Policy Research Group   - Strategic Insight: UN Commission Report on Benazir's murder: Part -I

UN Commission Report on Benazir's murder: Part -I
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. on 03 May, 2010 07:05:00
 
On 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto
was assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the Pakistani
city of
Rawalpindi.  In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and 91
injured.
After a request from the Government of Pakistan and extensive consultations with
Pakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security
Council,
the Secretary-General appointed a three member Commission of Inquiry to
determine
the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former prime minister. 
The
duty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and
bringing
them to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities.
The Secretary-General appointed Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz, the Permanent
Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of the Commission as well
as
Mr Marzuki Darusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter
FitzGerald, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda
Siochána.
The Commission commenced its activities on 1 July 2009 and provided its report
to
the Secretary-General on 30 March 2010.
In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support from
the
Government of Pakistan and many of its citizens. The Commissioners and staff
traveled frequently to Pakistan in the furtherance of its mandate. The
Commission
conducted more than 250 interviews, meeting with Pakistani officials and private
citizens, foreign citizens with knowledge of the events in Pakistan and members
of
the United Kingdom Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigated
aspects of the assassination. The Commission also reviewed hundreds of
documents,
videos, photographs and other documentary material provided by Pakistan’s
federal
and provincial authorities and others.
The Commission also met with representatives of other governments such as
Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Some relevant senior officials were not made available to the Commission, but
the
Commission is satisfied that this did not hinder its ability to establish the
facts and
circumstances of the assassination. Pertinent information from these sources,
including on threats to Ms Bhutto, nevertheless, was already in the possession
of
Pakistani authorities and eventually came to be known by the Commission.
The Commission was mystified by the efforts of certain high-ranking Pakistani
government authorities to obstruct access to military and intelligence sources,
as
revealed in their public declarations. The extension of the mandate until 31
March
enabled the Commission to pursue further this matter and eventually meet with
some
past and present members of the Pakistani military and intelligence services.
The report addresses the political and security context of Ms Bhutto’s return
to
Pakistan; the security arrangements made for her by the Pakistani authorities,
who
bore the primary responsibility to protect her, as well as her political party,
the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP); events immediately before and after the
assassination;
and the criminal investigations and actions of the Pakistani Government and
police in
the aftermath of the crime.
Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 and assassination on 27
December 2007 culminated a year of intense political conflict, revolving largely
around the elections scheduled for later that year and their potential for
opening a
transition to democracy after eight years of military rule.  It was also one of
the most
violent years in Pakistani history.  She returned in the context of a tenuous
and
inconclusive political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a
process
facilitated by the United Kingdom and the United States.
Ms Bhutto’s assassination could have been prevented if adequate security
measures
had been taken.  The responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security on the day of her
assassination rested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and
the
Rawalpindi District Police.  None of these entities took the necessary measures
to
respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew she
faced.
The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully aware of and
tracking the serious threats to Ms. Bhutto, did little more than pass on those
threats to
her and to provincial authorities and were not proactive in neutralizing them or
ensuring that the security provided was commensurate to the threats.  This is
especially grave given the attempt on her life in Karachi when she returned to
Pakistan on 18 October 2007.
The PPP provided additional security for Ms. Bhutto.  The Commission recognizes
the heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves to
protect her; however, the additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked
leadership and were inadequate and poorly executed.
The Rawalpindi district police’s actions and omissions in the immediate
aftermath of
the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the crime scene and
failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable damage to the
investigation.  The investigation into Ms Bhutto’s assassination, and those
who died
with her, lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a lack of
commitment to
identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice.  While she died when a 15
and a
half year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle, no one
believes that this boy acted alone.
Ms. Bhutto faced threats from a number of sources; these included Al-Qaida, the
Taliban, local jihadi groups and potentially from elements in the Pakistani
Establishment.  Yet the Commission found that the investigation focused on
pursuing
lower level operatives and placed little to no focus on investigating those
further up
the hierarchy in the planning, financing and execution of the assassination.
The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and other
government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth.  More
significantly, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) cond ucted parallel
investigations,
gathering evidence and detaining suspects.  Evidence gathered from such parallel
investigations was selectively shared with the police.
The Commission believes that the failure of the police to investigate
effectively Ms
Bhutto’s assassination was deliberate.  These officials, in part fearing
intelligence
agencies’ involvement, were unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue
actions,
which they knew, as professionals, they should have taken.
It remains the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities to carry out a
serious, credible
criminal investigation that determines who conceived, ordered and executed this
heinous crime of historic proportions, and brings those responsible to justice. 
Doing
so would constitute a ma jor step toward ending impunity for political crimes in
this
country.
I.    Introduction
1.    On 27 December 2007, former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir
Bhutto was assassinated as she left a campaign event at Liaquat Bagh, in the
Pakistani
city of Rawalpindi.  In the attack on Ms Bhutto, 24 other people were killed and
91
injured.
2. In May 2008, the Government of Pakistan requested the Secretary-General of
the United
Nations to establish an international commission for the purpose of
investigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto.  After extensive consultations
with
Pakistani officials as well as with members of the United Nations Security
Council,
the Secretary-General decided to appoint a three member Commission of Inquiry to
determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of the former prime
minister.  It was agreed with the Government of Pakistan that the international
commission should be fact-finding in nature and not be a criminal investigation.
 The
duty of carrying out a criminal investigation, finding the perpetrators and
bringing
them to justice, remains with the competent Pakistani authorities.  On the basis
of this
agreement, the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Security Council,
on 2
February 2009, informing of his wish to accede to the request and establish a
three
member Commission of Inquiry.  The President of the Security Council responded
on
3 February 2009 and took note with appreciation of the intention stated in
theSecretary-
General’s letter.  That exchange of letters, including the agreed terms of
reference of
the Commission, is attached as Annex.
3.    The Secretary-General appointed in February 2009 Ambassador Heraldo
Muñoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations as head of
the
Commission.  Two additional Commissioners were later appointed: Mr Marzuki
Darusman, a former Attorney-General of Indonesia, and Mr Peter FitzGerald, a
former Deputy Commissioner of the Irish Police, the Garda Siochána.  The
Commissioners were supported by a small staff that included professionals with
expertise in criminal investigation, law and political affairs.
4.    The Commission was mandated to submit its report to the Secretary-General
within six months from the start of its activities.  The Secretary-General was
to share
the report with the Government of Pakistan and submit it to the Security Council
for
information.  The Commission was to commence its activities on a date to be
determined by the Secretary-General and officially communicated to the
Government
of Pakistan. The Secretary-General announced the commencement of activities of
the
Commission of Inquiry on 1 July 2009, after a period during which the
Secretariat
raised voluntary funds to support the work of the Commission and built its
staffing
and administrative structure.  In December 2009, the Secretary-General announced
an
extension of three months of the Commission’s mandate to 31 March.
5.    The Commissioners travelled to Pakistan in July and September 2009 and in
February 2010 in furtherance of the inquiry.  They met with and interviewed a
wide
range of Pakistanis, both officials and private citizens.  They also conducted
interviews at locations outside Pakistan and met with representatives of other
governments.  Commission staff travelled frequently to Pakistan during the
mandate
period.  Commissioners and staff conducted more than 250 interviews with
Pakistanis
and others both inside and outside Pakistan.  Many of the persons interviewed by
the
Commission requested anonymity.  Therefore, the report does not include a list
of
those interviewed.  The Commission also reviewed hundreds of documents, videos,
photographs and other documentary material provided by federal and provincial
authorities in Pakistan and others.
6.    In the course of its inquiry, the Commission received significant support
from
the Government of Pakistan and many of its citizens.  The Commission wishes to
express its gratitude for this cooperation.  At the United Nations, Pakistan’s
Permanent Representative, Ambassador Abdullah Haroon, provided valuable support
as well. The Commission was mystified, however, by the efforts of certain high-
ranking government officials to obstruct access to Pakistani military and
intelligence
sources, as revealed in their public declarations.  The extension of the mandate
until
31 March enabled the Commission, among other things, to pursue further this
matter
and eventually meet with some past and present members of the military and
intelligence agencies.  The Commission also made contact with representatives of
several foreign governments and, in some cases, with their intelligence
services.
Pertinent information from these sources, including on threats to Ms Bhutto,
nevertheless was already in the possession of Pakistani authorities and
eventually
came to be known by the Commission.
7.    This report sets out the Commission’s findings on the facts and
circumstance of
Ms Bhutto’s assassination.
II. Facts and Circumstances
A. Political Context
8.    Ms Bhutto’s assassination occurred against the backdrop of a political
power
struggle in Pakistan over the continuation of military rule under General Pervez
Musharraf, the President of Pakistan, or the restoration of
democratically-elected
civilian government.  Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan was a flashpoint in this
struggle,
the outcome of which would have significant consequences for the country’s
major
political actors.  In addition, as will be described below, 2007 was an
exceptionally
violent year in Pakistan, which saw sharp increases in violence carried out by
Islamist
extremists and by the state.
Political assassination and impunity in Pakistan
9.    Ms Bhutto’s assassination was not the first time in Pakistan’s brief
national
history that a major political figure had been killed or died in an untimely
fashion.
The country’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951
in the
same park where Ms Bhutto was assassinated; the assassin was killed by police on
the
spot, but broader responsibilities, including who might have been behind the
killing
have never been established.  Ms Bhutto’s father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
president of
Pakistan from 1971-73 and prime minister from 1973-77, was deposed in a military
coup in 1977, charged with the murder of a political opponent’s father and
hanged in
1979.  Many believe that the judicial process against Mr Bhutto was deeply
flawed
and politically-motivated.  Later, General Zia ul Haq, the military leader who
deposed
Mr Bhutto and ruled Pakistan for 11 years, died in a plane crash together with
the
United States ambassador to Pakistan in 1988; investigations by the United
States and
Pakistan into the crash came to conflicting conclusions, and it remains the
object of
much speculation.  Other killings of political figures that have never been
solved
include the deaths of Ms Bhutto’s two brothers, Shahnawaz, who was killed in
France
in 1985 and Murtaza, killed in Pakistan in 1997.  The list continues to grow,
more
recently with the killings, among others, of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a 79-year old
Balochi nationalist leader in a military operation in August 2006 and three
other
Balochi nationalist leaders in April 2009, including Ghulam Mohammed Baloch.
10.    There has been little concerted effort by law enforcement and justice
sector
institutions to bring to justice those who planned, supported, financed or
carried out
these and similar crimes.  This situation has contributed to a widespread
expectation
of impunity in cases of political killings.  People do not expect the
perpetrators –
beyond those at the lowest levels – to be identified and brought to justice.
Political and security context
11.    Ms Bhutto’s return and assassination culminated a year of intense
internal
political conflict in Pakistan.  This revolved, in large measure, around the
elections
scheduled for late 2007, with their potential both for opening a transition to
democracy after eight years of military rule and for engendering significant
changes
in the political forces that would head the new government.  It was also one of
the
most violent years in Pakistani history, with dramatic increases both in
extremist
attacks carried out by radical Islamists against local targets, including
suicide
bombings, and in the use of force by the authorities against opposition
movements.
Finally, the year unfolded in a context of heightened international concerns
about the
strength of the Taliban and Al-Qaida in the region and increased pressures on
Pakistan to take on a heavier role in the fight against them.
12.    Pakistan had been under military rule since 1999, when General Musharraf,
Chief of Army Staff, led a military coup that deposed an elected government. 
His
regime first suspended the constitution and then modified it to provide a legal
framework for the government and to strengthen presidential powers.  Within that
framework, power was concentrated in the person of General Musharraf, who, after
elections in 2002, was both Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan.  With
this
dual authority, General Musharraf drew on the power of the military, while at
the
same time building an alliance of political parties in the national and
provincial
assemblies, which ensured additional control over other important power centres.
This alliance included the Pakistani Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), which
controlled the provincial government in Punjab, the country’s largest and
wealthiest
province, and in Sindh; the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) with its historic
base in Karachi; and, during most of the period, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA), which comprised the bulk of the Islamist parties.  General Musharraf’s
decision to consent to the United States request for Pakistani collaboration in
the war
on terror after 11 September 2001 also meant that he enjoyed the firm backing of
the
United States and its western allies.
13.    General Musharraf also had the full support of what is known in Pakistan
as the
“Establishment”, the de facto power structure that has as its permanent core
the
military high command and intelligence agencies, in particular, the powerful,
military-run the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as well as Military
Intelligence (MI)
and the Intelligence Bureau (IB).  The capability of the Establishment to
exercise
power in Pakistan is based in large part on the central role played by the
Pakistani
military and intelligence agencies in the country’s political life, with the
military
ruling the country directly for 32 of its 62 years as an independent state. 
General
Musharraf finally stepped down as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on 28 November
2007, handing the post over to his hand-picked successor, General Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani.  This did not, however, change the military nature of the regime.
14.    The post of prime minister has been suspended five times in Pakistan
due to martial law or another form of military interventio n, and no elected
civilian prime
minister has ever served a full five-year term in Pakistan.  Most were deposed
or
dismissed through some form of direct or indirect military intervention.  Before
the
election of 2007, Ms Bhutto, as the head of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had
twice served as prime minister, from December 1988 to August 1990 and from
October 1993 to November 1996.  Her first government ended after just 20 months,
and her second lasted less than three years.  Both times, she was dismissed by
the
sitting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari, respectively, based on
allegations of corruption and nepotism.  While both men were civilians, each had
close ties to the military.  Ms Bhutto and the PPP believed that it was the
military, or
more broadly, the Establishment, that forced her out.
15.    By 2007, when new parliamentary elections and the Electoral College vote
for
the presidency were scheduled, there were increasing pressures for an end to
direct
military rule, both internally and internationally, including from the United
Kingdom
and the United States.  Pakistan’s two main opposition political parties, Ms
Bhutto’s
PPP and the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), had put aside their long-term
rivalry and worked together since early 2005 to define a common framework for a
return to democratic rule.  This agreement, the “Charter for Democracy”, was
signed
in May 2006 by Ms Bhutto and Mr Nawaz Sharif, the respective leaders of the PPP
and the PML-N.
16.    Tensions deepened in the country after 9 March 2007, when General
Musharraf
suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.  The Government brought an
action for his removal based on allegations of his interference in matters
before the
lower courts and the abuse of power to gain favours for his son and to access
state
resources beyond those due his office.  Nonetheless, numerous observers have
identified two key issues at stake, both central to the political context.  The
first
involved Supreme Court actions to summon and question senior military and
intelligence officials in dozens of cases of people who had disappeared in
recent
months, brought by relatives who feared they had been illegally detained by
state
security forces.  The Government maintained that the Court was undermining its
efforts to combat terrorist groups.  The second issue pertained to the
composition of
the Court and its increasingly independent decisions, which took on great
relevance,
given its authority to determine the legality of the upcoming presidential
election,
which was certain to face constitutional challenges.
17.    Public response against General Musharraf’s action was strong,
especially from
legal professionals, who cited the actions as a clear infringement on judicial
independence.  Organized by the country’s Supreme Court Bar Association and
local
bar associations, they held scores of public debates, rallies and street
demonstrations
calling for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice.  This opposition soon became
the
“lawyers’ movement”, growing over the year into one of the largest mass
movements
in Pakistan’s history, as it galvanized a broad range of sentiments opposed to
continued
military rule.  The movement became a key factor in the political dynamics that
year,
and its activities formed a backdrop for the intensifying struggle for
political power.
18.    Chief Justice Chaudhry was reinstated on 20 July 2007, by a 13-member
panel
of the Supreme Court.  The dispute had not only sparked mass public protests, it
also
led to an unusually well-documented disclosure of participation by Pakistan’s
intelligence agencies in political and judicial matters.  Chief Justice
Chaudhry’s
affidavit to the Supreme Court in reference to the charges against him described
how
he was called to Army House by General Musharraf and told that he was being
suspended.  General Musharraf was accompanied at the meeting by Prime Minister
Shaukat Aziz, five other active duty generals and one brigadier, including the
Directors General of MI, the ISI and the IB and the President’s military Chief
of
Staff.  Affidavits by the Directors General of MI and the IB as well as the
president’s
Chief of Staff were presented as part of the Government’s case against the
Chief
Justice.
19.    The year also saw a dramatic increase in political violence both by the
state and
by radical Islamists.  Thousands of participants in the demonstrations called by
the
lawyers’ movement were beaten and jailed; its leaders were put in solitary
confinement, and many charged with terrorism or sedition.  Police raided at
least two
major television stations, some 250 journalists were arrested in the course of
the year
and severe restrictions were placed on the media.  At the same time, reports by
credible human rights organizations documented the disappearance of hundreds of
Balochi nationalists and the extrajudicial killings of some, whom the government
claimed were members of Islamist terrorist groups.  Staged “encounters” in
which
detained terrorism suspects were killed by security forces, were on the rise, as
well;
according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 234 people were killed in
police encounters in Punjab province alone.
20.    There was a steep increase in extremist violence by radical Islamists,
especially
after the government’s attack in July on pro-Taliban militants and their
supporters at
the Red Mosque, in the heart of Islamabad, which led to a week-long battle.  The
Special Investigations Group of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which
supports investigations in these cases, informed the Commission that 44 suicide
bombings took place in 2007, killing some 614, a dramatic rise from eight such
incidents in 2006.  Of these bombings, 35 occurred after the Red Mosque siege.
Credible non-governmental sources put the total number of suicide bombings at
closer to 70, with more than 900 dead.  The territorial reach of these actions
was
significant, with suicide bombings occurring in the North West Frontier
Province,
Punjab and Sindh and most major cities, including the capital, Islamabad, and
Rawalpindi, where Army Headquarters is located.  Suicide bombings and other
attacks were often directed against police and military personnel.  Other
attacks were
carried out in public places, causing many civilian casualties.
21.    The government’s long-running campaigns against radical Islamist
militants
punctuated by intermittent truce attempts, particularly in the Federally
Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Swat region of the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP), faced serious difficulties in 2007.  In July, shortly after the Red
Mosque
siege, militants declared an end to a ten month truce in Waziristan and launched
a
series of bombing attacks that took 70 lives in just two days.  The military
suffered
important losses in the region, with at least 250 soldiers taken as hostages in
August
by the Taliban, led by Baitullah Mehsud.  After negotiations between the
government
and Mr Mehsud, the hostages were exchanged in November for about 57 captured
militants.  Earlier, in Swat, the NWFP provincial government, closely allied to
General Musharraf, had struck a truce in May 2007 with the
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah
Muhammadi, which eventually joined up with Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP).  The truce was seen by many analysts as giving the militants de
facto
control of Swat, but it soon broke down and fighting resumed there in September.
The negotiations for Ms Bhutto’s return
22.     Ms Bhutto left Pakistan to live in Dubai in 1998, two years after she
was
deposed as prime minister in November 1996.  She continued to lead the PPP
during
her nine years of self-imposed exile and was deeply involvement in party affairs
from
afar.  During this period, she fought against the corruption charges levelled
against
her in Pakistan, Spain and Switzerland, and struggled to have her husband, Asif
Ali
Zardari, released from Pakistani prison, where he faced charges both for
corruption
and his alleged involvement in the murder of Murtaza Bhutto.  In her final book,
Reconciliation, she wrote of the difficulties of being a persona non grata for
years in
international political circles because of the charges.  Her determination to
return to
full political life in Pakistan led her to engage in a dialogue toward this end
with
General Musharraf, despite her sharp criticism of his military government.
23.    Serious efforts at rapprochement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf
had begun in 2004.  Some of General Musharraf’s closest advisors told the
Commission that they encouraged him to open channels with Ms Bhutto believing
that it would be better if General Musharraf had a broader base of political
support for
his next presidential term and that there were sufficient common interests
between the
two to make such an alliance feasible.  A discrete process was set in motion,
with at
least five meetings in 2005 and 2006 between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf’s
team, which included Tarik Aziz, former Secretary of the National Security
Council,
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, then Director General of ISI and, in later
meetings,
Lt. General Hamid Javed, General Musharraf’s Chief of Staff.  While these
meetings
were important for identifying areas of common interest, they did not produce
any
concrete agreements.  To break the stalemate, a direct meeting between Ms Bhutto
and General Musharraf was arranged, and the two met secretly on 24 January 2007
in
Abu Dhabi.  They met again on 27 July in Abu Dhabi. She and a few close
advisers,
which included Mr Rehman Malik and Makhdoom Amin Fahim, had ongoing
contacts with General Musharraf’s team.
24.    The discussions were facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom
and the United States, which were deeply involved in the process.  Both
governments
gave priority to ensuring a continued leadership role for General Musharraf, as
they
believed this was vital for the ongoing war against terror, while at the same
time they
believed the effort could be strengthened with a credible civilian partner
heading the
government.  The United Kingdom played an early role (2004-05) in urging Ms
Bhutto and General Musharraf to engage in discussions and in encouraging the
United States to see Ms Bhutto as a potential partner.  Later, the United States
would
play an increasingly active role in persuading General Musharraf to agree to an
“accommodation” with Ms Bhutto.  Both General Musha rraf and Ms Bhutto had
numerous contacts about the process with United States State Department
officials at
the highest levels throughout 2007.
25.    In September 2007, after she announced the date she would return to
Pakistan,
Ms Bhutto began to raise her concerns and needs regarding her personal security
in
these discussions, especially with her contacts in the United States Government.
Representatives of the United States Government told the Commission that they
provided advice to Ms Bhutto on hiring Pakistani private security firms used by
diplomatic missions and spoke at least once with the Musharraf camp about her
security arrangements. The same officials said, however, that the United States
had
not accepted any responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security in Pakistan.  Other
sources
close to Ms Bhutto told the Commission that she had expected the United States
to
play a strong role in urging General Musharraf to provide her with all of the
security
support she needed.
26.    General Musharraf informed his close political allies, including the
PML-Q
leadership, about the process after his January 2007 meeting with Ms Bhutto.
Throughout the year, most of them continued to express their deep reservations,
even
arguing against seeking PPP support for General Musharraf’s re-election as
president,
confident that they could win alone, sure that they would carry the day in the
parliamentary elections and concerned that a broadened alliance would diminish
their
power.  Similarly, few in the PPP senior leadership believed that an alliance
with
General Musharraf would benefit the party.
27.    As recounted to the Commission by interlocutors from all parties to the
discussions, Ms Bhutto laid out several issues of concern in the meetings. The
most
central of these were: (i) her return to Pakistan to participate in politics;
(ii) free and
fair elections in 2007; (iii) Musharraf’s resignation from the Army; (iv)
amnesty in
the criminal cases against her and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari; and (v) the
elimination of the ban on third terms for former prime ministers, which would
impede
her from holding that office again. The same sources indicated that General
Musharraf’s chief goals were to accommodate international interests in having
Ms
Bhutto return and to ensure his continuity in power.
28.     Media coverage of the process led to a generalized perception that they
would
likely govern together after the elections, with General Musharraf continuing as
president
and Ms Bhutto serving as prime minister. A number of sources interviewed
by the Commission confirmed that this option had been under discussion, but that
the
outcome depended on the results of the general elections. The PML-Q leadership
had
also been assured by General Musharraf that if they won the elections, their
leader
Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, would become the next prime minister. Other options,
such
as Ms Bhutto becoming Senate Chairperson had also been raised. The specific
terms
of a power-sharing agreement between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf were fluid
and never unequivocally finalized.
29.    In August and September 2007, there were intense behind the scenes
discussions between Ms Bhutto and General Musharraf and their respective teams.
Both shared an increasing sense of urgency, but had different priorities. For Ms
Bhutto, the most pressing concern was the creation of a legal mechanism to
eliminate
old criminal corruption charges against her and her husband; for General
Musharraf,
the most immediate issue was ensuring PPP support for his re-election as
president.
After a meeting in Dubai, other meetings in Islamabad and many last minute
discussions, compromise agreements on both core issues were reached in the first
week of October, less than two weeks before Ms Bhutto’s announced return.
30.    Negotiations on the question of the old cases were turned over to
high-level
representatives of the PML-Q and PPP, who met in September at an ISI safe house
in
Islamabad at least twice.  During these and later meetings, they drafted what
would
become the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which provided a virtual
amnesty for political figures “found to have been falsely involved for
political reasons
or through political victimization in cases” brought against them between 1986
and
October 1999. On 5 October 2007, General Musharraf signed the NRO. On 6
October, General Musharraf was re-elected president by the Electoral College,
composed of the members of the sitting Parliament and Provincial Assemblies.
While the PPP members abstained from the vote, they stayed in the session, which
was required for a quorum after other opposition party members refused to
participate
and withdrew.  This allowed the PML-Q votes in favour of General Musharraf to
carry the day.
31.    According to several sources, General Musharraf was unable to convince
the
PML-Q to agree to support the lifting of the ban on third terms.  Party leaders
were
deeply opposed to the measure, as they feared it would ultimately diminish their
power, facilitate Mr Nawaz Sharif’s return and give a boost in the elections
to both
Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif.  Thus, there was never any agreement to create the
legal
possibility of a third term for Ms Bhutto.
32.    This situation increased the importance for Ms Bhutto that the elections
be
carried out in a free and fair manner.  She wrote extensively in her book,
Reconciliation, about election rigging in previous elections, detailing her
assertions
that the ISI and MI had played the key role in these actions. In addition to
this history,
there were well-documented problems with the voter lists in 2007, which had to
be
redone at mid-year, along with thousands of complaints from PPP and PML-N
activists that PML-Q authorities were preparing the ground for local rigging. 
Yet for
Ms Bhutto to become prime minister, the PPP would have to win the elections with
a
sufficient majority and build the needed alliances to ensure that, in a new
National
Assembly, they could pass legislation allowing a third term.  This placed
additional
pressure on her, not only to be vigilant on potential rigging, but also to carry
out a
vigorous public campaign to win votes.
Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan
33.    Ms Bhutto’s announcement on 14 September that she would return to
Pakistan
on 18 October 2007 to lead the PPP electoral campaign was made in this context. 
It
was also a major point of contention with General Musharraf.  He and others
close to
him believed that he had a firm agreement with her that she would return only
after
the elections, then scheduled for November.  Several persons interviewed who
have
first-hand knowledge of the situation told the Commission that General Musharraf
was furious when Ms Bhutto made her announcement and, according to one source,
believed that her action represented “a total breach of the agreement”. 
Other
informed sources said that Ms Bhutto seemed equally stunned by General
Musharraf’s reaction.
34.    The PPP had decided in July 2007 at a meeting of its Central Executive
Committee meeting in London that Ms Bhutto would continue to head the party,
that
her participation in the campaign was critical to raising the chances of victory
and
that she would announce the date for her return in September.
35.    Throughout the negotiations, General Musharraf’s principal argument for
insisting that Ms Bhutto postpone her return until after the elections was
security
concerns. He and his team emphasized the threats against her by extremist groups
and
the great risks of campaigning.  When Ms Bhutto announced her decision to return
to
campaign, General Musharraf’s team reiterated those arguments to her, as they
continued to do after her return.
36.    While Ms Bhutto expressed to many of her closest associates her fears
about
these and other threats, they say that she did not fully trust the warnings on
threats
that General Musharraf and his government passed on to her.  According to
diverse
sources, she had a clear understanding of the serious risks she faced.  However,
Ms
Bhutto believed that General Musharraf was using the security issue as a ploy to
intimidate her, to keep her out of Pakistan and to prevent her from campaigning.
 Ms
Bhutto’s underlying distrust of General Musharraf and her fears that the
elections
would be rigged led her to carry out a very active campaign, with much public
exposure, despite the risks she faced.
37.    On 18 October 2007, Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan from exile, flying
into
Karachi from Dubai. Her husband stayed behind, a deliberate decision made on
security grounds.  Enormous crowds met her at the airport in Karachi and along
the
Sharea-e-Faisal highway, slowing the progress of her cavalcade to her
destination at
the mausoleum of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, where she had
intended to deliver a speech.  Shortly after midnight, near the Karsaz
neighborhood,
an explosion went off near the armoured truck in which she was riding.  A
second,
much more powerful explosion followed.  Ms Bhutto was not hurt, but many others
were, with the official toll put at 149 deaths and 402 injuries.
38.    Ms Bhutto stated shortly after the attack that she was not accusing the
government for the attack.  However, on 21 October 2007, she attempted to lodge
a
formal complaint in the form of a First Information Report (FIR) to supersede
the
Karachi police’s FIR, which she believed to be too narrow in scope. In her
FIR,
which was only registered long after her death, after a protracted court
process, she
referred to the threat against her posed by persons she named in a 16 October
2007
letter she sent to General Musharraf.  While Ms Bhutto’s FIR application does
not
name these persons, Pakistani and foreign media soon reported that Ms Bhutto’s
letter
referred to Lt.General (ret) Hamid Gul, Director General of MI under the General
Zia
ul-Haq dictatorship and Director General of the ISI during her first tenure as
prime
minister; Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, Director General of the IB and former ISI
official;
and Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, PML-Q Chief Minister of Punjab, one of General
Musharraf’s closest political allies.  The Ministry of the Interior later
discounted any
involvement by these men in the attack.
39.    The Sindh police investigation of the attack never advanced. A former
high-
level ISI official told the Commission, however, that the ISI conducted its own
investigation and near the end of October 2007, captured and detained four
suspects
from a militant cell; the whereabouts of these four could not be confirmed by
the
Commission as of March 2010.
40.    The relationship between General Musharraf and Ms Bhutto deteriorated
further
with General Musharraf’s decision on 3 November 2007 to declare emergency
rule,
suspend the constitution, promulgate a series of measures that amounted to
martial
law, and again sack Chief Justice Chaudhry, together with a number of other high
court justices.  The Chief Justice and two-thirds of the country’s senior
judges were
put under house arrest.  General Musharraf explained the decision as necessary
to
contain the rise in extremist violence.  Virtually all of the sources who spoke
with the
Commission about this decision, including some close to General Musharraf,
believe
that the decisive factor was, instead, the imminence of the Supreme Court ruling
regarding the legality of General Musharraf’s recent re-election as president
and his
eligibility to hold dual posts as president and Chief of Army Staff.  General
Musharraf believed that the Court was going to rule against him.
41.    Led by the PPP and PML-N, political protests flared throughout the
country
against the emergency rule measures and against military rule.  Violent
confrontations
between police and protestors occurred in a number of cities, with hundreds of
injuries reported in the media.  In November alone, the Government acknowledged
the arrest of some 5,000 protesters; a number of PPP and PML-N candidates were
among them.  Some in the PML-Q began to call for a postponement of the
elections,
adding an additional degree of uncertainty to the situation. On 9 November, Ms
Bhutto was briefly placed under house arrest.  The next day in a speech in
Islamabad,
she broke with General Musharraf, denouncing his actions, calling for an end to
the
military government and announcing that any deal with him was off.
42.    A number of sources close to the situation told the Commission that once
back
in Pakistan, Ms Bhutto increasingly understood that by contemplating plans for
governing together with General Musharraf, she risked having to share with him
the
growing public ire against his government. She feared that her on-going
political
relationship with him could potentially weaken her politically, diminish her
legitimacy and lessen possibilities for a solid PPP victory.
43.    While Ms Bhutto reportedly later re-established contacts with General
Musharraf through intermediaries, she turned more of her energies toward her
campaign and to strengthening her relationship with Mr Nawaz Sharif and the PML-
N.  On 25 November, Mr Sharif was allowed to return to Pakistan from Saudi
Arabia,
following a failed attempt in September when he was detained at the airport and
deported for violating the terms of an agreement that sent him into exile for 10
years
after he was deposed as prime minister by General Musharraf in 1999.  The PPP
and
the PML-N continued to discuss strategies for the elections, and in some
districts
decided to run a single candidate. Both Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif reconfirmed
their
commitment to the Charter of Democracy and believed that there could be a strong
PPP and PML-N alliance after the elections.
44.    General Musharraf lifted the emergency rule measures on 16 December.  Ms
Bhutto was assassinated 11 days later.  By the time of her assassination, the
possibility of rehabilitating the relationship between the two had clearly
waned.  The
Commission received no compelling evidence that either Ms Bhutto or General
Musharraf believed that she or he still needed the support of the other to
achieve their
ultimate political goals.
B.    Security arrangements for Ms Bhutto
Government security for Ms Bhutto
45.    As Ms Bhutto’s determination to return to Pakistan on a date of her
choosing
became clear, the Musharraf government began to make security arrangements for
her.  These arrangements included relaying intelligence warnings of threats
against
her, providing some security measures as well as deputing a police officer to
act as
Ms Bhutto’s liaison with local authorities.
Threat warnings
46.    The Commission reviewed numerous documents provided by the Ministry of
Interior as well as provincial governments that noted intelligence warnings of
threats
against Ms Bhutto.  The authenticity of these documents was confirmed through
numerous interviews.  These threat warnings were regularly communicated by the
Interior Ministry or intelligence agencies such as the ISI and (MI) directly to
Ms
Bhutto, and through Mr Rehman Malik and Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a police
officer deputed as her liaison and personal protection officer.
47.    The documents reveal significant threats to Ms Bhutto, particularly
around
three time periods – from just before her return to Pakistan in October, from
early to
mid-November, and from mid-to late December.  For instance, on 20 December, the
Military Operations Directorate informed Interior Secretary Syed Kamal Shah that
Usama bin Laden had ordered the assassination of General Pervez Musharraf, Ms
Bhutto and Maulana Fazal ur Rahman, a religious and political leader.  Another
warned that an attack on Ms Bhutto and Mr Malik could be launched on 21
December.
48.    The Commission was told by present and former senior officials of the ISI
that
they had received intelligence regarding threats to Ms Bhutto from
representatives of
the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  In the case of
the
United Arab Emirates, their officials confirmed to the Commission that
government
to government information sharing occurred.  The ISI officials stated that, on
at least
two occasions, representatives from both countries flew to Pakistan to provide
this
and other information, which generally coincided with their own.  Some threat
warnings were also relayed directly to Ms Bhutto or people close to her by
foreign
governments.  The Commission learned that one such instance occurred in Dubai
when she was urged by a high authority not to return due to the grave security
situation in Pakistan.  Ms Bhutto also mentioned in her final book that she was
given
specific information that four different groups were planning to send suicide
bombers
to attack her.  Mr Rehman Malik informed the Commission that he received
information from a “brotherly country” about another significant threat
aimed at Ms
Bhutto and himself.  Mr. Malik did not specify the details of the threat.
Notwithstanding the warnings received directly by Ms Bhutto or her aides, the
main
conduit of information flow regarding such warnings was between the ISI and
foreign
intelligence agencies.
49.    The Director General of the ISI, Major General Nadeem Taj, met with Ms
Bhutto in the early morning hours of 27 December at Zardari House in Islamabad.
Directly knowledgeable sources told the Commission that they spoke both about
the
elections and about threats to Ms Bhutto’s life; versions differ as to how
much detail
was conveyed about the threats.  The Commission is satisfied, that at the least,
Major
General Taj told Ms Bhutto that the ISI was concerned about a possible terrorist
attack against her and urged her to limit her public exposure and to keep a low
profile
at the campaign event at Liaquat National Bagh (Liaquat Bagh) later that day.
50.    The Interior Ministry, as a matter of routine, passed on many of these
threat
warnings, often in writing, to provincial authorities and advised them to take
“foolproof” security measures.  The Commission found that none of these
documents
contained clear and specific instructions to protect Ms Bhutto, and the federal
Government took no measures to ensure that its advice was followed by provincial
authorities.
51.    In meetings with the Commission, the then Interior Secretary Mr Syed
Kamal
Shah minimized the federal Government’s role in her security, noting that
these
communications from the federal Government were merely advisory since under
Pakistan’s federal structure, responsibility for policing and law and order
are with
provincial authorities.  Several senior federal and provincial officials,
however,
asserted to the Commission that it was rare for provincial authorities to ignore
or
reject a federal request.  “These are taken as instructions,” was how Mr
Khusro
Pervez, the then Home Secretary of Punjab, put it to the Commission.  Similar
views
were expressed by then Inspector General (IG) of Punjab Ahmed Nasim.  Moreover,
when the federal and provincial governments are headed by the same political
party
or alliance, as was the case in 2007, then it is even rarer for provincial
authorities to
ignore a federal request.
52.    The Commission has reviewed one Interior Ministry letter, dated 22
October
2007, which is clearly a federal directive.  Sent to all provincial governments,
it
orders them to provide stringent and specific security measures for Messrs.
Shaukat
Aziz1 and Chaudhry Shujat Hussain as ex-prime ministers.  Both were from the
PML-
Q party and were General Musharraf’s close allies.  The annex to the Interior
Ministry letter instructed provincial authorities to provide VVIP-level security
for the
two ex-prime ministers, listing the specific measures to be implemented. 
Despite a
search of their archives, at the request of the Commission, Punjab provincial
authorities could not find a similar directive from federal authorities in the
case of Ms
Bhutto, also an ex-prime minister.  The Commission was told by the then Interior
Secretary Mr Kamal Shah that the 22 October directive was the result of an
instruction from Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.  When asked why no such directive
was issued to safeguard Ms Bhutto, he did not provide a clear answer, noting
only
that federal authorities had issued a directive on 18 October to Sindh
provincial
authorities to protect Ms Bhutto when she arrived from exile.  The Commission
finds
it inexcusable that federal authorities did not issue a similarly clear
directive as the 22
October directive for ex-Prime Ministers Aziz and Hussain to protect Ms Bhutto.
This is all the more troubling as she had been attacked in Karachi just three
days prior
to the 22 October directive, and intelligence agencies had specific, on-going
and
credible threats to her.
Security measures
53.    Mindful of the complex security situation in Pakistan and of the threats
against
her, Ms Bhutto and her aides made frequent and specific requests to federal and
provincial governments to augment her security.  They asked for bullet-proof
vehicles
and vests, frequency jammers, permission to allow tinted windows for her
vehicles,
and additional trained security personnel as well as the Pakistani Rangers to
protect
her entourage and her residences.  The government partially acceded to these
requests.
54.    Among Ms Bhutto’s first requests was permission to be accompanied by a
foreign security detail when she returned to Pakistan from exile.  General
Musharraf
rejected the request on national sovereignty grounds.
55.    Federal and provincial authorities responded positively to some of Ms
Bhutto’s
requests.  For example, they posted policemen outside Zardari House in Islamabad
and Bilawal House in Karachi and provided some police escorts when she
travelled,
but these escorts were generally minimal.  The requests for jammers were met in
some cases, but the PPP often complained that they did not work properly.
Particularly in Sindh and the North West Frontier Provinces, the provincial
governments provided some security support for Ms Bhutto in response to several
specific requests by provincial and na tional PPP leaders, as well as by Ms
Bhutto’s
security officer Major Imtiaz.
56.    In November, citing security threats, the Government took two specific
and
controversial measures.  Acting on the request of the Punjab Home Department,
the
federal Government restricted Ms Bhutto from leaving Zardari House in Islamabad
on 9 November and thwarted a planned protest at Liaquat Bagh against General
Musharraf’s emergency declaration.  The Punjab Home Secretary also issued a
detention order against her on 9 November, citing the security threats against
her as
well as the vulnerability of the Liaquat Bagh venue to terror attacks.  Although
she
was allowed to venture outside Zardari House on 10 November, she was again put
under house arrest on orders of the Punjab Home Secretary in Lahore on 13
November, preventing her from leading a Long March for Democracy from Lahore to
Islamabad to protest emergency rule.
57.    Ms Bhutto, the PPP and many observers believed that these drastic
measures
were politically motivated.  The Punjab Chief Minister at that time, Mr Chaudhry
Pervaiz Elahi of the PML-Q, justified the house arrests as a preventive measure
for
her protection, considering the specific threats against her.  While security
may
indeed have been a consideration, given the circumstances and timing of the
house
arrests, politics also played a key role.  Indeed, one senior Interior Ministry
official
had no doubts that the motive for the house arrests was “political.”  Even
the Punjab
Home Secretary who issued both the detention orders told the Commission that
they
were for her protection and “administrative” reasons.
58.    On 26 December, the Peshawar police made stringent security arrangements
for
Ms Bhutto’s public meeting in that city.  The Peshawar police chief Tanveer ul
Haq
noted that the local PPP cooperated with him in planning the event, although it
took
him three days to convince them to shift the original venue of the public
meeting
from a vulnerable location to the more secure local stadium.  Reports that the
police
had arrested a potential suicide bomber at the venue were unfounded.  The police
did
arrest a boy who was found to be carrying minute amounts of explosives without a
detonator in his trouser pocket, the remnants from a wedding celebration he had
attended earlier that day.  Mr Haq said that the boy was released after the
police were
satisfied with his testimony.
Official security liaison
59.    Just before Ms Bhutto returned to Pakistan, the government offered her
two
candidates to serve as her personal protection officer and more importantly as
liaison
with the Pakistani authorities.  She chose Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain, a Senior
Superintendent of Police (SSP) whom she trusted as he had served with her during
her tenure as Prime Minister in 1993-96.  The ISI also offered three other
candidates,
according to ISI Deputy Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, but Ms
Bhutto turned them down.
60.    Major Imtiaz was the only permanent government-provided security officer
for
Ms Bhutto.  His main role was to be with Ms Bhutto at all times and to liaise
with the
local administration and police.  He also made requests to federal and
provincial
authorities for specific security support such as jammers, bullet-proof vehicles
and
vests and trained police personnel to escort Ms Bhutto’s entourage.  Major
Imtiaz did
not receive adequate support from the government to carry out his duties
effectively.
No support staff was assigned to him by the government; nor did it accede to
many of
his specific requests.  Despite the Commission’s efforts, it could not
establish whom
Major Imtiaz reported to other than Ms Bhutto while carrying out his duties, but
he
did coordinate with the other PPP security people surrounding Ms Bhutto.
61.    Major Imtiaz also advised Ms Bhutto on her own security responsibilities.
 He
noted that he had advised her many times not to expose herself by standing
through
the escape hatch of her armoured car to wave to the crowds, but she would
usually
ignore his advice and sometimes express anger at being told what to do.  On the
day
of her assassination, Major Imtiaz did not advise Ms Bhutto not to stand up
through
the escape hatch.
62.    The Commission finds that the federal Government did not have a
comprehensive security plan to protect Ms Bhutto.  It also failed to fix
responsibility
for her security in a specific federal official, entity or organization. 
Instead, the
federal government expected provincial authorities to provide fool-proof
security for
Ms Bhutto, but did not issue the necessary, specific and detailed instructions
commensurate to the threats and never followed up to ensure effective measures
were
undertaken.  She was treated in a discriminatory manner in comparison to other
ex-
prime ministers.  Despite the many threat warnings relayed to them, the
provincial
authorities, particularly in Punjab, failed to strengthen Ms Bhutto’s security
in
December 2007.
PPP security for Ms Bhutto
63.    The PPP is a political party, not a security agency.  The responsibility
for Ms
Bhutto’s security rested with the governme nt.  Nevertheless, Ms Bhutto
believed that
the government of General Musharraf could not be trusted to provide adequate
security for her.  The PPP therefore made its own security arrangements for Ms
Bhutto to augment whatever level of protection the government afforded to her.
64.    Mr Asif Ali Zardari, Ms Bhutto’s husband, was deeply involved in
planning Ms
Bhutto’s security for her return to Pakistan.  Ms Bhutto and Mr Zardari relied
to a
significant extent on persons close to them to plan and organize the PPP’s
security for
her.  They included former senior FIA official Mr Rehman Malik and Sindh PPP
leaders Mr Zulfikar Ali Mirza and Mr Agha Sirraj Durrani.
65.    Mr Malik described his role to the Commission as Ms Bhutto’s
“national
security advisor”, not her physical security advisor.  He also liaised with
the federal
authorities on behalf of Ms Bhutto and participated as her representative in
negotiations with General Musharraf and his aides.  However, most PPP leaders
understood Mr Malik’s role as encompassing all aspects of Ms Bhutto’s
security.
Many also said that he coordinated with Ms Bhutto’s protection detail,
including with
Major Imtiaz and Mr Tauqir Kaira.  The Commission finds that, in addition to
what
Mr Malik himself described, he performed a significant role in the overall
management of Ms Bhutto’s security.  His letters to the authorities regarding
threat
warnings and requesting specific security support reflect this involvement.   (
continued in Part-II)