That Pakistan faces a mortal threat from Islamists who are somewhat conveniently but perhaps erroneously, clubbed together and referred to as the Taliban, is something that should have by now become clear to even the most purblind not only in that country but also in rest of the world. The real challenge for both the Pakistani state and society, however, does not lie so much in the efforts of the Pakistan security forces to defeat and exterminate the Islamists in the Pakhtun tribal badlands; the real challenge lies in fighting the Islamists in Pakistan’s heartland – Punjab. And no, its not just South Punjab that one is talking about. Serious as the situation is in South Punjab, it is no better in central and north Punjab.
The phenomenon of ‘Punjabi Taliban’ has been receiving a lot of attention in recent months, more so after evidence has emerged of their involvement in almost all the major acts of terrorism in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. But much of the focus on this phenomenon has centred on South Punjab. The abysmal development indices in South Punjab coupled with the domination of the feudal classes and the increasingly dysfunctional social and administrative structures have certainly acted as contributory factors for making this region a fertile recruiting ground for the Islamists of all hues. Whether it is Deobandi jihadists organisations like Jaish Mohammad, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipahe Sahaba with close links to al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Salafi/Wahabbi outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have all gathered their jihadi cannon-fodder from this region.
But for anyone to imagine that the rising tide of radical Islamism is limited to only South Punjab is nothing but self-deception. The fact is that Islamists (regardless of the labels they operate under) have spread their wings all over Punjab. Most of the top al Qaeda militants have been arrested not from the dirty backwaters of South Punjab, but from the bustling cities of central and north Punjab – Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Attock and what have you. The core support base of the fundamentalist Islamic party, Jamaat Islami, is central and north Punjab, and not only is the Jamaat Islami increasingly functioning like the political arm of the al Qaeda but cadres of this party have been found involved in sheltering al Qaeda fugitives.
Perhaps the biggest jihadist organisation in Pakistan, and one which is arguably far more dangerous than the TTP, is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is headquartered in Muridke (just north of Lahore). The LeT also maintains a huge establishment in the heart of Lahore and has a presence in every nook and corner of Pakistan. Most of the LeT cadre comes from all parts of Punjab and not just from the much maligned South Punjab. The extensive network of the LeT in Punjab is in many ways potentially far more destabilising for Pakistan than the horrendous acts of terror being perpetrated by the Taliban.
An indication of the immense power that LeT wields has comes in a recent write-up by the Pakistani journalist Shaheen Sehbai. He writes: “the GHQ realises that if the Kerry-Lugar Bill was to be implemented as desired by Washington, Pakistani cities could soon turn into battlegrounds between the Army and the Lashkar Tayyaba, the Jaish Mohammed and Taliban forces combined. So far the GHQ has kept the Lashkar Tayyaba quiet by not acceding to the US demands of attacking or even touching Muridke, arguing that once this sleeping elephant wakes up, it could turn around and trample our own forces. After all, the LeT was raised and trained by our military establishment to fight the Indians in Kashmir and they are good at it. Turning their guns inwards, with TTP suicide bombers roaming everywhere, would turn Pakistan into a burning inferno, ready to collapse.”
Unfortunately, instead of waking up to the alarming spread of radical Islamist forces in Pakistan’s political powerhouse, the Pakistani state and society has slipped into a mode of total and complete denial of the problem. In many ways, the denial over the inexorable march of talibanisation in Punjab is reminiscent of the dismissal of similar premonitions about the inevitable blowback of the policy of using the jihadists as instruments of state policy in Afghanistan and against India. Then, as now, the arguments given were more or less the same that we are hearing today: the state machinery is pretty much in control and remains effective enough to snuff out any challenge to state authority; the army and intelligence agencies are competent and powerful enough to turn off the tap of jihad with a snap of their fingers; the jihadists pose no threat to Pakistani state and people and are only fighting the enemies of Islam and oppressors of Muslims; a handful of jihadists are in any case in no position to bite the hand that feeds them, etc. But if all these arguments of yore have fallen flat today, then the arguments being given today to refrain from moving against the Islamists in Punjab, will almost certainly yield disastrous consequences tomorrow.
True, the LeT and other Punjab-based jihadist organisations are not fighting the Pakistani state today. But it is equally true that the ultimate objectives of ‘loyalist’ jihadist outfits are no different from those of the ‘rogue’ jihadists; only their immediate objective and enemy is not the same. Given the firepower at their command, and their long-term objective of imposing a Wahabbi/Salafi version of Islam on Pakistan, a clash between the loyalist jihadists and the Pakistani state is simply a matter of time and the break, when it comes, could be over something pretty trivial. After all, the Taliban too were loyalists, even clients, of the Pakistani state not too long back in the past. None of the ‘rogue’ jihadists ever indulged in terrorism inside Pakistan so long as they were allowed to function unhindered. But the moment obstacles were placed in their path they turned their guns on the Pakistani state. What is there to ensure that organisations like the LeT will not do something similar in the future?
To an extent, the manner in which the problem of talibanisation is defined prevents a realistic appreciation of the threat, or if you will challenge, of radical Islamism or jihadism in Punjab. As the thinking goes in Pakistan’s security, political and intellectual circles, so long as the jihadists do not defy the state or create an insurgency-like situation inside Pakistan but continue to export their violence and virulence outside Pakistan, they are not considered a danger; rather, they are lauded as ‘mujahids’. In the process, the fact that the jihadists cannot ply their trade without distorting and disrupting the social, economic and administrative fabric of local communities is simply glossed over. The focus is generally limited to the law and order implications of jihadist militancy. But the mindset that provides legitimacy and justification, not to mention recruits, to militant jihad is all too often neglected.
In Pakistan’s Punjab province, the threat of the extensive network of armed militants (call them Taliban or jihadists) running amok is just one part of the problem. Equally serious is the mindset that has emerged from nearly three decades of sustained brain-washing of the society to make it more ‘Islamic’ and exhorting the people to contribute men and material for the so-called ‘Islamic causes’. Anyone who follows the public discourse in Pakistan (which is basically dominated by the Punjabis) will realise its jihadist orientation. This is not something that has happened overnight; nor is this a function of the imagined persecution of Muslims by the West. And it is certainly not a trend that has emerged in reaction to the US occupation of Afghanistan.
The reality is that this is a mindset that has been actively encouraged and assiduously cultivated by the Pakistani state. And while it is easy to blame it all on the proliferating Madrassas, one just needs to read the stuff that is taught in state-run schools to understand the demonical mindset that is being imbued in Pakistani children. It is hardly any surprise therefore that over the years the innate pragmatism that characterised the Punjabi has given way to Islamism, which coupled with a false sense of machismo has created a society that brooks no compromise, tolerance or accommodation of another man’s worldview. The Pakistani Punjabi mind has become so radicalised that many people in Pakistan don’t even realise how extreme they appear to the outside world, in both their action as well as their words.
If the Pakistanis really want to rediscover their traditional moderation and syncretism then they have no choice but to confront and defeat militarily, philosophically and ideologically the jihadists in their midst. The longer that the Pakistani state delays action against jihadist infrastructure in Punjab and Sindh, the more difficult it will become to dismantle the nurseries of terror that are operating right under the nose, and by accounts with the connivance, of the Pakistani establishment. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are becoming powerful by the day and could one day not too far in the future pose an even more potent threat to the existence of the Pakistani state than is posed by the Taliban.
The phenomenon of ‘Punjabi Taliban’ has been receiving a lot of attention in recent months, more so after evidence has emerged of their involvement in almost all the major acts of terrorism in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. But much of the focus on this phenomenon has centred on South Punjab. The abysmal development indices in South Punjab coupled with the domination of the feudal classes and the increasingly dysfunctional social and administrative structures have certainly acted as contributory factors for making this region a fertile recruiting ground for the Islamists of all hues. Whether it is Deobandi jihadists organisations like Jaish Mohammad, Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipahe Sahaba with close links to al Qaeda and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Salafi/Wahabbi outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have all gathered their jihadi cannon-fodder from this region.
But for anyone to imagine that the rising tide of radical Islamism is limited to only South Punjab is nothing but self-deception. The fact is that Islamists (regardless of the labels they operate under) have spread their wings all over Punjab. Most of the top al Qaeda militants have been arrested not from the dirty backwaters of South Punjab, but from the bustling cities of central and north Punjab – Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Attock and what have you. The core support base of the fundamentalist Islamic party, Jamaat Islami, is central and north Punjab, and not only is the Jamaat Islami increasingly functioning like the political arm of the al Qaeda but cadres of this party have been found involved in sheltering al Qaeda fugitives.
Perhaps the biggest jihadist organisation in Pakistan, and one which is arguably far more dangerous than the TTP, is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is headquartered in Muridke (just north of Lahore). The LeT also maintains a huge establishment in the heart of Lahore and has a presence in every nook and corner of Pakistan. Most of the LeT cadre comes from all parts of Punjab and not just from the much maligned South Punjab. The extensive network of the LeT in Punjab is in many ways potentially far more destabilising for Pakistan than the horrendous acts of terror being perpetrated by the Taliban.
An indication of the immense power that LeT wields has comes in a recent write-up by the Pakistani journalist Shaheen Sehbai. He writes: “the GHQ realises that if the Kerry-Lugar Bill was to be implemented as desired by Washington, Pakistani cities could soon turn into battlegrounds between the Army and the Lashkar Tayyaba, the Jaish Mohammed and Taliban forces combined. So far the GHQ has kept the Lashkar Tayyaba quiet by not acceding to the US demands of attacking or even touching Muridke, arguing that once this sleeping elephant wakes up, it could turn around and trample our own forces. After all, the LeT was raised and trained by our military establishment to fight the Indians in Kashmir and they are good at it. Turning their guns inwards, with TTP suicide bombers roaming everywhere, would turn Pakistan into a burning inferno, ready to collapse.”
Unfortunately, instead of waking up to the alarming spread of radical Islamist forces in Pakistan’s political powerhouse, the Pakistani state and society has slipped into a mode of total and complete denial of the problem. In many ways, the denial over the inexorable march of talibanisation in Punjab is reminiscent of the dismissal of similar premonitions about the inevitable blowback of the policy of using the jihadists as instruments of state policy in Afghanistan and against India. Then, as now, the arguments given were more or less the same that we are hearing today: the state machinery is pretty much in control and remains effective enough to snuff out any challenge to state authority; the army and intelligence agencies are competent and powerful enough to turn off the tap of jihad with a snap of their fingers; the jihadists pose no threat to Pakistani state and people and are only fighting the enemies of Islam and oppressors of Muslims; a handful of jihadists are in any case in no position to bite the hand that feeds them, etc. But if all these arguments of yore have fallen flat today, then the arguments being given today to refrain from moving against the Islamists in Punjab, will almost certainly yield disastrous consequences tomorrow.
True, the LeT and other Punjab-based jihadist organisations are not fighting the Pakistani state today. But it is equally true that the ultimate objectives of ‘loyalist’ jihadist outfits are no different from those of the ‘rogue’ jihadists; only their immediate objective and enemy is not the same. Given the firepower at their command, and their long-term objective of imposing a Wahabbi/Salafi version of Islam on Pakistan, a clash between the loyalist jihadists and the Pakistani state is simply a matter of time and the break, when it comes, could be over something pretty trivial. After all, the Taliban too were loyalists, even clients, of the Pakistani state not too long back in the past. None of the ‘rogue’ jihadists ever indulged in terrorism inside Pakistan so long as they were allowed to function unhindered. But the moment obstacles were placed in their path they turned their guns on the Pakistani state. What is there to ensure that organisations like the LeT will not do something similar in the future?
To an extent, the manner in which the problem of talibanisation is defined prevents a realistic appreciation of the threat, or if you will challenge, of radical Islamism or jihadism in Punjab. As the thinking goes in Pakistan’s security, political and intellectual circles, so long as the jihadists do not defy the state or create an insurgency-like situation inside Pakistan but continue to export their violence and virulence outside Pakistan, they are not considered a danger; rather, they are lauded as ‘mujahids’. In the process, the fact that the jihadists cannot ply their trade without distorting and disrupting the social, economic and administrative fabric of local communities is simply glossed over. The focus is generally limited to the law and order implications of jihadist militancy. But the mindset that provides legitimacy and justification, not to mention recruits, to militant jihad is all too often neglected.
In Pakistan’s Punjab province, the threat of the extensive network of armed militants (call them Taliban or jihadists) running amok is just one part of the problem. Equally serious is the mindset that has emerged from nearly three decades of sustained brain-washing of the society to make it more ‘Islamic’ and exhorting the people to contribute men and material for the so-called ‘Islamic causes’. Anyone who follows the public discourse in Pakistan (which is basically dominated by the Punjabis) will realise its jihadist orientation. This is not something that has happened overnight; nor is this a function of the imagined persecution of Muslims by the West. And it is certainly not a trend that has emerged in reaction to the US occupation of Afghanistan.
The reality is that this is a mindset that has been actively encouraged and assiduously cultivated by the Pakistani state. And while it is easy to blame it all on the proliferating Madrassas, one just needs to read the stuff that is taught in state-run schools to understand the demonical mindset that is being imbued in Pakistani children. It is hardly any surprise therefore that over the years the innate pragmatism that characterised the Punjabi has given way to Islamism, which coupled with a false sense of machismo has created a society that brooks no compromise, tolerance or accommodation of another man’s worldview. The Pakistani Punjabi mind has become so radicalised that many people in Pakistan don’t even realise how extreme they appear to the outside world, in both their action as well as their words.
If the Pakistanis really want to rediscover their traditional moderation and syncretism then they have no choice but to confront and defeat militarily, philosophically and ideologically the jihadists in their midst. The longer that the Pakistani state delays action against jihadist infrastructure in Punjab and Sindh, the more difficult it will become to dismantle the nurseries of terror that are operating right under the nose, and by accounts with the connivance, of the Pakistani establishment. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are becoming powerful by the day and could one day not too far in the future pose an even more potent threat to the existence of the Pakistani state than is posed by the Taliban.
