Either the FBI or the CIA can claim to be ignorant of Fai’s activities just as the ISI can not get away with its claims of being ignorant about Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad lair.
Just one fact suffices to nail the proclaimed ignoramuses in Washington and Islamabad.
FBI questioned Fai about his relationship with ISI in March 2007; it also had in its arsenal documents and intercepts that disclose that ISI handlers became argumentative Pakistanis over reimbursing him for the costs of trips or about contracts for which he had not gotten advance approval. The Justice Department sent Fai a letter in March 2010 notifying him of his possible obligation to register as a foreign agent with the Justice Department as required under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA).
A major beneficiary of contributions funnels through Fai and co is Republican Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana. He is the founder of the House Kashmir caucus. He travelled to Pakistan and Kashmir on trips sponsored by Fai’s group, reports the Washington Post reports.
On his part Burton is not denying any knowledge of Dr Fai. Instead, he is contending that he had ‘no inkling of Fai’s involvement with any foreign intelligence operation’.
Even if the Republican Congressman is to be taken on his face value, it tests one’s credulity that the American lawmaker or any of his Congressional staff had had no occasion to verify the credentials of the benevolent donor or at least his source of funds.
Only last month, reports appeared in Pakistani and British news papers that the Pakistan made huge pay-offs to select British lawmakers. The Information Ministry was provided with secret funds for the operation, the reports had said.
Taking the Washington and London date-lined reports together, it becomes clear that the Pakistan government has been running a clandestine lobbying campaign in both capitals through the secret services.
Lobbying is not a dirty word in American lexicon and all most all walks of official America have lobbyists of one hue or the other. Most foreign governments interested in promoting or protecting their interests engage lobby firms run by retired Secretaries of State, State Department Officials or former envoys. Even China has engaged such lobby firms by making payments upfront. Pakistan embassy too has engaged a couple of lobby firms at exorbitant fees.
So, the question is when there are legal and valid channels for lobbying, what was the need for the intelligence agency, ISI to step in. Also why it (lobbying through Fai’s KAC) should be ‘handled by rotating colonels’ with little or no knowledge of lobbying and the laws in the US, as an unnamed Pakistan official told the Independent (July 21).
The answer is simple.
The Pakistan military and its powerful spy agency have no confidence in the ability of highly visible faces of the Foreign Service to deliver on the dotted line.
Also more to the point both Army, the parent, and the ISI, its progeny, are unwilling to trust the career diplomats, bureaucrats and professional politicians with a covert attempt to tilt the U.S. Policy on Kashmir.
However, the operation, like the Pervez Musharraf scripted and directed Kargil Operation, has ended as a clumsy affair. It has left tell tale marks along its way what with a network of at least 10 straw contributors to make the campaign contributions and to donate the bulk of the Kashmiri Center’s annual operating budget.
Fai and his colleagues helped organize these straw contributors. The ISI would reimburse them — or their families in Pakistan — for these donations.
The straw contributors are still to be identified publicly. Court documents identify them only by code. But as and when this lid is blown off, it is sure to leave many in the ISI and the pro-Pakistani Kashmiri community with red faces.
Already those, who were pampered on Dr Fai’s seminar circuit, some Indian egg heads and journalists including, are running for cover. Their credibility is suddenly at stake in the face of FBI affidavit that says ISI handlers had dictated to the KAC chief the agenda for his seminars and the resolutions to be adopted at the end of a seminar. Value for Money spent!
Why did it take so long for the US to go public with the Fai saga?
A charitable conclusion is that the US of A needed a thorough investigation to build its case on actionable evidence and present a sustainable case before the court.
A less charitable conclusion is that the rusticated Fai was a weapon in the US armoury and it had come in handy for an appropriate response to the victimisation of several US moles in Pakistan who had helped in Operation Geronimo and in the CIA funded fake vaccination programme in Abbottabad.
