By Guillem Monsonis*
Despite European guarantees to stick to the letter of the 1973 UN resolution, and a broad consensus on Gaddafi’s unacceptable brutality towards his own people, the multinational military operation, Odyssey Dawn, in Libya started amidst divisions among world powers about its legitimacy.
There has been strong criticism around the world, especially from countries like Russia, China, Brazil and India besides the African Union. Some people, in Europe, may argue that non-democratic countries like Russia and China are intrinsically hostile to interference in national affairs, but what about the opposition from democracies like Brazil and India? Frankly, outside interference in national affairs is an extremely sensitive issue for emerging or developing countries.
Countries that had experienced European colonialism and domination are usually reluctant to support the NATO or Western coalitions in military interventions outside Europe. More over, both governments and the media in these countries tend to see any western move as imperialism and militarism. They are deeply suspicious of foreign interference, which is perceived as a traditional power policy rather than a generous willingness to help and to encourage democratization.
In the Libyan case, some countries, like Italy and Russia, have also important economic ties with Colonel Gaddafi’s regime (arms sales, energy), and they are not particularly prone to regime change. This helps to explain why Vladimir Putin has condemned ‘Operation Dawn’ as a crusade led by the West against Libya. The Chinese vote (in the Security Council, in this case an abstention), necessary to pass the UN resolution, was determined by the influence of the Arab League diplomacy and Saudi Arabia’s good relations with Beijing.
From a Western point of view, especially a European one, North Africa is a strategic region, just a few kilometers away from their shores, and its stability is a major source of concern. Massive immigration waves hitting southern Europe and spreading across continental Europe are a nightmare hunting any European Interior minister.
Beyond that, the defense of democratic ideals and the need for regime change put forward by some influential people in the close environment of Barack Obama (Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton, for instance) or Nicolas Sarkozy (the French philosopher Bernard Henry Levy), have played a notable role in convincing both presidents of the urgent need to start the operation.
In case, if Gaddafi is successful in defeating the rebels, his example may give a fatal blow to the democratic chain reaction in the Arab world, and tell undemocratic regimes that the use of force is the only way to ‘kill’ revolutions.
FRANCE’S COMPULSIONS
Among coalition countries, Paris clearly appears as the main leader in the Libyan crisis – politically and at the operational level. France has deployed 20 military aircraft, an aircraft carrier with a full escort and mobilised space assets. On the political front, France was the first country to officially recognise the rebels, the first to push for a military intervention at the Security Council, and the first to bomb targets inside Libya.
Initial French reluctance to engage NATO in Libyan operations was based on the poor image of the alliance in the Arab world; it was also due to the fact that NATO’s operational procedures wouldn’t have allowed Paris to be so quick with the strikes. Flexibility the operation demands, in the French perception, too would have been at a premium.
The French pro-active strategy gave decisive operational results, since the first bombs delivered by Rafale jet fighters were critical to ‘preserve’ Benghazi from Gaddafi’s troops. For the French diplomacy, there is an obvious need to correct the poor image showed during the Tunisian and Egyptian crisis. More over, this move was intended to reboot Sarkozy’s waning popularity, just one year before the presidential elections.
Some NATO members like Belgium, Italy, Norway and Germany, were not happy with the French willingness to keep the Libya operation out of NATO’s command. This led to numerous diplomatic clashes, especially between NATO’s General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen and the French representatives. Now that the transfer of operations planning to NATO is accepted and implemented by all its members, and the United States withdrew from major operations, France and the UK should stay at the forefront of the ‘contact group’ to lead operations. In order to capitalise on the benefits from this leadership, France needs to find a quick breakthrough to the conflict, and succeed in removing Gaddafi from power.
REBELS, WHAT NEXT
Regime change is obviously the primary objective of the Allied intervention, despite the restraint of 1973 UN resolution, which just calls for a respect of the cease-fire and the creation of a no-fly zone. But who are those rebels who yearn for power in Libya?
Roughly, the rebels are mostly from eastern Libya (Cyrenaica) tribal groups, who have fought for a long time against Tripoli hegemony. Cities like Al Bayda, (formerly a royalist and today an Islamist stronghold), and Darna have joined the revolt.
The movement is led by the “National Council of Transition”, created in Benghazi on Mar 5 under the presidency of Mustafa Abdel Jalil, a former Libyan Minister of Justice.
Politically, the alliance is heterogeneous, and highly disorganised. Some European governments fear that this weakness may facilitate infiltration of the rebellion by terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). However, various intelligence sources tend to consider AQIM and other such groups as marginal and poorly integrated into the local social fabric while the uprising is essentially driven by tribal and democratic considerations.
Poorly trained, equipped and lacking a strong and effective command and control, the rebels are not capable, without coalition’s air support, to face Gaddafi’s troops. In order to compensate for this conventional inferiority, French and British Special Forces have been engaged in the Benghazi sector in training the rebels, especially in artillery operations. Some equipment is also being delivered to the rebels.
There is a risk of small arms proliferation in the whole region. Mali has already warned of the possibility of a major rise in arms traffic in the Sahelian area.
possible scenarios
If the Rebels manage to reach Tripoli, they would face enormous difficulties. The loyalist troops protecting the Libyan capital (among them 6000 mercenaries from Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion) are well trained and they would fight to death. In order to avoid air strikes, they would disseminate among civilians and use them as human shields.
Given the risks, the coalition hopes for a quick regime fall, following the Libyan ‘Guide’ death or overthrow. If threatened, Gaddafi and his praetorian guard could, according to some intelligence sources, leave Tripoli region and retreat to the South, near Sabha.
Long term possible scenarios include a de facto partition of the country, with each faction controlling a part of oil resources. If so, Libya may become a kind of insecure ‘North African Somalia’, and Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would easily infiltrate the region and find a new safe haven in rebel controlled areas. A few days before the UN vote, AQIM made a statement addressing the rebels as ‘Libyan brothers’ and urging them ‘to continue’ the fight against Gaddafi but not to fall into the ‘Western trap’.
Frankly, the ability of the rebels to capitalise from coalition’s air strikes and to defeat Gaddafi’s forces on the ground will be the only long term solution to the Libyan crisis. The possibility of a ground intervention by NATO countries seems highly unlikely, given the diplomatic clash it would generate with China and Russia.
The ‘Contact Group’ should shortly reduce its military involvement and focus on supporting an indigenous process of political transition.
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* The author is Chief Editor, TTU Weekly, Paris
