US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension;
By Hafeez Malik; OUP; Pp 308; Price (Indian)Rs. 475.00
ISBN: 9780195475234 / 0195475232
This book by Dr. Hafeez Malik, Professor of Political Science at Villanova University, USA, is an analytical study of the US power which has been described as the imperial system as against a policy of imperial conquest. The author is well qualified for the job as he has had first hand exposure first as a Pakistani journalist in Washington and later on as an academic in the Eldorado of the modern world.
At the very outset, the blurb set the tone, when it says “While the US power grew steadily through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is now at its peak. The US does not have a countervailing force of any state to contend with and is in this unique position which carries a heavy responsibility for the management of the world affairs”.
Against the background of the US power, the book examines US relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan and highlights the fact that both states have forged new asymmetrical alliances with the US which serve the strategic interests of the United States but also protect the security interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The latter face a serious challenge of violence and terror unleashed by the Al-Qaeda –Taliban movement, which is now in a position to destabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author believes that the present alliance helps to defeat the terrorist movement and provides the basis for national development for both states.
Contents, Preface, 1 Introduction, 2 The Emergence of American Imperium, 3 The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan, 4 Pakistani Territorial Claims on Kashmir and Relations with India, 5 The US Tilt towards India, 6 Diplomatic Calm before the Storm, 7 Policy Change in Pakistan Regime Change in Afghanistan, 8 Consolidation of Power
Devoting a chapter to US and India under the heading, The US Tilt Towards India (Chapter 5), Malik thinks India has taken on new importance in Washington because of China. But the thinking is long-term. For the present both want India and Pakistan to normalize and cool down the Kashmir dispute, China advising peace to Pakistan because it thinks Pakistan will damage itself in the process. Lack of knowledge of China hurts Pakistan all the time. Last time its leaders misread China was when they thought China would intervene in East Pakistan to deter India from dismembering Pakistan. The Pakistani military should be more realistic, but it too succumbs to the trust in China as an all-weather friend.
Undeniably, the US is deeply involved in Afghanistan. President Obama’s plan of early exit is neither here nor there even though his second term is coming to an end. Clearly Washington cannot win the war unless Pakistan collaborates. But Pakistan will collaborate only on its terms and not on the term of the West.
How the White House manages to solve the puzzle will hold the key to peace in Kabul. More so, as the author points out, since Pakistan is entrenched in its policy of dominance in Afghanistan. China’s entry into the Afghan theatre as the shining white knight with loads of yuans has added to the complications in the land locked country.
What is the author’s advice? Well it is a home truth (available on Page 70).
“Less developed states like Afghanistan and Pakistan have to learn the diplomatic skills to be on the right side of the American imperium. If the US is in a position to dictate terms, they too can exploit their weak position to extract as many economic, industrial and educational benefits as possible. As long as these two countries remain politically unstable and fail to evolve stable political systems which best suit their national character, they will remain tempting playgrounds for other more powerful states,” he says