Policy Research Group   - Strategic Insight: US chases good Taliban mirage

US chases good Taliban mirage
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. on 31 January, 2010 08:17:00
 
The West’s desperate attempt to court the `good` Taliban to bring peace and
stability to Afghanistan is doomed to fail and create a backlash of violence not
only in the region but in the US and other countries.
There are three `common sense` reasons for projecting such an eventuality.
First, there is no  `good Taliban`. Today’s Taliban as a whole is a mixed bag
of religious zealots, terrorists, criminals and mercenaries led by smart men
with long beards and thick turbans who nurse a voracious ambition to grasp power
through any means possible.
Second, the Taliban, in whatever formats they come in, are not peaceniks—their
credo is to establish their ideologies and their kind of life over the people
through violence. So even if they may not have an American or a British soldier
to shoot at, they will brutalise ordinary men and women for raising their head
or voice against their retrogressive way of life.
Third, the Taliban is not an independent group but part of the global jihadi
network that has found a sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This network has
time and again made it clear that it’s main enemy was the West which was
blocking the progress of their `long journey` to establish Islamic Caliphate.
There is another way of looking at this issue and realize why courting the
Taliban would boomerang. The Western armies are keen on withdrawing from
Afghanistan at the earliest but since so much money and effort have gone into
pursuing the elusive Osama bin Laden and his aides since 2001, they need a fig
leaf of peace and stability in Afghanistan before they get themselves out.
Stabilising a war-torn Afghanistan is a noble idea, no doubt. But the question
is the United States of America had no qualms about abandoning the country and
its people in the early 90s once it evicted the occupational Soviet troops with
the help of `mujahideen` forces. Today, the American and other `foreign` troops
are the occupational force and are facing the erstwhile `mujahideen`.  There is
however a critical difference between the earlier version of `mujahideen` and
the new band—the first one was sponsored by the West, the second has both
independent sources of sustenance and the critical support of Pakistan which,
ironically, continues to be an ally from the Afghan Jihad days to the War on
Terror.
Having briefly laid out the table of contents, it would be quite instructive to
inquire the reasons for the current round of instability and violence in
Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. The rise and rise of Taliban since 2001 was
perhaps the single reason why President Barak Obama had spent months mulling
over what to do in Afghanistan, finally coming out with this great idea of
sending in more troops and telling them to get out before July 2011.
Probe a little further, it would not be difficult to fathom that the Taliban
would not have become the force to reckon with which it has now unless it had a
full-blown support from Pakistan Army and its intelligence arm, ISI. Not only
the Taliban, various other wings and claws of the Global Jihadi Network could
not have survived the aggressive military and diplomatic assault that followed
the WTC attack but for Pakistan Army.
History could be boring but quite insightful in understanding the colossal
mistake humans in high positions make and repeat ad nauseum. When the US jets
pulverizing the mountain hideouts of al Qaida and the Taliban in October 2001,
it was Pakistan Army and ISI which was quietly helping the terrorist leadership
to make way to safer grounds in cities like Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta and even
Rawalpindi. Several others were allowed find a safe perch in the tribal areas
and North West Frontier Province. Not only that, it was the Army, and the
`trusted` ally of President George Bush, President Pervez Musharraf who went
ahead and signed peace deals with the tribal leaders aligned with the Taliban
and al Qaida leadership. Musharraf’s successor, Ashfaq Kayani let the Taliban
open another front within Pakistan and run free till the threats came seriously
closer home.
In short, the challenge before the western nations today is to make the Taliban
amenable to the larger interest of Afghanistan, and not Pakistan. And for that,
walking away from Afghanistan could only be a sensible thing to do, if the next
door opens into Pakistan.
Or else, a peace accord with the Taliban will be a defeat for the Western
nations, and a clear victory for the terrorist alliance. It will also help them
consolidate their hold on the sanctuary that straddles Durand Line and gives
them a strategic position to control events not only in Pakistan and Afghanistan
but over the entire South Asia.
A strong and victorious Taliban and its allies would only justify violent means
to achieve political and strategic objectives for Pakistan Army as well as its
strategic tools, the terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyeba.
The Afghan escape would strengthen the Global Jihadi Network that will obviously
become more emboldened to take on the West, this time closer to home.