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UN Commission Report on Benazir's murder -Part IV
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CONTD...PART IV
184. Apart from Major Imtiaz, the JIT never interviewed the people in the car with
Ms Bhutto at the time of the incident. When asked about this, AIG Majeed explained
that those persons had been summoned to be interviewed, but they refused to appear.
However, some members of the JIT acknowledged that, while they could confirm that
the letters summoning PPP members for interviews had been sent, they did not have
any confirmation that they had been received. In general, the limited efforts of the
JIT to reach out to the PPP are highlighted by a comparison to the efforts of the
Karachi police after the October attack. There, although relations between the
Karachi police and the PPP were tense, bordering on antagonistic, the Karachi police
made efforts to accommodate PPP concerns by, among others things, replacing the
initial lead investigator at the PPP’s request.
185. PPP members deny that the police contacted them, asserting that they would
have appeared if contacted. To underscore that willingness, they point out that when
contacted by Scotland Yard they did, in fact, respond. In addition, they point out that
they had spoken to several media outlets about the assassination and related events.
They maintained that having been so close to Ms Bhutto, it was only natural that they
would want the truth regarding her death to come out.
186. At the same time, several PPP members explained to the Commission that the
PPP did not have faith in the integrity of the investigations and that, as a result, they
did not cooperate with the police. Some senior PPP members acknowledged to the
Commission that the PPP had, accordingly, adopted a policy against cooperating with
the Karachi police investigation because the police had refused to register their FIR.
This distrust of the police by the PPP was reflected also in Ms Bhutto’s efforts to
lodge a second FIR following the Karachi attack.
187. The Commission recognizes that the PPP distrust of the police investigations in
both Karachi and Rawalpindi contributed to the party’s unwillingness to cooperate
with the criminal investigations. However, the PPP’s refusal to cooperate with the
Karachi and Rawalpindi investigations was not constructive. The Commission notes
that PPP members clearly did not have to wait to be formally notified to talk to the
police. As in any law enforcement matter, PPP members were free to take the
initiative to speak to investigators.
Scotland Yard
188. Following discussions between the United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon
Brown and General Musharraf, it was agreed that a team of forensics experts and
investigators from the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command (SO15)
would carry out a limited investigation to assist the Pakistani police investigation into
Ms Bhutto’s assassination. The team’s work resulted in a confidential report.
189. The terms of reference for Scotland Yard’s assistance, agreed between the UK’s
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, were made
public through a statement issued on 11 January 2008 by the British High
Commission in Pakistan. The main objective of the Scotland Yard team was “to
assist the local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms
Bhutto’s death”. According to the Scotland Yard report, a team of experts and
investigators arrived in Pakistan on 4 January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks
carrying out their investigation. The British High Commission in Pakistan released
an executive summary of the Scotland Yard report on 8 February 2008. The main
body of the report has not yet been made public.
190. According to the summary, the team’s key findings included the following:
a.although not possible to “categorically…exclude” the possibility of a
gun shot wound, the available evidence suggested there was no gunshot
wound;
b.Ms Bhutto died of a severe head injury caused by impact in the area of the
escape hatch lip as a result of the blast; and
c.the same individual both fired the shots and detonated the explosives.
The summary notes that the “task of establishing exactly what happened was
complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the
absence of an autopsy….” However, it goes on to assert that “[n]evertheless, the
evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.” This
latter comment has been seized upon by some Pakistani officials as support for the
performance of the Rawalpindi District Police in the crime scene management and as
support for their failure to allow the autopsy. It is unfortunate that the poor
performance of the Rawalpindi police was excused in the executive summary.
191. Since only the executive summary is public, critical elements of the Scotland
Yard report are not widely known. In the Commission’s view, it is important to note
that, in the Scotland Yard team’s view, there was no forensic examination of the
crime scene by the police on 27 December 2007.8 The team found chaos and
confusion understandable in the “immediate aftermath” of the blast and during the
evacuation of casualties, but noted that there was never any organized or structured
scene control or forensic examination that evening. For what evidence was collected,
the Rawalpindi police often did not note their original location accurately. The
Scotland Yard team was told by one police officer that the scene was searched for 45
minutes. Scotland Yard found that the scene was hosed down “within an hour” after
the blast and, as a result, the “opportunity for a thorough forensic examination was
lost”.
192. Dr Nathaniel Cary, the pathologist appointed by Scotland Yard, confirmed that
the force of the blast caused Ms Bhutto’s fatal injury. However, Ms Bhutto did not
suffer her injuries from hitting the latch of the escape hatch, as announced in the
Ministry of Interior’s press conference on 28 December 2007. Rather, Dr Cary
asserted that her head struck somewhere on the lip of the escape hatch opening.
While Scotland Yard’s finding was arrived at after investigation, the Ministry of
Interior’s was conclusory.
193. As noted above, officials at the time sought also to invoke the Scotland Yard
report to excuse the failure to conduct an autopsy. The report does not offer any
support for that failure. Rather, the report cites Pakistan’s Criminal Code of 1898 (as
amended by Act II 1997, section 174(3) which mandates that a police officer shall
submit a body for an autopsy and notes that Dr Aurangzeb had written that the cause
of death was “[t]o be ascertained by autopsy.” The team’s executive summary noted
that “[t]he task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by [among
other things] the absence of an autopsy.” Furthermore, the summary expressly
explains that Dr Cary was unable to categorically exclude the possibility of a gunshot
wound because of the “limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem
examination and CT scan.”
194. A number of officials from the Pakistani go vernment at the time of the
assassination and a number of police officials from the Punjab police have sought to
cite the Scotland Yard report as support for, or ratification of, the Rawalpindi police’s
security arrangements for Ms Bhutto or its management of the crime scene on 27
December 2007 and other actions or inactions of the Rawalpindi police and
government officials at that time. There is no factual or logical basis for such
assertions. The Scotland Yard team stated clearly that they were not reviewing the
security arrangements for Ms Bhutto and that identification of those responsible was
not within the team’s terms of reference.
195. Given its extremely narrow mandate, much of the context in the Scotland Yard
report was – as Scotland Yard emphasized – taken on good faith from the Pakistani
police. That good faith was, in many respects, abused by officers of the Rawalpindi
District Police, particularly with respect to security arrangements. The Commission’s
inquiry shows the accounts of the Rawalpind i police provided to Scotland Yard to be
largely untrue.
196. At the request of the Commission, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI)
conducted a review of Scotland Yard’s investigation of the cause and manner of death
of Ms Bhutto. Based on its analysis of the Scotland Yard report, the NFI prepared its
own report for the Commission in which it concluded that there were no important
inconsistencies in Scotland Yard’s investigation.
The further investigation: second JIT (FIA-led)
197. In October 2009, 18 months after the PPP government had come into power in
Pakistan, the Ministry of Interior initiated further investigations, for which a JIT was
formed, in order to investigate aspects of the case not covered by the first JIT. This
JIT is federally led, with officers of the FIA/SIG leading the investigation, which is
currently ongoing. The Commission will not comment in any detail on the work of
this second JIT.
198. The Commission does note, generally, that this second JIT has been more
rigorous in carrying out its investigations. The investigators have been vigorously
pushing certain areas of the investigation and appear to have made some further
progress. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent even this investigation will be free
to conduct an unfettered pursuit of the truth, including in freely investigating those
who may have borne the greatest responsibility for the planning and execution of Ms
Bhutto’s assassination.
III. Threats, Responsibilities and Possible Culpabilities
199. A determination of criminal responsibility for planning, organizing, funding,
supporting and carrying out the assassination can only be made by the competent
authorities of Pakistan. This Commission has neither the authority nor the means to
reach such conclusions. Indeed, if it were to do so, it could jeopardize future
prosecutions or make it difficult for future accused persons to receive fair trials. This
section, instead, assesses hypotheses regarding possible culpabilities of individuals
and entities that appeared to pose threats to Ms Bhutto. In addition, this section
reviews the performance of those who were responsible for Ms Bhutto’s security and
the investigation of her assassination. This section also reviews the role of Pakistan’s
intelligence agencies in this case.
A. Threats and Possible Culpabilities regarding the Assassination
200. The Commission’s inquiry has resulted in a picture of the significant threats
that Ms Bhutto faced on her return to Pakistan. In her writings and speeches, and in
discussions with her colleagues as described to the Commission, Ms Bhutto was
outspoken about her perception of the threats posed to her.
201. The conditions in Pakistan that resulted in threats to Ms Bhutto must be
understood against the backdrop of Pakistan’s recent history. Under the military
dictatorship of General Zia ul Haq from 1977 to 1988, a once secular military was
aligned with political Islam, and jihad was used as a tool to recruit and support
insurgents fighting against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The
Pakistani military organized and supported the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan
in 1996. Similar tactics were used in Kashmir against India after 1989. These
policies resulted in active linkages between elements of the military and the
Establishment with radical Islamists, at the expense of national secular forces, and the
entrenchment of religious extremist and other militant groups in the tribal areas and
Punjab. Ms Bhutto’s return from exile in 2007 occurred against this backdrop.
Therefore, a discussion of the threats to Ms Bhutto and of the forces that felt
threatened by her potential return to power in Pakistan must include the following:
Al-Qaida, Taliban and local jihadi groups and elements of the Establishment.
Al-Qaida
202. The Musharraf Government and Ms Bhutto disagreed on much, but they both
identified threats to her arising from Islamist extremist groups. Ms Bhutto had
concerns that Al-Qaida might have reason to do her harm. Her public positions
against Al-Qaida-inspired Islamist violence, on the need to check extremism in the
tribal areas, and on the perception among many that she was acting on behalf of the
United States, are factors that could have made her a target for Al-Qaida and allied
groups. She asserted in her 2007 book, Reconciliation, that Usama bin Laden funded
the ISI’s attempt to oust her first government in 1989 through a no-confidence motion
in parliament. A close associate remembered that during the election campaigning,
Ms Bhutto told her, “Usama bin Laden would take out a lot of money to have me
killed.”
203. Al-Qaida posed a general threat to all Pakistani politicians, including Ms
Bhutto, who were not in line with their thinking. But as her return to Pakistan neared,
and as she vigorously campaigned for the election, the threat to her increased and
became specific. The Al-Qaida threats to Ms Bhutto were relayed to her by the
Pakistan Government and United Arab Emirates authorities.
204. After the Karachi attack, on 23 October, senior PPP leader and Ms Bhutto’s
lawyer, Mr Farooq Naek, received a hand-written letter at his office from a person
claiming to be the “head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al-Qaida” and
threatening that Ms Bhutto would be assassinated in a gruesome manner. Mr Naek
notified the Supreme Court, urging that the threat be passed on to the government
with a request to strengthen Ms Bhutto’s security.
205. Further indications of the Al-Qaida threat to Ms Bhutto emerged two days after
her death when Al-Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu al Yazid claimed responsibility for
her assassination in a telephone interview with Asia Times Online. He stated: “We
have terminated the most precious American asset who vowed to defeat mujaheddin.”
Al Yazid said that Al-Qaida had ordered the assassination, which was carried out by
operatives of Lashkar e Jangvi, a Punjab jihadi group with a strong anti-Shia bias.
Al-Qaida stood to gain from the political destabilization of Pakistan that followed her
assassination. Given the above, the Commission believes that the competent
authorities of Pakistan should vigorously pursue the possible role of Al-Qaida in Ms
Bhutto’s assassination.
The Pakistani Taliban and other local jihadi groups9
206. The Pakistani Taliban is an agglomeration of Pashtun militant Islamist groups
operating in the tribal areas. They are closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban, and
with Al-Qaida. Several of these groups banded together in late 2007 to form the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban
commander from South Waziristan. Beginning initially as a support network for the
Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the Pakistan Taliban became
an actor in its own right after General Musharraf was perceived to have sided with the
United States’ anti-terror efforts. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban now constitutes a
significant threat to Pakistan’s internal stability.
207. The jihadi organizations are Sunni groups based largely in Punjab. Members of
these groups aided the Taliban effort in Afghanistan at the behest of the ISI and later
cultivated ties with Al-Qaida and Pakistani Taliban groups. The Pakistani military
and ISI also used and supported some of these groups in the Kashmir insurgency after
1989. The bulk of the anti-Indian activity was and still remains the work of groups
such as Lashkar e Taiba, which has close ties with the ISI. A common characteristic
of these jihadi groups was their adherence to the Deobandi Sunni sect of Islam, their
strong anti-Shia bias, and their use by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies
in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
208. Given this background, it is not surprising that they posed a threat to Ms Bhutto
and what she stood for. Ms Bhutto was not only a modernist politician and the leader
of a major secular party, she also spoke out strongly and publicly against the
extremist Islam espoused by these groups. She was supportive of the United States
approach to terrorism, and it was open knowledge that the United Kingdom and
United States were aiding in her return to Pakistan. And despite her differences with
General Musharraf, she had supported his crackdown on militants, including in the
Red Mosque episode in July 2007. Indeed, she had repeatedly castigated General
Musharraf for doing a half-hearted job on the terror front. Many believe that Ms
Bhutto’s gender was also an issue with the religious extremists who believed that a
woman should not lead an Islamic country. She was perceived as a Shia, at least by
some militants, because her mother and husband are Shia.
209. Just before Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan in October 2007, a newspaper report
quoting Senator Saleh Shah Qureshi of South Waziristan, noted that Baitullah
Mehsud had threatened to welcome Ms Bhutto with a wave of suicide bombers. The
report was emphatically denied by Senator Saleh Shah. However, several sources in
Pakistan have told the Commission that Baitullah Mehsud presented a credible threat
to Ms Bhutto. Along these lines, two of Baitullah Mehsud’s aides, when escorting a
British Broadcasting Corporation journalist in South Waziristan in early October
2007, said that they were convinced that Ms Bhutto’s impending return to Pakistan
was part of a power-sharing deal with General Musharraf that was meant to
strengthen the already strong pro-Americanism of the Pakistani Government. “She is
actually a Shia, so what else can we expect”, one of the aides told the journalist,
according to the BBC report.
210. Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was also blamed for the
assassination by the government of General Musharraf in its 28 December 2007 press
conference. Former senior intelligence officials told the Commission that in
November and December, they had been tracking multiple suicide bomb cells that
targeted Ms Bhutto in Larkana, Mardan, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Senior officials
of the current Pakistani government have expressed their belief in Mr Mehsud’s
involvement, although they continue to believe that he was part of a larger
conspiracy.
211. Taliban and Al-Qaida culpability was also supported by Mr Michael Hayden,
the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. He alleged in a
Washington Post interview on 18 January 2008 that Ms Bhutto was killed by fighters
allied with Baitullah Mehsud with support from Al-Qaida’s terroris t network. The
United States Government did not permit the Commission to meet with United States
intelligence officials to ascertain the basis for Mr Hayden’s assertion.
212. These factors alone are insufficient to gauge possible Taliban and jihadi
culpability for Ms Bhutto’s assassination. Nevertheless, almost no one the
Commission has interviewed, including Ms Bhutto’s PPP colleagues, deny that the
militants (Taliban and jihadi groups) posed a threat to Ms Bhutto. One retired
general, quite critical of the Musharraf regime, admits: “Baitullah Meshud would be
one of those who would have wanted [Ms Bhutto] killed.” The Commission believes
that the competent authorities of Pakistan should aggressively pursue the possible role
of the TTP and Pakistani jihadi groups in Ms Bhutto’s assassination.
Threats from the Establishment
213. The Establishment is generally used in Pakistan to refer to those who exercise
de facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies,
together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high-level members of the
bureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high
command and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are its
most permanent and influential components.
214. Ms Bhutto, through her writings and public statements, was outspoken as to the
sources of the threats she faced; key among these were elements of the Establishment,
whose tactics and reach she knew well. She and many others held the military and
the intelligence agencies responsible for a number of “dirty” campaigns against her
when she ran for office in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for orchestrating the
sacking of her governments. She believed that the policies she advocated – a return
to civilian rule and democracy, human rights, negotiations with India, reconciliation
with the non-Muslim world, and confrontation with radical Islamists – threatened the
Establishment’s continued control of Pakistan.
215. Ms Bhutto’s relevant policy proposals, including those laid out in the PPP’s
Manifesto for 2007, called for restrictions on the power of the military and
intelligence agencies. She proposed bringing them under civilian, democratic
controls, with provisions for transparency and control of the military budget and
spending. She vowed publicly to use reforms to rid the intelligence agencies of
elements driven by political or religious motives. Some of the positions taken by Ms
Bhutto that touched Establishment concerns included:
a. Her publicly stated position on the need to eliminate all remnants of the
military-militant nexus. Her proposal was to eliminate the military and
intelligence ties to the Taliban and jihadis, although many in those
institutions still publicly regarded these groups as important foreign policy
tools to advance national interests against India in the sub-region. In this
vein, Ms Bhutto denounced the military’s various truces with Taliban
militants in Swat and the tribal areas, arguing that they amounted to
appeasement.
b. Her independent position on the urgent need to improve relations with
India, and its implications for the Kashmir dispute, which the military had
regarded as its policy domain.
c. Her frequent denunciation of the role of the military and the intelligence
agencies in domestic politics.
d. The perception of her willingness to accommodate Western concerns.
While the military and others in the Establishment were willing to
cooperate with the United States, United Kingdom and other Western
states, Ms Bhutto was portrayed as overly pliant.
e. Her alleged willingness to compromise Pakistan’s nuclear programme and
allow greater Western access to it. The military has kept a tight grip on its
nuclear secrets and its persistent refusal to allow international access to Dr
A Q Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold nuclear weapons
knowledge to other countries. Ms Bhutto had said that she would give the
International Atomic Energy Agency access to Dr Khan, although her
statement was twisted in some media storie s.
216. Many sources interviewed by the Commission believe that the Establishment
was threatened by the possibility of Ms Bhutto’s return to high public office and that
it was involved in or bears some responsibility for her assassination. Their analysis is
based on years of observation and knowledge of how the Establishment works,
although they do not offer any specific evidence with regard to the Bhutto
assassination.
217. Several of these sources spoke of the existence of elements within the
Establishment who saw her return to an active political life in Pakistan as a threat to
their power. These elements included, in particular, those who retain links with
radical Islamists, especially the militant jihadi and Taliban groups and are
sympathetic to their cause or view them as strategic assets for asserting Pakistan’s
role in the region. The development of these organizations and the spread of Islamist
extremism, which marginalized secular democratizing forces, was promoted during
the General Zia ul Haq military regime (which overthrew the civilian government
headed by Ms Bhutto’s father and later executed him); the ISI cultivated these
relationships, initially in the context of the Cold War and the anti-Soviet war in
Afghanistan in the 1980’s and later in support of Kashmiri insurgents. While several
Pakistani current and former intelligence officials told the Commission that their
agencies no longer had such ties in 2007, virtually all independent analysts provided
information to the contrary and affirmed the ongoing nature of many such links.
218. Ms Bhutto’s own concerns about threats to her by Al-Qaida and other militants
resulted in part from her knowledge of their links with people who had worked with
or been assets of the ISI. She feared that the authorities could activate these
connections, using radical Islamists to harm her, while hiding their own role in any
attack. This was the basis for her allegations against Lt. General (ret) Hamid Gul and
Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, in her 16 October letter to General Musharraf. Gul was
Director General of MI under Zia ul Haq and then Director General of the ISI when
Ms Bhutto was Prime Minister in 1988-90. Although he was retired, Ms Bhutto
believed he still maintained his former close ties with the militant jihadis. Brigadier
Ejaz Shah, Director General of the Intelligence Bureau in 2007 and a former ISI
officer, was a member of General Musharraf’s inner circle. When Omar Saeed
Sheikh¸ the main accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case, was cornered in 2002, he
requested to surrender to Brigadier Shah. Some believe this was because of Brigadier
Shah’s reported intelligence connections with Mr Sheikh; Brigadier Shah vigorously
denied this and told the Commission that the surrender was facilitated through family
ties in their home community.
219. Militants of particular concern to Ms Bhutto and others included Qari Saifullah
Akhtar, one of the founders of the extremist Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), whom she
accused of involvement in a failed coup attempt against her in 1995, during her
second government. Mr Akhtar, who was living in Pakistan when Ms Bhutto
returned from exile, was reportedly one of the ISI’s main links to the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan and is believed to have cultivated ties to Mr bin Laden, who lived in
Afghanistan during that period. Ms Bhutto believed that Mr Akhtar was connected to
the Karachi attack against her in October 2007. Mr Akhtar’s one-time deputy Ilyas
Kashmiri, who had ties with the Pakistani military during the Afghan and Kashmir
campaigns, had been a senior aide to Mr bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al Zawahiri.
220. It was such links and connections between elements in the intelligence agencies
and militants, which most concerned Ms Bhutto and many others who believed that
the authorities could activate these connections to harm her. Given their clandestine
nature, any such connection in an attack on her is very difficult to detect or prove.
221. Ms Bhutto also emerged as a potential threat for General Musharraf, as she
increasingly challenged his plans to maintain his hold on power, first by returning to
Pakistan to campaign, then by focusing on the potential for election rigging, and
finally by campaigning directly against the military dictatorship during the weeks of
martial law. Some believe that he became increasingly angry at Ms Bhutto for
criticizing him and his regime so strongly, after having engaged in negotiations with
him. Along the same lines, General Musharraf’s allies, the PML-Q were also
threatened by Ms Bhutto, as they had the most to lose if the PPP were to win the
elections and displace them from their majority position in Parliament.
222. Over the course of her campaign in Pakistan before her assassination, Ms
Bhutto developed the view that General Musharraf was the main threat to her safety.
As she saw it, his government was not providing the security she was warranted and
deserved due to the threats against her and her status as a former prime minister. An
email she sent to her United States-based adviser, Mr Mark Siegel, stressed her
security concerns and stated: “I have been made to feel insecure by Musharraf and his
minions.”
223. The Commission believes that the criminal investigation of both attacks against
Ms Bhutto, first in Karachi and in Rawalpindi when she was killed, must include a
focus on those who may have been involved, not only on the direct operational level,
but also in their conception, planning and financing. In this regard, the pertinent
authorities should follow all leads and explore all reasonable hypotheses in this
regard, including the possible involvement of those who form part of the
Establishment.
Other hypotheses of culpability
224. The assassination of Ms Bhutto has led to a proliferation of hypotheses
regarding possible perpetrators. These include other governments and Bhutto family
members, close associates and security aides. The majority of these hypotheses do
not assert any basis in evidence, with some seeking to do no more than name persons
believed to have benefited in some way from Ms Bhutto’s death, including those
closest to her. The stubborn persistence of these hypotheses is attributable almost
entirely to the abject failure of the government authorities at the time to carry out an
investigation with vigour and integrity. The Commission need not address each of
these many theories in turn. It is sufficient to note that the proper response is an
unfettered criminal investigation – a meaningful search for truth – which has thus far
been frustrated.
B. Responsibilities
Security provided by the Pakistani authorities
225. The Pakistani Government failed in its responsibility to protect Ms Bhutto. Her
status as a former prime minister and a leading political candidate and the existence
of credible threats on her life should have prompted an effective security response.
226. There was no overall federal security plan to safeguard Ms Bhutto. The federal
nature of the organization of the Pakistani police made the establishment of a
uniformly high level security programme difficult, but this does not absolve the
federal Government of responsibility.
227. Provincial police did not receive from the Ministry of Interior security
instructions for Ms Bhutto like those provided for the protection of other former
prime ministers. As a result, security provisions for her varied from election rally to
election rally depending on the capacity and motivation of the provincial and local
police. In addition, the effectiveness of the police security plans relied to a great
extent on the supplemental security provided by the PPP. There was no overall
security plan to provide protection to Ms Bhutto between campaign events.
228. The provision of security equipment from the authorities for Ms Bhutto was
inadequate, and the equipment provided often did not work.
229. The Pakistani authorities identified threats to Ms Bhutto and urged her not to
return to Pakistan. There is little evidence of efforts by the authorities to act against
those threats. Given the seriousness of the threats identified by the Government and
the dangerous individuals and institutions presenting those threats, the federal
response to the danger to Ms Bhutto was extremely inadequate. The federal
authorities took on no effective responsibility for her security, merely passing on
threat warnings to Ms Bhutto and provincial authorities, and agreeing to the
appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and the PPP.
230. The appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and Ms
Bhutto proved to be insufficient. There was little support for Major Imtiaz by the
federal or local authorities. Since he travelled with her most of the time, he was not
able to work effectively with federal or local authorities to plan security arrangements
in advance or receive adequate information from them. Major Imtiaz’s appointment
gives the impression of federal support, but it was ineffectual.
231. At Liaquat Bagh, on 27 December 2007, security for Ms Bhutto by the Punjab
police was ineffective, insufficient and passive. Her assassination could have been
prevented with proper security. The security plan was not adequate, and there is little
evidence that it was even implemented. The plan called for the deployment of 1,371
police, but the Commission does not believe that the number of police actually
deployed came close to that figure. The performance of the police demonstrated a
lack of seriousness of purpose, a lack of leadership at the top and insufficient
commitment among the ranks.
232. On Ms Bhutto’s departure from the rally, the police did not control the crowds
outside Liaquat Bagh and coming from within the park. As a result the crowd was
able to surround her vehicle thereby slowing it down. Video footage and photographs
show very little police presence at this time. The delay in the departure of Ms Bhutto
from the scene is due to the crowds blocking her car. The Elite police unit that was
supposed to provide a “box” security for Ms Bhutto’s vehicle were not immediately
present to do so. The police had a responsibility to ensure that the departure
proceeded quickly and smoothly, and that if the primary route was blocked, an
alternative route could be used. That the only alternative route was blocked by
parked police cars is inexcusable. Their failure to clear Liaquat Road to allow for a
rapid departure from the rally was a critical failure.
233. There was no emergency plan in place in case of an attack. Once the attack
occurred, chaos ensued. Her vehicle was not accompanied by a police escort to get
her to a hospital quickly. It is extraordinary that her vehicle was stuck alone on
Murree Road until the arrival of Ms Sherry Rehman’s car which took her to the
hospital. Save for the people in her vehicle, Ms Bhutto was alone, without police
escort or support from the back up armoured vehicle that was supposed to be part of
her convoy.
234. The inadequacy of the Rawalpindi District Police’s security arrangements for
Ms Bhutto is further underscored when compared to those of the Karachi police for
Ms Bhutto’s arrival there on 18 October 2007. The event of Ms Bhutto’s return to
Pakistan clearly had a higher profile than the Rawalpindi public gathering. However,
that difference cannot account for the fundamental differences in the security
arrangements. Unlike the Rawalpindi District Police, the Karachi police engaged in
an extensive series of meetings with the PPP to develop security arrangements
cooperatively. The Karachi police also had a more coherent written security plan,
which emphasized coordination with PPP security elements, and integrated them into
the plan. The seriousness of purpose with which the Karachi police made their
security arrangements was also reflected in the concrete efforts they undertook to test
the efficacy of their security plan. These efforts included a full rehearsal of the
security plan on 17 October 2007, involving thousands of police officers.
Security provided by the PPP
235. The PPP was forced, by the nature of the threats to Ms Bhutto and a perception
that the authorities would not adequately protect her, to devise supplemental security
arrangements.
236. While the PPP did not bear responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security, its own
provision of security was characterized by disorganization and a lack of
professionalism. Each senior PPP official the Commission spoke with on this issue
described the PPP security arrangements differently. Even though Mr Rehman Malik
claimed that he was not an adviser on physical security, the letters he wrote to
authorities, and his liaison role with security and intelligence agencies shows that he
was deeply involved in the overall management of Ms Bhutto’s security. His
departure from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed her damaged vehicle
to become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which Mr
Malik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After moving
a safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle should
have waited to see for themselves if Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was able to depart safely
and if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle would
have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was damaged
or not.
237. Major Imtiaz did not provide leadership after the attack, although he was
assigned to the team precisely for this reason. It is understandable that others in the
vehicle would be overwhelmed by the shock of the attack, but as the lead security
professional in the vehicle, he would have been expected to provide leadership at that
critical moment. ( More in Part -V)
184. Apart from Major Imtiaz, the JIT never interviewed the people in the car with
Ms Bhutto at the time of the incident. When asked about this, AIG Majeed explained
that those persons had been summoned to be interviewed, but they refused to appear.
However, some members of the JIT acknowledged that, while they could confirm that
the letters summoning PPP members for interviews had been sent, they did not have
any confirmation that they had been received. In general, the limited efforts of the
JIT to reach out to the PPP are highlighted by a comparison to the efforts of the
Karachi police after the October attack. There, although relations between the
Karachi police and the PPP were tense, bordering on antagonistic, the Karachi police
made efforts to accommodate PPP concerns by, among others things, replacing the
initial lead investigator at the PPP’s request.
185. PPP members deny that the police contacted them, asserting that they would
have appeared if contacted. To underscore that willingness, they point out that when
contacted by Scotland Yard they did, in fact, respond. In addition, they point out that
they had spoken to several media outlets about the assassination and related events.
They maintained that having been so close to Ms Bhutto, it was only natural that they
would want the truth regarding her death to come out.
186. At the same time, several PPP members explained to the Commission that the
PPP did not have faith in the integrity of the investigations and that, as a result, they
did not cooperate with the police. Some senior PPP members acknowledged to the
Commission that the PPP had, accordingly, adopted a policy against cooperating with
the Karachi police investigation because the police had refused to register their FIR.
This distrust of the police by the PPP was reflected also in Ms Bhutto’s efforts to
lodge a second FIR following the Karachi attack.
187. The Commission recognizes that the PPP distrust of the police investigations in
both Karachi and Rawalpindi contributed to the party’s unwillingness to cooperate
with the criminal investigations. However, the PPP’s refusal to cooperate with the
Karachi and Rawalpindi investigations was not constructive. The Commission notes
that PPP members clearly did not have to wait to be formally notified to talk to the
police. As in any law enforcement matter, PPP members were free to take the
initiative to speak to investigators.
Scotland Yard
188. Following discussions between the United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon
Brown and General Musharraf, it was agreed that a team of forensics experts and
investigators from the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command (SO15)
would carry out a limited investigation to assist the Pakistani police investigation into
Ms Bhutto’s assassination. The team’s work resulted in a confidential report.
189. The terms of reference for Scotland Yard’s assistance, agreed between the UK’s
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Interior Ministry of Pakistan, were made
public through a statement issued on 11 January 2008 by the British High
Commission in Pakistan. The main objective of the Scotland Yard team was “to
assist the local authorities in providing clarity regarding the precise cause of Ms
Bhutto’s death”. According to the Scotland Yard report, a team of experts and
investigators arrived in Pakistan on 4 January 2008 and spent two and a half weeks
carrying out their investigation. The British High Commission in Pakistan released
an executive summary of the Scotland Yard report on 8 February 2008. The main
body of the report has not yet been made public.
190. According to the summary, the team’s key findings included the following:
a.although not possible to “categorically…exclude” the possibility of a
gun shot wound, the available evidence suggested there was no gunshot
wound;
b.Ms Bhutto died of a severe head injury caused by impact in the area of the
escape hatch lip as a result of the blast; and
c.the same individual both fired the shots and detonated the explosives.
The summary notes that the “task of establishing exactly what happened was
complicated by the lack of an extended and detailed search of the crime scene, the
absence of an autopsy….” However, it goes on to assert that “[n]evertheless, the
evidence that is available is sufficient for reliable conclusions to be drawn.” This
latter comment has been seized upon by some Pakistani officials as support for the
performance of the Rawalpindi District Police in the crime scene management and as
support for their failure to allow the autopsy. It is unfortunate that the poor
performance of the Rawalpindi police was excused in the executive summary.
191. Since only the executive summary is public, critical elements of the Scotland
Yard report are not widely known. In the Commission’s view, it is important to note
that, in the Scotland Yard team’s view, there was no forensic examination of the
crime scene by the police on 27 December 2007.8 The team found chaos and
confusion understandable in the “immediate aftermath” of the blast and during the
evacuation of casualties, but noted that there was never any organized or structured
scene control or forensic examination that evening. For what evidence was collected,
the Rawalpindi police often did not note their original location accurately. The
Scotland Yard team was told by one police officer that the scene was searched for 45
minutes. Scotland Yard found that the scene was hosed down “within an hour” after
the blast and, as a result, the “opportunity for a thorough forensic examination was
lost”.
192. Dr Nathaniel Cary, the pathologist appointed by Scotland Yard, confirmed that
the force of the blast caused Ms Bhutto’s fatal injury. However, Ms Bhutto did not
suffer her injuries from hitting the latch of the escape hatch, as announced in the
Ministry of Interior’s press conference on 28 December 2007. Rather, Dr Cary
asserted that her head struck somewhere on the lip of the escape hatch opening.
While Scotland Yard’s finding was arrived at after investigation, the Ministry of
Interior’s was conclusory.
193. As noted above, officials at the time sought also to invoke the Scotland Yard
report to excuse the failure to conduct an autopsy. The report does not offer any
support for that failure. Rather, the report cites Pakistan’s Criminal Code of 1898 (as
amended by Act II 1997, section 174(3) which mandates that a police officer shall
submit a body for an autopsy and notes that Dr Aurangzeb had written that the cause
of death was “[t]o be ascertained by autopsy.” The team’s executive summary noted
that “[t]he task of establishing exactly what happened was complicated by [among
other things] the absence of an autopsy.” Furthermore, the summary expressly
explains that Dr Cary was unable to categorically exclude the possibility of a gunshot
wound because of the “limited X-ray material, the absence of a full post mortem
examination and CT scan.”
194. A number of officials from the Pakistani go vernment at the time of the
assassination and a number of police officials from the Punjab police have sought to
cite the Scotland Yard report as support for, or ratification of, the Rawalpindi police’s
security arrangements for Ms Bhutto or its management of the crime scene on 27
December 2007 and other actions or inactions of the Rawalpindi police and
government officials at that time. There is no factual or logical basis for such
assertions. The Scotland Yard team stated clearly that they were not reviewing the
security arrangements for Ms Bhutto and that identification of those responsible was
not within the team’s terms of reference.
195. Given its extremely narrow mandate, much of the context in the Scotland Yard
report was – as Scotland Yard emphasized – taken on good faith from the Pakistani
police. That good faith was, in many respects, abused by officers of the Rawalpindi
District Police, particularly with respect to security arrangements. The Commission’s
inquiry shows the accounts of the Rawalpind i police provided to Scotland Yard to be
largely untrue.
196. At the request of the Commission, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI)
conducted a review of Scotland Yard’s investigation of the cause and manner of death
of Ms Bhutto. Based on its analysis of the Scotland Yard report, the NFI prepared its
own report for the Commission in which it concluded that there were no important
inconsistencies in Scotland Yard’s investigation.
The further investigation: second JIT (FIA-led)
197. In October 2009, 18 months after the PPP government had come into power in
Pakistan, the Ministry of Interior initiated further investigations, for which a JIT was
formed, in order to investigate aspects of the case not covered by the first JIT. This
JIT is federally led, with officers of the FIA/SIG leading the investigation, which is
currently ongoing. The Commission will not comment in any detail on the work of
this second JIT.
198. The Commission does note, generally, that this second JIT has been more
rigorous in carrying out its investigations. The investigators have been vigorously
pushing certain areas of the investigation and appear to have made some further
progress. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent even this investigation will be free
to conduct an unfettered pursuit of the truth, including in freely investigating those
who may have borne the greatest responsibility for the planning and execution of Ms
Bhutto’s assassination.
III. Threats, Responsibilities and Possible Culpabilities
199. A determination of criminal responsibility for planning, organizing, funding,
supporting and carrying out the assassination can only be made by the competent
authorities of Pakistan. This Commission has neither the authority nor the means to
reach such conclusions. Indeed, if it were to do so, it could jeopardize future
prosecutions or make it difficult for future accused persons to receive fair trials. This
section, instead, assesses hypotheses regarding possible culpabilities of individuals
and entities that appeared to pose threats to Ms Bhutto. In addition, this section
reviews the performance of those who were responsible for Ms Bhutto’s security and
the investigation of her assassination. This section also reviews the role of Pakistan’s
intelligence agencies in this case.
A. Threats and Possible Culpabilities regarding the Assassination
200. The Commission’s inquiry has resulted in a picture of the significant threats
that Ms Bhutto faced on her return to Pakistan. In her writings and speeches, and in
discussions with her colleagues as described to the Commission, Ms Bhutto was
outspoken about her perception of the threats posed to her.
201. The conditions in Pakistan that resulted in threats to Ms Bhutto must be
understood against the backdrop of Pakistan’s recent history. Under the military
dictatorship of General Zia ul Haq from 1977 to 1988, a once secular military was
aligned with political Islam, and jihad was used as a tool to recruit and support
insurgents fighting against the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan. The
Pakistani military organized and supported the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan
in 1996. Similar tactics were used in Kashmir against India after 1989. These
policies resulted in active linkages between elements of the military and the
Establishment with radical Islamists, at the expense of national secular forces, and the
entrenchment of religious extremist and other militant groups in the tribal areas and
Punjab. Ms Bhutto’s return from exile in 2007 occurred against this backdrop.
Therefore, a discussion of the threats to Ms Bhutto and of the forces that felt
threatened by her potential return to power in Pakistan must include the following:
Al-Qaida, Taliban and local jihadi groups and elements of the Establishment.
Al-Qaida
202. The Musharraf Government and Ms Bhutto disagreed on much, but they both
identified threats to her arising from Islamist extremist groups. Ms Bhutto had
concerns that Al-Qaida might have reason to do her harm. Her public positions
against Al-Qaida-inspired Islamist violence, on the need to check extremism in the
tribal areas, and on the perception among many that she was acting on behalf of the
United States, are factors that could have made her a target for Al-Qaida and allied
groups. She asserted in her 2007 book, Reconciliation, that Usama bin Laden funded
the ISI’s attempt to oust her first government in 1989 through a no-confidence motion
in parliament. A close associate remembered that during the election campaigning,
Ms Bhutto told her, “Usama bin Laden would take out a lot of money to have me
killed.”
203. Al-Qaida posed a general threat to all Pakistani politicians, including Ms
Bhutto, who were not in line with their thinking. But as her return to Pakistan neared,
and as she vigorously campaigned for the election, the threat to her increased and
became specific. The Al-Qaida threats to Ms Bhutto were relayed to her by the
Pakistan Government and United Arab Emirates authorities.
204. After the Karachi attack, on 23 October, senior PPP leader and Ms Bhutto’s
lawyer, Mr Farooq Naek, received a hand-written letter at his office from a person
claiming to be the “head of suicide bombers and a friend of Al-Qaida” and
threatening that Ms Bhutto would be assassinated in a gruesome manner. Mr Naek
notified the Supreme Court, urging that the threat be passed on to the government
with a request to strengthen Ms Bhutto’s security.
205. Further indications of the Al-Qaida threat to Ms Bhutto emerged two days after
her death when Al-Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu al Yazid claimed responsibility for
her assassination in a telephone interview with Asia Times Online. He stated: “We
have terminated the most precious American asset who vowed to defeat mujaheddin.”
Al Yazid said that Al-Qaida had ordered the assassination, which was carried out by
operatives of Lashkar e Jangvi, a Punjab jihadi group with a strong anti-Shia bias.
Al-Qaida stood to gain from the political destabilization of Pakistan that followed her
assassination. Given the above, the Commission believes that the competent
authorities of Pakistan should vigorously pursue the possible role of Al-Qaida in Ms
Bhutto’s assassination.
The Pakistani Taliban and other local jihadi groups9
206. The Pakistani Taliban is an agglomeration of Pashtun militant Islamist groups
operating in the tribal areas. They are closely aligned with the Afghan Taliban, and
with Al-Qaida. Several of these groups banded together in late 2007 to form the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban
commander from South Waziristan. Beginning initially as a support network for the
Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the Pakistan Taliban became
an actor in its own right after General Musharraf was perceived to have sided with the
United States’ anti-terror efforts. As a result, the Pakistani Taliban now constitutes a
significant threat to Pakistan’s internal stability.
207. The jihadi organizations are Sunni groups based largely in Punjab. Members of
these groups aided the Taliban effort in Afghanistan at the behest of the ISI and later
cultivated ties with Al-Qaida and Pakistani Taliban groups. The Pakistani military
and ISI also used and supported some of these groups in the Kashmir insurgency after
1989. The bulk of the anti-Indian activity was and still remains the work of groups
such as Lashkar e Taiba, which has close ties with the ISI. A common characteristic
of these jihadi groups was their adherence to the Deobandi Sunni sect of Islam, their
strong anti-Shia bias, and their use by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies
in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
208. Given this background, it is not surprising that they posed a threat to Ms Bhutto
and what she stood for. Ms Bhutto was not only a modernist politician and the leader
of a major secular party, she also spoke out strongly and publicly against the
extremist Islam espoused by these groups. She was supportive of the United States
approach to terrorism, and it was open knowledge that the United Kingdom and
United States were aiding in her return to Pakistan. And despite her differences with
General Musharraf, she had supported his crackdown on militants, including in the
Red Mosque episode in July 2007. Indeed, she had repeatedly castigated General
Musharraf for doing a half-hearted job on the terror front. Many believe that Ms
Bhutto’s gender was also an issue with the religious extremists who believed that a
woman should not lead an Islamic country. She was perceived as a Shia, at least by
some militants, because her mother and husband are Shia.
209. Just before Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan in October 2007, a newspaper report
quoting Senator Saleh Shah Qureshi of South Waziristan, noted that Baitullah
Mehsud had threatened to welcome Ms Bhutto with a wave of suicide bombers. The
report was emphatically denied by Senator Saleh Shah. However, several sources in
Pakistan have told the Commission that Baitullah Mehsud presented a credible threat
to Ms Bhutto. Along these lines, two of Baitullah Mehsud’s aides, when escorting a
British Broadcasting Corporation journalist in South Waziristan in early October
2007, said that they were convinced that Ms Bhutto’s impending return to Pakistan
was part of a power-sharing deal with General Musharraf that was meant to
strengthen the already strong pro-Americanism of the Pakistani Government. “She is
actually a Shia, so what else can we expect”, one of the aides told the journalist,
according to the BBC report.
210. Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was also blamed for the
assassination by the government of General Musharraf in its 28 December 2007 press
conference. Former senior intelligence officials told the Commission that in
November and December, they had been tracking multiple suicide bomb cells that
targeted Ms Bhutto in Larkana, Mardan, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. Senior officials
of the current Pakistani government have expressed their belief in Mr Mehsud’s
involvement, although they continue to believe that he was part of a larger
conspiracy.
211. Taliban and Al-Qaida culpability was also supported by Mr Michael Hayden,
the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. He alleged in a
Washington Post interview on 18 January 2008 that Ms Bhutto was killed by fighters
allied with Baitullah Mehsud with support from Al-Qaida’s terroris t network. The
United States Government did not permit the Commission to meet with United States
intelligence officials to ascertain the basis for Mr Hayden’s assertion.
212. These factors alone are insufficient to gauge possible Taliban and jihadi
culpability for Ms Bhutto’s assassination. Nevertheless, almost no one the
Commission has interviewed, including Ms Bhutto’s PPP colleagues, deny that the
militants (Taliban and jihadi groups) posed a threat to Ms Bhutto. One retired
general, quite critical of the Musharraf regime, admits: “Baitullah Meshud would be
one of those who would have wanted [Ms Bhutto] killed.” The Commission believes
that the competent authorities of Pakistan should aggressively pursue the possible role
of the TTP and Pakistani jihadi groups in Ms Bhutto’s assassination.
Threats from the Establishment
213. The Establishment is generally used in Pakistan to refer to those who exercise
de facto power; it includes the military high command and the intelligence agencies,
together with the top leadership of certain political parties, high-level members of the
bureaucracy and business persons that work in alliance with them. The military high
command and intelligence agencies form the core of the Establishment and are its
most permanent and influential components.
214. Ms Bhutto, through her writings and public statements, was outspoken as to the
sources of the threats she faced; key among these were elements of the Establishment,
whose tactics and reach she knew well. She and many others held the military and
the intelligence agencies responsible for a number of “dirty” campaigns against her
when she ran for office in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as for orchestrating the
sacking of her governments. She believed that the policies she advocated – a return
to civilian rule and democracy, human rights, negotiations with India, reconciliation
with the non-Muslim world, and confrontation with radical Islamists – threatened the
Establishment’s continued control of Pakistan.
215. Ms Bhutto’s relevant policy proposals, including those laid out in the PPP’s
Manifesto for 2007, called for restrictions on the power of the military and
intelligence agencies. She proposed bringing them under civilian, democratic
controls, with provisions for transparency and control of the military budget and
spending. She vowed publicly to use reforms to rid the intelligence agencies of
elements driven by political or religious motives. Some of the positions taken by Ms
Bhutto that touched Establishment concerns included:
a. Her publicly stated position on the need to eliminate all remnants of the
military-militant nexus. Her proposal was to eliminate the military and
intelligence ties to the Taliban and jihadis, although many in those
institutions still publicly regarded these groups as important foreign policy
tools to advance national interests against India in the sub-region. In this
vein, Ms Bhutto denounced the military’s various truces with Taliban
militants in Swat and the tribal areas, arguing that they amounted to
appeasement.
b. Her independent position on the urgent need to improve relations with
India, and its implications for the Kashmir dispute, which the military had
regarded as its policy domain.
c. Her frequent denunciation of the role of the military and the intelligence
agencies in domestic politics.
d. The perception of her willingness to accommodate Western concerns.
While the military and others in the Establishment were willing to
cooperate with the United States, United Kingdom and other Western
states, Ms Bhutto was portrayed as overly pliant.
e. Her alleged willingness to compromise Pakistan’s nuclear programme and
allow greater Western access to it. The military has kept a tight grip on its
nuclear secrets and its persistent refusal to allow international access to Dr
A Q Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold nuclear weapons
knowledge to other countries. Ms Bhutto had said that she would give the
International Atomic Energy Agency access to Dr Khan, although her
statement was twisted in some media storie s.
216. Many sources interviewed by the Commission believe that the Establishment
was threatened by the possibility of Ms Bhutto’s return to high public office and that
it was involved in or bears some responsibility for her assassination. Their analysis is
based on years of observation and knowledge of how the Establishment works,
although they do not offer any specific evidence with regard to the Bhutto
assassination.
217. Several of these sources spoke of the existence of elements within the
Establishment who saw her return to an active political life in Pakistan as a threat to
their power. These elements included, in particular, those who retain links with
radical Islamists, especially the militant jihadi and Taliban groups and are
sympathetic to their cause or view them as strategic assets for asserting Pakistan’s
role in the region. The development of these organizations and the spread of Islamist
extremism, which marginalized secular democratizing forces, was promoted during
the General Zia ul Haq military regime (which overthrew the civilian government
headed by Ms Bhutto’s father and later executed him); the ISI cultivated these
relationships, initially in the context of the Cold War and the anti-Soviet war in
Afghanistan in the 1980’s and later in support of Kashmiri insurgents. While several
Pakistani current and former intelligence officials told the Commission that their
agencies no longer had such ties in 2007, virtually all independent analysts provided
information to the contrary and affirmed the ongoing nature of many such links.
218. Ms Bhutto’s own concerns about threats to her by Al-Qaida and other militants
resulted in part from her knowledge of their links with people who had worked with
or been assets of the ISI. She feared that the authorities could activate these
connections, using radical Islamists to harm her, while hiding their own role in any
attack. This was the basis for her allegations against Lt. General (ret) Hamid Gul and
Brigadier (ret) Ejaz Shah, in her 16 October letter to General Musharraf. Gul was
Director General of MI under Zia ul Haq and then Director General of the ISI when
Ms Bhutto was Prime Minister in 1988-90. Although he was retired, Ms Bhutto
believed he still maintained his former close ties with the militant jihadis. Brigadier
Ejaz Shah, Director General of the Intelligence Bureau in 2007 and a former ISI
officer, was a member of General Musharraf’s inner circle. When Omar Saeed
Sheikh¸ the main accused in the Daniel Pearl murder case, was cornered in 2002, he
requested to surrender to Brigadier Shah. Some believe this was because of Brigadier
Shah’s reported intelligence connections with Mr Sheikh; Brigadier Shah vigorously
denied this and told the Commission that the surrender was facilitated through family
ties in their home community.
219. Militants of particular concern to Ms Bhutto and others included Qari Saifullah
Akhtar, one of the founders of the extremist Harkat ul Jihad Islami (HuJI), whom she
accused of involvement in a failed coup attempt against her in 1995, during her
second government. Mr Akhtar, who was living in Pakistan when Ms Bhutto
returned from exile, was reportedly one of the ISI’s main links to the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan and is believed to have cultivated ties to Mr bin Laden, who lived in
Afghanistan during that period. Ms Bhutto believed that Mr Akhtar was connected to
the Karachi attack against her in October 2007. Mr Akhtar’s one-time deputy Ilyas
Kashmiri, who had ties with the Pakistani military during the Afghan and Kashmir
campaigns, had been a senior aide to Mr bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al Zawahiri.
220. It was such links and connections between elements in the intelligence agencies
and militants, which most concerned Ms Bhutto and many others who believed that
the authorities could activate these connections to harm her. Given their clandestine
nature, any such connection in an attack on her is very difficult to detect or prove.
221. Ms Bhutto also emerged as a potential threat for General Musharraf, as she
increasingly challenged his plans to maintain his hold on power, first by returning to
Pakistan to campaign, then by focusing on the potential for election rigging, and
finally by campaigning directly against the military dictatorship during the weeks of
martial law. Some believe that he became increasingly angry at Ms Bhutto for
criticizing him and his regime so strongly, after having engaged in negotiations with
him. Along the same lines, General Musharraf’s allies, the PML-Q were also
threatened by Ms Bhutto, as they had the most to lose if the PPP were to win the
elections and displace them from their majority position in Parliament.
222. Over the course of her campaign in Pakistan before her assassination, Ms
Bhutto developed the view that General Musharraf was the main threat to her safety.
As she saw it, his government was not providing the security she was warranted and
deserved due to the threats against her and her status as a former prime minister. An
email she sent to her United States-based adviser, Mr Mark Siegel, stressed her
security concerns and stated: “I have been made to feel insecure by Musharraf and his
minions.”
223. The Commission believes that the criminal investigation of both attacks against
Ms Bhutto, first in Karachi and in Rawalpindi when she was killed, must include a
focus on those who may have been involved, not only on the direct operational level,
but also in their conception, planning and financing. In this regard, the pertinent
authorities should follow all leads and explore all reasonable hypotheses in this
regard, including the possible involvement of those who form part of the
Establishment.
Other hypotheses of culpability
224. The assassination of Ms Bhutto has led to a proliferation of hypotheses
regarding possible perpetrators. These include other governments and Bhutto family
members, close associates and security aides. The majority of these hypotheses do
not assert any basis in evidence, with some seeking to do no more than name persons
believed to have benefited in some way from Ms Bhutto’s death, including those
closest to her. The stubborn persistence of these hypotheses is attributable almost
entirely to the abject failure of the government authorities at the time to carry out an
investigation with vigour and integrity. The Commission need not address each of
these many theories in turn. It is sufficient to note that the proper response is an
unfettered criminal investigation – a meaningful search for truth – which has thus far
been frustrated.
B. Responsibilities
Security provided by the Pakistani authorities
225. The Pakistani Government failed in its responsibility to protect Ms Bhutto. Her
status as a former prime minister and a leading political candidate and the existence
of credible threats on her life should have prompted an effective security response.
226. There was no overall federal security plan to safeguard Ms Bhutto. The federal
nature of the organization of the Pakistani police made the establishment of a
uniformly high level security programme difficult, but this does not absolve the
federal Government of responsibility.
227. Provincial police did not receive from the Ministry of Interior security
instructions for Ms Bhutto like those provided for the protection of other former
prime ministers. As a result, security provisions for her varied from election rally to
election rally depending on the capacity and motivation of the provincial and local
police. In addition, the effectiveness of the police security plans relied to a great
extent on the supplemental security provided by the PPP. There was no overall
security plan to provide protection to Ms Bhutto between campaign events.
228. The provision of security equipment from the authorities for Ms Bhutto was
inadequate, and the equipment provided often did not work.
229. The Pakistani authorities identified threats to Ms Bhutto and urged her not to
return to Pakistan. There is little evidence of efforts by the authorities to act against
those threats. Given the seriousness of the threats identified by the Government and
the dangerous individuals and institutions presenting those threats, the federal
response to the danger to Ms Bhutto was extremely inadequate. The federal
authorities took on no effective responsibility for her security, merely passing on
threat warnings to Ms Bhutto and provincial authorities, and agreeing to the
appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and the PPP.
230. The appointment of Major Imtiaz as a liaison between the authorities and Ms
Bhutto proved to be insufficient. There was little support for Major Imtiaz by the
federal or local authorities. Since he travelled with her most of the time, he was not
able to work effectively with federal or local authorities to plan security arrangements
in advance or receive adequate information from them. Major Imtiaz’s appointment
gives the impression of federal support, but it was ineffectual.
231. At Liaquat Bagh, on 27 December 2007, security for Ms Bhutto by the Punjab
police was ineffective, insufficient and passive. Her assassination could have been
prevented with proper security. The security plan was not adequate, and there is little
evidence that it was even implemented. The plan called for the deployment of 1,371
police, but the Commission does not believe that the number of police actually
deployed came close to that figure. The performance of the police demonstrated a
lack of seriousness of purpose, a lack of leadership at the top and insufficient
commitment among the ranks.
232. On Ms Bhutto’s departure from the rally, the police did not control the crowds
outside Liaquat Bagh and coming from within the park. As a result the crowd was
able to surround her vehicle thereby slowing it down. Video footage and photographs
show very little police presence at this time. The delay in the departure of Ms Bhutto
from the scene is due to the crowds blocking her car. The Elite police unit that was
supposed to provide a “box” security for Ms Bhutto’s vehicle were not immediately
present to do so. The police had a responsibility to ensure that the departure
proceeded quickly and smoothly, and that if the primary route was blocked, an
alternative route could be used. That the only alternative route was blocked by
parked police cars is inexcusable. Their failure to clear Liaquat Road to allow for a
rapid departure from the rally was a critical failure.
233. There was no emergency plan in place in case of an attack. Once the attack
occurred, chaos ensued. Her vehicle was not accompanied by a police escort to get
her to a hospital quickly. It is extraordinary that her vehicle was stuck alone on
Murree Road until the arrival of Ms Sherry Rehman’s car which took her to the
hospital. Save for the people in her vehicle, Ms Bhutto was alone, without police
escort or support from the back up armoured vehicle that was supposed to be part of
her convoy.
234. The inadequacy of the Rawalpindi District Police’s security arrangements for
Ms Bhutto is further underscored when compared to those of the Karachi police for
Ms Bhutto’s arrival there on 18 October 2007. The event of Ms Bhutto’s return to
Pakistan clearly had a higher profile than the Rawalpindi public gathering. However,
that difference cannot account for the fundamental differences in the security
arrangements. Unlike the Rawalpindi District Police, the Karachi police engaged in
an extensive series of meetings with the PPP to develop security arrangements
cooperatively. The Karachi police also had a more coherent written security plan,
which emphasized coordination with PPP security elements, and integrated them into
the plan. The seriousness of purpose with which the Karachi police made their
security arrangements was also reflected in the concrete efforts they undertook to test
the efficacy of their security plan. These efforts included a full rehearsal of the
security plan on 17 October 2007, involving thousands of police officers.
Security provided by the PPP
235. The PPP was forced, by the nature of the threats to Ms Bhutto and a perception
that the authorities would not adequately protect her, to devise supplemental security
arrangements.
236. While the PPP did not bear responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security, its own
provision of security was characterized by disorganization and a lack of
professionalism. Each senior PPP official the Commission spoke with on this issue
described the PPP security arrangements differently. Even though Mr Rehman Malik
claimed that he was not an adviser on physical security, the letters he wrote to
authorities, and his liaison role with security and intelligence agencies shows that he
was deeply involved in the overall management of Ms Bhutto’s security. His
departure from the scene at Rawalpindi after the attack allowed her damaged vehicle
to become isolated. The rapid departure of the only back up vehicle, in which Mr
Malik and other senior PPP leaders rode, was a serious security lapse. After moving
a safe distance away from the scene of the attack, the occupants of the vehicle should
have waited to see for themselves if Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was able to depart safely
and if there was a need for a back up vehicle. As the back-up, their vehicle would
have been a necessary part of the convoy whether Ms Bhutto’s vehicle was damaged
or not.
237. Major Imtiaz did not provide leadership after the attack, although he was
assigned to the team precisely for this reason. It is understandable that others in the
vehicle would be overwhelmed by the shock of the attack, but as the lead security
professional in the vehicle, he would have been expected to provide leadership at that
critical moment. ( More in Part -V)
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