China seeking to control of `Seas’ worry neighbours

China's interests in the 'seas' are no longer hidden. It is no longer a pin-prick attack focused on Vietnam alone. For China today, South China Sea is of core strategic value comparable to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Lately China is looking into Indian Ocean for naval bases in Maldives and the Gulf of Aden, while consolidating the foot-hold on the coasts of Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan

China, in March this year, has given an unambiguous message to the USA that South China Sea is of `core’ interest to its territorial integrity, thus raising the strategic status of the area to that of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. 

Alerted by China’s assertions, backed by military activism, its neighbours including the ASEAN member countries sought American assistance which was immediately assured. Addressing the ASEAN Regional Forum, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, “The US has a `national’ interest in freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”  By openly wading into the disputed zone, the US offered the ASEAN and other neighbours to articulate a more coherent `regional’ response to the Chinese activism.

The Chinese message was preceded by a series of pin-prick attacks on Vietnamese fishermen and oil exploration activities in the ‘disputed’ Paracel and Spratly islands.  Two Chinese fishery patrol ships visited Paracel islands while a Chinese medical ship went to one of the islands in Spratly Archipelago. Both these ‘visits’ in November last drew sharp reaction from Vietnam which described Chinese action as a violation of its sovereignty over these islands. 

China also forced British Petroleum (BP) to withdraw from a contract signed with Vietnam for oil exploration in the latter’s Exclusive Economic Zone and separately awarded contracts to three of its own oil companies for exploration in and around the disputed islands.  Air and naval patrolling threatened Vietnam’s oil and gas exploration activities in the area.  The Chinese ships detained Vietnamese ships and fishermen, imposing a penalty of US $ 8000 per ship, and forced the fishermen to abandon what they claim to be their traditional fishing areas.

Vietnam, thus, remained the primary focus of Chinese policy of consolidating its claims on the Paracel and Spratly islands.  To camouflage its intentions, Beijing has adopted a dual-track policy of publicly seeking a peaceful solution while quietly exploring oil and mineral resources and augmenting naval forces to assert its sovereignty over them.  China’s flexing of muscles over the long-standing East China Sea issue with Japan and Yellow Sea matter with South Korea further complicated the waters for the two American allies.

Being not in a position to militarily counter the Chinese activism, Honoi quietly pursued a diplomatic approach to adopt a `common’ position vis-à-vis China within the ASEAN.  It engaged the US for appropriate strategies while forging `security’ ties with other key regional powers like Japan, Russia and India to `balance’ China’s influence.  It found a close partner in Malaysia, which also claims parts of Spratly islands, for jointly submitting to the UN Commission on the Convention on the Law of the Sea claims of their respective exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea, which was denounced and rejected by Beijing.  Vietnam also used its current chairmanship of the ASEAN to bring the territorial disputes with China on the Group’s agenda. 

The US Navy has made over a dozen visits to Vietnamese ports, besides other military assistance.  Honoi is trying to augment its naval and air force with imports of Kilo-class submarines and Su-30 fighter aircraft from Russia.  Japan, on its part, is boosting its submarine fleet for the first time in 36 years, while other ASEAN countries and Australia are making new acquisitions in the face of changing military strategies of China.

China has in the recent days demonstrated a continuous and significant increase in its military activities and economic exploitation in the South China Sea.  It reportedly held six military exercises between Jan and Mar this year compared to just one such exercise during the same period a year ago.  In mid-April, about 30 warships from Baihai, Donghai and Nanhai bases exercised near Paracel islands.

*China deployed two destroyers and one combat support ship to patrol the Cuarteron reef in Spratly islands.

** Three warships and one Maritime Administration ship anchored on the islands to deter the Vietnamese venturing into the area for fishing or oil and gas exploration

** Commenced regular month-long patrols of the estuary area of Tonkin Gulf, the Paracel and Spratly islands from April

*** Upgraded its nuclear submarines base on Hainan islands and naval establishments on woody islands, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef; and

**** Constructed an airfield on Triton island for operation of military aircraft.

The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army’s Navy carried out own massive live fire exercises in East China Sea from June 30 to July 5, 2010 ahead of planned US military exercises with Japan, Vietnam and South Korea during July-August. 

China’s East Sea Fleet, South Sea Fleet and North Sea Fleet participated in the exercises that features mine sweeping, surface strikes training, simulated and live air to air, air to surface and surface to air missile operations.  These operations covered eight fishery zones which China claimed are within its own exclusive economic zone, and other areas often being visited by US naval and air reconnaissance missions. 

Notwithstanding strong public opposition to participation of its N-powered aircraft carrier, George Washington, the US exercised with naval and air forces of Japan, Vietnam and South Korea in East China Sea, South China Sea and Yellow Sea.  The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen has rejected China’s opposition to foreign warships or aircraft carriers in the Yellow Sea. He said Yellow Sea is an open sea and so there is no bar on US military exercises there.

While dispute over the sovereignty of the East China Sea Diaoyu islands between China and Japan has politico-security significance, the South China Sea islands have greater economic potential. Also security value as their complicated geological features provide an advantage to China in its confrontation with neighbouring countries.

The PLA Navy is still in a `transition’ state from `brown water’ to `blue water’ navy and as the Global Times (May 5, 2010) observed it must conquer the bottlenecks in the `first chain of Islands which are being used by some countries as their `frontline’ base.  While China continues to try to browbeat Vietnam, it is unlikely to enter into any confrontation with the US in the near future. 

Beijing is conscious of its naval inadequacies and is planning to augment the carrier fleet. Till that goal is reached, for which it needs time and money in abundance, China will remain content with diplomatic overtures to convince bilaterally and multilaterally the ASEAN states of its `benign’ intent of `peaceful growth’.