By Guillem Monsonis, Chief Editor, TTU Weekly, Paris 

“Improvements and modernization make Tunisia a true example for the region”[1] This statement was made in October 2009 by French president Nicolas Sarkozy in letter of congratulations to President Ben Ali after his controversial election. For Paris, the Tunisian events were of particular importance: the colonial past, the need to safeguard French influence in the region, and the Tunisian minority living in France (600000 and around 25000 French nationals living in Tunisia) are important factors in Paris relations with its Mediterranean neighbour.

Did these factors explain France’s disturbing silence during the crisis? Paris initially described the events as “social movements”, and never talked of a “Jasmine revolution”. Under strong political pressure, at the heights of the political insurrection, Sarkozy’s government finally had to leave its support to President Ben Ali, days after the strong stand taken by Germany, the United States and the UK.  For France, the consequences of the Tunisian crisis meant once again the end of a long time support to foreign ruler linked with the post-colonial “Francafrique”[2] networks.

Diplomatic blindness and ambiguity

Paris, like most of the Western capitals, had not anticipated Ben Ali’s regime brutal fall. A few hours before Ben Ali’s escape and his flight to Malta, French ambassador in Tunisia, Pierre Menat, sent a reassuring message to Paris stating that the political situation was under control for the regime. Since then, French diplomacy has been heavily criticized for its blindness, hesitation and ambiguity. As a consequence, in the aftermath of the Tunisian events, the foreign ministry decided to reinforce its prospective cell in order to avoid another affront and to improve its crisis anticipation capabilities.

But behind the French ambassador’s diplomatic myopia lie the consequences of Sarkozy’s hyper-presidential regime: French diplomats try to stay in synch with Elysee Palace’s political line, avoid contacts with local opposition parties, even if it meant hushing up ground realities. Today, French MEA has little control over a diplomacy mostly controlled by Nicolas Sarkozy and Claude Gueant, the general secretary of Elysee Palace.

French intelligence, usually considered as the most active and influential in the Maghreb region, was also taken by surprise and never anticipated the course of political events. Moreover, intelligence agencies underestimated the decisive impact of United States mediation, especially the importance of Washington’s links with Tunisian army’s chief of staff.

One pillar of Paris today diplomacy is extreme caution in dealing with internal politics of its former colonies. It is a direct consequence of the Ivory Coast events of 2004, when France was in the frontline in condemning Laurent Gbagbo’s regime, and paid a heavy price for it[3]. In consequence, French foreign policy is now trying to keep a low profile in these countries, as pointed out by Henri Guaino’s (President Sarkozy special adviser) when he said “France is not the Mediterranean watchdog”.

In addition, Tunisia’s authoritarian ruler was considered in the West as a “non-embarrassing dictator”: it was common, within France’s political class, to praise Tunisia’s improvement in women’s rights, fight against Islamic fundamentalism and economic development. Popular frustration and generalized anger against a corrupt and violent regime was mostly occulted.

Two reasons explain this leniency to Ben Ali/Trabelsi’s regime. First, at the diplomatic level, Paris is put under pressure by Chinese and American growing political and economic influence in its former colonies, and was probably not very keen to push for a regime change in Tunisia. Secondly, behind political justifications -aka keeping a non-religious safe-haven- most of France’s support for the regime was justified by the preservation of French economic interests in the country[4]. With 139 million Euros invested in 2009, France is still Tunisia’s first trade partner.

Political storm in Paris

In the days following the crisis, French Media made some embarrassing revelations about the intimate links between the French political class and Tunisia’s regime, especially French  ministers spending their holidays in governmental resorts of the Tunisian Riviera. Dominique Strauss Kahn, the current IMF president and member of the Socialist Party, praised the “Tunisian model” during a visit in Tunis.

Foreign minister Michelle Alliot-Marie’s decision to offer France’s help to the Tunisian government in matters of law enforcement during the crisis generated a political storm among French political class. The opposition parties asked for her resignation. Worst, a few days  later, a consignment of anti-riot special equipment, about to be sent to Tunis by the French government, was finally stopped at the Paris airport after ithe media exposed the plan..  

In a desperate move, Boris Boillon, a promising young diplomat close to Sarkozy, who was France’s ambassador in Iraq, was  made the new ambassador in Tunis[5]. But it was too late. Many consider that the “Jasmine revolution” exemplified the setback of France’s traditional Arab foreign policy.

Nicolas Sarkozy’s administration almost ruined all the benefits generated by Chirac’s voluntarism and diplomatic push towards Arab countries since the mid-1990s. With the revolt today spreading to Egypt, and tomorrow to other countries, France, which is still considered by many, in France and abroad, as the “land of human rights”, can’t miss this democratic spring because of short term realpolitik considerations.