Pasha’s extension has raised several issues. First it clearly shows the Army Chief’s supremacy over the civilian government and strengthens the existence of a parallel power bloc, a state within a state, which has been the bane of Pakistan since General Ayub Khan took power in a coup. Second, the extension, though endorsed by the Prime Minister, questions the authority of the elected government. Third, the Pasha extension is more than likely to set a precedent in the armed forces. Four, as some analysts aver, civilian government departments may like to follow Kayani’s way, and thus completely undermining the political set-up.
The Army spokespersons have been at pains to contend that that it is well within the power of the Army chief to give extension to a Lt. General. If it is so, Kayani need not have sent the Pasha file to the Prime Minister’s office for approval.
Kayani, in any case, had approved the extension of two other Lieutenant-Generals earlier – Peshawar Corps Commander Masood Aslam and Force Commander UN Mission in Liberia Sikandar Afzal. With Pasha’s extension, Kayani has clearly made it known that the civilian government has no authority over matters of military.
Are these extensions a part of a larger plan to subvert the civilian authority? This question assumes significance since two crucial military posts are falling vacant in a few months. These two posts are Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) in October 2010 and the Chief of Army Staff a month later in November, 2010.
Another aspect of the Pashaism is the unsettling affect on promotions and consequently morale within the army. Extension to a Lt. General by a year unsettles the line-up for next higher level of appointments which are due in the next 8 months. A Major General will have to wait longer for his promotion or even retire without getting the promotion for no fault of his.
There are already murmurs within the army that by choosing to give extension to Pasha on the ground that his presence was essential to continue with military operations against terrorists, Kayani has played favourites. This feeling is likely to intensify if other Lt. Generals are allowed to retire.
There are nine Lt. Generals in the retirement list– Lt-Gen Ahsan Azhar Hayat, Lt-Gen Tanvir Tahir, Lt-Gen Mohammad Ashraf Saleem (March) Lt-Gen Ijaz Ahmad Baksh, Lt-Gen Nadeem Ahmed (May), Lt-Gen Masood Aslam, Lt-Gen Shahid Iqbal, Lt-Gen Zahid Hussain and Lt-Gen Mohammad Asghar (October).
Questions are also being raised whether the army has a shortage of competent officers who can step into the shoes of Pasha.
More significantly, there is growing feeling about Washington’s role in the extensions, a perception which undermines Kayani’s professional image and provokes the possibility of a similar extension for Kayani himself, particularly now that he has proved his credentials to the US by persisting with a military offensive against the Taliban and other militant groups inimical to Pakistan.
Both Pasha and Kayani, key to the US game plan in Afghanistan, have a comfortable working relationship with the Pentagon which is obviously hesitant to deal with a new set of commanders when the Obama administration is planning a honorable exit beginning July 2011.
Although there could be some murmurs within the force about the US role in such decision, the officers are certain to fall in line once Kayani decides to take on the civilian establishment, beginning with the appointment of CJCSC when Lt. General Tariq Majid retires in October 8 this year.
The unwritten rule is that the post of CJCSC is rotated among the three armed forces. Since Majid is from the army, the post should go either to the air force or navy. But this rule has often been overlooked with the army deciding to favour its own over an officer. General Pervez Musharraf, for instance, kept the post with the Army, choosing his confidant, Majid, over other more deserving candidates from other two services.
Both the military and civilian establishment can play mischief with the appointments of CJCSC and COAS. If the next CJCSC were to be chosen from either the air force or navy, the possibility of a confrontation could be lessened. The trouble would be if a junior Lt. General is selected to the post which means other senior Lt. Generals will have to retire after being superceded, leaving the post of COAS to the next in the seniority list.
The civilian government will have a greater control, at least in theory, over the appointment of the next COAS since Kayani cannot give himself an extension. If it does, it could be construed as a coup.
The government can choose to let Kayani retire and choose an officer from the list of Lt. Generals, and thus upset the plans set in motion by Washington and Rawalpindi.
The real question therefore is how much leeway the US would give to the civilian government in appointing the next Pak army chief. Or would Washington be more comfortable with Kayani in the saddle for another year to see through its Afghan exit plan which is critical not only to the Obama administration but to Pentagon itself.
