadres and facilities, it continued to provide significant support to the IM cadres. According to an estimate, by 2000, roughly three years before the IM’s creation, the SIMI had some 400 ansars (full-time workers) and 20,000 ikhwans (sympathizers) in addition to a cell for young children aged seven to 11, called the Shahin Force. This significant mass of people comprised lower-middle- and middle-class families who were energized by the message of Islam’s preeminence over the decadent and immoral West and a polytheistic Hinduism. It would be correct to assume that by the time the IM achieved some influence in 2005, most of the SIMI cadres who had not become foot soldiers of the IM became its ikhwans.
The SIMI cadres continue to provide shelter and gathering space for IM cadres who are attempting to evade security forces following an operation. Among the many examples of this collaboration between the two groups is an episode in which four IM operatives involved in the Patna explosions in October 2013 were hidden in Chhattisgarh for a fortnight by a group of erstwhile SIMI activists. According to intelligence sources, certain IM cadres are responsible for maintaining a steady linkage with the SIMI. These include Hyder Ali, who is wanted in connection with the Patna explosions, and Abu Faisal, who is suspected of devising a plot to kill three judges because they handed down an allegedly pro- Hindu judgment in the Babri Masjid bombing.
Tools of Terror
Aside from the lone drive-by shooting incident at Jama Masjid in Delhi in 2010, the IM’s modus operandi has involved planting explosives in crowded places and is geared toward two objectives: maintaining the bomb planter’s anonymity and maximizing casualties. Within this tightly defined mode of operation, the IM has benefited from its highly diversified, flexible, and cost-effective explosives manufacturing process.
To begin with, the IM’s mode of manufacturing explosives involves a central bomb-making expert, believed to be Mohammad Waqas, the IM Pakistani national. Waqas was described as suffering from a facial paralysis that necessitated frequent visits to doctors within India, a story that allowed Waqas, over time, to pass on his techniques to a select band of Indian IM recruits during his stays in the country. This group included Yasin Bhatkal, one of the IM’s founding members. To carry out explosions on an array of targets while maximizing fatalities, the IM requires a large number of IED assemblers to fulfill the needs of its different modules. After his explosives training with Waqas, Bhatkal in turn went on to train other IM cadres in the techniques.
The strategy of having an array of explosives assemblers, however, backfired to some extent. Starting in 2010, three of the IM’s bombing campaigns—at the Jama Masjid, Pune, and Bodh Gaya—were largely unsuccessful. Many of the planted explosives either could not be detonated or were ineffective in their impact. Forensic experts who examined the unexploded bombs identified problems in the circuitry of the devices, among other issues. It is probable that the learning process for IED assembly in these cases was somewhat incomplete.
On many occasions, senior leaders like Yasin Bhatkal also doubled as planters of explosives, indicating that the IM is indeed non-hierarchical and fully geared toward achieving its objectives. This further upholds the organization’s operational principle of keeping its module strength small and maximizing the output of every member.
The IM has manufactured its explosives predominantly using locally available chemicals. As a result, its IEDs contain less research department explosive (known as RDX), which has to be imported from foreign countries and is thus both harder to procure and more easily traceable than local products. Ammonium nitrate, which continues to be available in the Indian markets even after a 2011 sale ban by the government, has remained a primary component in the IM’s explosives throughout the group’s bomb-making career. On some occasions, nitro-gelatin sourced from private suppliers has also been used in IM explosives. Police sources reveal that the IM may be using stolen industrial explosives as well for manufacturing its IEDs. While the explosive content of the IM’s IEDs has remained more or less the same, the IM has attempted to bring sophistication to the manufacturing process by experimenting with a variety of timers.
Shortcomings of Law Enforcement Agencies
Unlike the conflict-affected regions in India’s northeast, Jammu and Kashmir, and the states affected by left-wing extremism, where New Delhi uses a mix of force and development-centric approaches for conflict resolution, there isn’t an official Indian policy toward violence perpetrated by the Islamists. Some of the key elements of the investigative agencies’ anti-IM policy include pursuing IM cadres who are involved in particular attacks and targeting their networks, financial channels, and explosives manufacturing. Strengthening intelligence, hardening targets, and recruiting security-force personnel have also been key strategies to neutralize the IM game plan. This largely reactive approach has appeared successful in the event of a terrorist arrest, seizure of explosives, or raid of a module, but looks far less successful when the IM has managed to carry out its bombings.
Apart from India’s inability to pursue the IM leadership based in Pakistan and the largely unresponsive attitude of Islamabad toward antiterrorism, Indian law enforcement agencies’ overall policy suffers from three interlinked primary shortcomings: limited knowledge of the IM, increasing sectarian polarization in Indian politics with regard to the IM, and the Indian culture’s apathy toward in-depth research on counterterrorism.
Limited Knowledge of the IM
The 29 August 2013 arrest of IM cofounder/leader Yasin Bhatkal has been the biggest achievement so far for the NIA vis-à-vis the IM. According to a statement issued by India’s home minister, Bhatkal was arrested along with his associate Asadullah Akhtar (alias Tabrez) while "planning to meet in East Champaran area (near Raxaul), Bihar to plan/execute some terrorist acts." Other media reports, however, indicated that both of these terrorists were arrested in Nepal and deported to India. The Nepalese government has denied that the arrests occurred on its soil, while at the same time asserting that no anti-India activity would be allowed in Nepal. The confusion around the exact location of the arrest notwithstanding, Bhatkal’s arrest provided the intelligence agencies with some new inputs regarding the operational dynamics of the IM organization. The NIA nevertheless has struggled to transform those inputs into tactical advantages against the outfit. It is not clear whether the huge workload of the NIA, which is in charge of a large number of terror incidents in addition to the IM’s activities, is taking a toll on the agency’s capacities.
Culture’s Apathy toward Counter-terrorism Research
Although the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs and the intelligence agencies are largely insular institutions and fairly impervious to interventions from outside the country, the efforts they have made to delve deeper into the IM’s operations have been thwarted by a general cultural disinterest in strategic research. Research institutions and think tanks in India have often shied away from research on terrorism. In the absence of primary, field-based research—a dearth reflected by the fact that one lone book on the IM has been published so far—the ill-informed news media have dominated reporting on security issues.
The Prognosis
The threat from the IM could easily transform into a much larger menace if this terrorist juggernaut remains unaddressed both inside India and in countries like Pakistan, where key IM leaders are based. While arrests of IM cadres within India may provide temporary setbacks for the IM’s plan of action, its expanded presence in multiple Indian states makes it elimination-proof. Terrorist groups like the LeT are willing to play a supporting role to the IM, as long as the latter continues to inflame the Muslim-Hindu divide in India and batter the country with its hate and bombing campaigns. The year 2014 and beyond could prove to be important for the IM’s future, especially if instability in Afghanistan continues to fuel the capacities of Pakistan-based terrorist groups as well as the IM.
—By Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray and Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza
(Dr Routray is a Singapore-based security analyst and consultant; Dr. D’Souza is a research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore).