Iranian threat has become a key issue in the Middle East since the early 1990s, mostly due to the fact that many governments are concerned about the Iranian activities. Moreover, the Iranian strategy has several dimensions. First, Iran is making intensive efforts to achieve hegemony in the Middle East, as well as in the Muslim world. Being the largest Shiite state, Iran is leading the Shiite camp as a challenge to the Arab Sunni bloc. Thus Iran has created during the last decade a Shiite-radical axis which goes from western Afghanistan, through Iran, Iraq, Syria (which is not Shiite, but its Alawite regime is close to the Shiites) and Lebanon, and has sent an arm to Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations in the Gaza Strip. Since 1987 Iran is making a major effort to advance a nuclear military program. If Iran manages to acquire that weapon, it will change the Middle East. `
The possibility that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons is regarded as a major threat by many governments in the Middle East and beyond the region. The threat is so seriously perceived that the American and Israeli governments consider a military operation aimed at destroying the Iranian nuclear sites, and leaders of Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states urged the US administration to do everything to stop the Iranian nuclear efforts.
Until seven-eight years ago an intensive debate took place among governments, intelligence communities and experts regarding Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons. While the American and Israeli governments believed since the early 1990s that Iran was making serious efforts to develop nuclear weapons, other governments claimed that Iran lacked capabilities and/or intentions to produce nuclear weapons. This debate is over, since so many details have been revealed about the Iranian nuclear program that they leave no room for doubt that Iran is close to get nuclear weapons. These details have been disclosed by western intelligence communities, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Iranians themselves.
Thus, for the last few years there is almost an international consensus that Iran has made a very significant progress toward acquiring nuclear capabilities. There is even a consensus regarding the timetable of the Iranian nuclear program. Leading Western intelligence communities estimate that at the moment Iran probably has not decided to break out for the nuclear bomb, for two reasons: first, the Iranians want to minimize the costs of the decision to produce the bomb and therefore they are waiting for the optimal timing to do it; and second, the Iranians intend to produce not only one bomb but an arsenal of at least several bombs, and therefore they are building simultaneously a wide range of various nuclear capabilities that will allow them, once they decide, to produce a number of bombs within a short time. Leading western intelligence estimate that once Iran decides to break out for the bomb, technically it can produce its first nuclear bomb within about a year after the decision is made.
How to Stop Iran: The Diplomatic Option
The debate on the Iranian nuclear issue is focusing today on two main questions. First, can Iran be stopped before it acquires nuclear weapons. There are two main options to stop Iran. The first option is the diplomatic efforts to convince Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program through negotiations. While all the relevant governments prefer this option, since it is not risky, there is an understanding that just negotiations will not convince Iran to suspend its program. The negotiations between Iran and the P+1 governments (the permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) started by 2002-2003, yet no real progress has been achieved. Iran has not shown any intention to agree on a real compromise, and used the negotiations to gain time in order to advance their nuclear program.
On the background of this experience, there is today an international consensus that it is necessary to impose economic sanctions on Iran in order to induce it to compromise. Even the Russian and Chinese governments supported four times in the UN Security Council, between 2006-2010, the resolutions to impose sanctions on Iran. Yet the Security Council sanctions were light sanctions, and until the summer of 2010, the sanctions had no real impact on the Iranian economy.
There are two main reasons for that. First, there is no agreement regarding the severity of the sanctions that should be imposed. There is a significant difficulty to build a wide international consensus to impose effective sanctions on Iran, due to important economic and political interests of various governments with regard to Iran. The governments that have reservations regarding the sanctions are mostly East Asian governments, which import growing amounts of Iranian oil, as well as the Russian government which has close relations with Iran due to political and economic considerations. And second, Iran has been under western economic sanctions since 1979. During this long period of time Iran has learned how to live with the sanctions, and has developed various measures which enable it to evade the sanctions and reduce their impact. Clearly, the fact that Iran is a major exporter of oil helps it to cope with the sanctions.
Since the summer of 2010, and especially since the summer of 2012, the American administration has initiated the imposition of a new wave of much more severe sanctions on Iran. This time the sanctions have affected two of the most sensitive sectors of the Iranian economy: the oil sector and the banking system. Moreover, the European governments have taken part in these sanctions. The new sanctions have been painful for the Iranians.
The European governments have imposed an oil embargo on Iran, which – together with the isolation of the central bank of Iran – have reduced the oil export of Iran, and hence the foreign currency revenues of the Iranian government. Many international companies have left the Iranian economy and reduced their investments there, especially in the energy sector. As an outcome, the value of the Iranian currency, the Rial, has been reduced and the prices of many basic products have risen.
Yet, despite the painful sanctions, so far there is no indication that Iran is willing to compromise. Iran is indicating that it is ready to resume the negotiations regarding its nuclear program, and perhaps might consider some arrangement regarding the enrichment of uranium to the level of 20% conducted by Iran during the last three years. Yet there is no indication that Iran is willing to give up its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. It seems that at this stage the Iranian regime is ready to cope with the economic distress in order to acquire the nuclear weapons, as long as the sanctions do not create domestic unrest, or as long as it does not face a threat of an imminent military attack against its nuclear sites.
The Military Option
The other option to stop the Iranian nuclear efforts is the military option: to carry out a military operation against Iran’s nuclear sites. There is no doubt that a military attack on the Iranian sites is a problematic and controversial option. The operation is very complicated from the military viewpoint. The Iranians will probably respond by firing ballistic missiles and carrying out terror attacks against Israel and the United States, and perhaps against American allies in the Gulf area. The Iranians might try to reconstruct their nuclear sites, and then decide to break out for the bomb. Many governments will condemn the attack, and the Iranians might use it to remove the sanctions imposed on their country. And the attack might bring about a rise of the oil prices. Yet such an operation is feasible: the United States has better capabilities to carry it out, yet Israel claims that it can do it as well, although there are prominent political and military figures in Israel who are against such an operation.
Before making a decision to attack, Israel will be required to answer a series of critical questions: What is the chance that the economic sanctions will prove to be effective? Are its military capabilities sufficient to carry out a successful operation? Is the intelligence needed for such an operation accurate enough? How will Iran respond to such an attack, and what will be the impact of its response? How much time can be gained by destroying the nuclear installations? What will be the international and regional response, including the reaction in Arab states, to the attack? Will the American administration decide to carry out the attack? If it decides not to attack, will the administration give a "green light" to Israel to launch the attack? Can Israel initiate an attack without receiving a “green light” for the operation from the administration? What is the optimal timing for the operation? What is the balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the operation? And finally, what is the alternative to the military operation? In other words, can Israel live under the shadow of nuclear Iran? This is a cluster of very difficult questions – each question is difficult to answer, and calculating the bottom-line answer to the entire set of questions is even more difficult.
Due to the difficulties involved in a military operation, only two governments have considered a military operation – the American and the Israeli ones. All the other governments oppose such an operation and will not take part in it. Yet there is disagreement even between the Israeli government and the US administration. While the American administration maintains that all the options regarding Iran are on the table, including the military one, it also emphasizes that the current conditions are not ripe for a military attack on Iran. It claims that the impact of the economic sanctions has not been exhausted, that such an attack might not achieve its aims, because it will only delay the Iranian nuclear program and will not stop it altogether; moreover the attack will lead to negative consequences in the Middle East, like an Iranian response against US targets and its allies and rise of the oil prices.
On the other hand, Israel claims that the sanctions have not proved to be effective, since there is no indication that Iran has changed its mind regarding an agreement to suspend its nuclear program. Moreover, Israel emphasizes that time is running out and within the coming months Iran will enter what Israel has defined as the “zone of immunity”, for two reasons: first, once Iran will acquire its first bomb, or even produce enough fissile material for a bomb, it will be too late to attack; and second, Iran is constantly improving the protection of its nuclear installations, and before long it will be very difficult to attack them, if possible at all. Moreover, it is clear that once Iran gets the bomb, there is no chance not only to attack it, but also to convince it to give up its nuclear weapons. It is a fait accompli.
Hence, during the last year Israel has declared that it cannot wait too long regarding a military operation, and asked the American administration to set a clear timetable for continuing the negotiations with Iran, after which a military operation will become a viable one. Israel has also asked the US administration to strengthen the credibility of the military attack, and avoid undermining it by emphasizing the difficulties involved in the operation.
It should be emphasized that Israel is not alone in emphasizing the need to seriously consider the military option. As it was mentioned, the Wikileaks documents have disclosed that during the last years several leaders of the Gulf states, and most importantly King Abdallah of Saudi Arabia, asked the American administration to make any effort needed to stop the Iranian nuclear program, even by carrying out a military operation. In addition, in the United States itself, a number of political and ex-military personalities claimed that a nuclear Iran is more dangerous than a military attack against it..
At the current stage, the Obama administration is intending to give some more time to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions and the outcome of the pressures exerted on Iran, and may try once again to negotiate with Iran. The administration is not very optimistic with regard to the outcome of future negotiation, for at least three reasons. First, Iran is still insisting that the European governments will recognize its right to enrich uranium and remove the economic sanctions imposed on it.
In other words, Iran wants to maintain its capabilities to produce fissile material and develop the bomb. Second, during the last round of talks with Iran, in the spring of 2012, the western governments insisted, among other demands, that in the framework of an agreement Iran will close its nuclear site in Fordo – one of the most critical sites of Iran; Iran,of course, rejected the demand. Iran rejected other demands as well. And third, there is no minimal degree of trust between the parties, especially between Iran and the United States. There is a basic suspicion and misunderstanding between the parties. Without trust future negotiations are expected to fail as well.
So far, the strategy of the Obama administration is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, not to contain it. This is a strong commitment. It means that Obama is committed to make sure by all means that Iran will not get the bomb; it rejects the strategy of containment, which means that if Iran gets the bomb, it will make any efforts to deter Iran from launching a nuclear attack against any country. However, if the administration concludes that it exhausted the diplomatic efforts, it might face two very difficult options: to accept the fact that it cannot prevent Iran from going nuclear, or to carry out a military operation against Iran.
The Implications of Nuclear Iran
The fact that until now the diplomatic option has not convinced Iran to suspend its nuclear option, and that the military option is controversial and faces strong opposition even in the United States and Israel, created a severe concern regarding the scenario whereby Iran acquires nuclear weapons despite the preemptive efforts. This concern raises a very important question: what are the implications of nuclear Iran? The prevailing view is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will significantly contribute to the instability of the Middle East. Iran with nuclear weapons might conduct a more aggressive policy – toward moderate Arab and Muslim regimes as well as the American military presence in the Gulf. Iran will strengthen its position as the cornerstone of the radical Islamic camp, and will increase the pressures on moderate regimes in the Middle East to adapt their policy to Iran.
And above all, other Middle East countries – especially Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and in the longer run Syria and Iraq – might join the nuclear race following Iran and develop their own nuclear capabilities. Until now only a few Arab states had tried to develop nuclear military program. The most advanced attempts were made by Iraq under Saddam Hussein during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet his nuclear program was destroyed twice – by an Israeli aerial attack in June 1981 and by the US forces during the First Gulf War in 1991. Syria tried to develop another nuclear program, with North Korean assistance, by the early 2000s, yet it was destroyed by an Israeli aerial attack in September 2007. A few other Arab states, like Libya, tried to develop nuclear programs, but they stopped their efforts in initial stages.
It should be noted that the fact that Israel has been assumed to build a large arsenal of nuclear weapons since the 1960s was not a reason for the Arab states to develop their own nuclear arsenals, perhaps with the exception of Syria. The reason is that Arab leaders have been convinced that Israel is keeping its nuclear arsenal only for an extreme danger to its existence, and it does not intend to use it against Arab states under any other circumstances; since such extreme danger to Israel’s existence was not expected, due to its military superiority over the Arab armed forces, it was not expected that Israel would be forced to consider a nuclear strike against Arab states. Moreover, Arab leaders have assumed as well that the United States would exert a heavy pressure on Israel to avoid using nuclear weapons, and that would even send American forces in order to prevent an Israeli nuclear strike.
The Iranian case is different from the viewpoint of Arab leaders. None of them is concerned about an Iranian nuclear attack against their territories. Yet they are concerned about the regional implications of nuclear Iran mentioned above. Hence, one should take into consideration that some of the Middle East governments will decide to follow Iran, the more so since if Iran goes nuclear there will be two nuclear players in the Middle East – Iran and Israel. Each of these countries might have a different motivation to develop a nuclear weapon. For Egypt, the leader of the Arab world, it will be difficult to notice that not only Israel, but also Iran acquired nuclear weapons. Same will be true also for Turkey. Saudi Arabia will face a new strategic threat emanating from Iran, and might need a new deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons. Iraq had tried already to develop nuclear weapons under Saddam Hussein, and might return to its old aspirations. And Syria, which tried already to build nuclear capabilities during the former decade, might follow Iran and resume its nuclear efforts in order to develop a strategic weapon against Israel.
The Implications on Israel
Israel is a unique case in this framework. In addition to all these implications, nuclear Iran will aggravate Israel’s security concerns. By acquiring nuclear weapons Iran will create an additional layer of deterrence against Israel and the United States. Even the United States will find it more difficult to deter Iran once it possesses nuclear weapons, and its freedom of action vis-à-vis Iran will be reduced. If Iran obtains nuclear weapons it might provide Syria with a nuclear umbrella in case of a confrontation with Israel. If this happens, it might encourage Syria, in the long run, to consider a military attack against Israel, enjoying the Iranian nuclear safety net, and limit Israel’s freedom of action and strategic deterrence in case of a military confrontation with Syria.
In addition, nuclear Iran might limit Israel’s freedom of action against Hizbollah, and encourage that organization to initiate military activities against Israel. Some observers suggest that Iran might provide terror organizations like Hizbollah with nuclear weapons. Yet the probability that Iran would do it appears low. It is doubtful what Iran can gain from that supply. If Iran provides Hizbollah with nuclear weapons it will be immediately clear that the weapons came from Iran. If the aim is to defend Hizbollah against Israel, Iran can do it by itself. Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons by Hizbollah might get out of control, and in any case Syria would probably oppose the idea that an organization in its backyard would possess nuclear weapons.
More importantly, Israel has a unique perception of the threat emanating from nuclear Iran. It was mentioned already that many governments are concerned about nuclear Iran, especially due to the instability that will be introduced into the Middle East. Yet none of these governments is concerned about the possibility that Iran will attack their territory with nuclear weapons. Israel is different. It does take into account the possibility of an Iranian nuclear attack against its territory. This threat perception has two roots. First, if Iran goes nuclear it will be the first time in the history of Israel that an enemy country will acquire the capability to inflict a fatal blow against Israel. And second, Iranian top leaders speak explicitly about the need to eliminate Israel. The combination of these two elements – the future lethal capabilities and the intentions as they are expressed by Iranian leaders – is the reason why many Israelis believe that nuclear Iran might create a threat to Israel’s existence.
Will Iran launch a nuclear attack against Israel?
At the moment there are no indications regarding the future Iranian nuclear policy, and it is possible that the Iranian regime has not decided how it would use its nuclear weapons once it acquires them. If Iran, however, will act as a rational player, it will probably not attack Israel, or any other country, with nuclear weapons. There are three reasons for that. It seems that Iran had decided to produce nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense – against Iraq in the past and against the United States today.
Though the Iranian leaders would like to wipe Israel off the map, as they suggest, it seems that they have not decided to develop nuclear weapons in order to achieve this aim. Moreover, the Iranians believe, like everybody does, that Israel has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, and that probably Israel has a second strike capability. Hence, if Iran launches a nuclear attack against Israel, Israel would respond in coin, and the outcome of a nuclear attack on Tehran – a capital with 14 million people – will be devastating for the Iranians. And finally, Iran is very much aware of the special relationship between the United States and Israel and that the American administration is committed to the existence and security of Israel. Hence, Iran will have to take into account, especially if the American administration clarifies it explicitly, that a nuclear attack against Israel would be followed by an American nuclear attack against Iran.
This conclusion should have three reservations. First, the assessment that Iran possibly will not carry out a nuclear attack against Israel, though it is a rational assessment, could be mistaken, since strategic assessments are wrong in many cases, more so, since there is no solid basis for assessing Iran’s intentions. The assessment regarding nuclear Iran is based on assumptions, not on facts, because Iran does not supply any facts or indications with regard to its future nuclear policy. Second, it is difficult to judge the role of religious, ideological and fundamentalist motivation in the Iranian decision making. Iran has a unique leadership: the Iranian regime is the only one that its supreme leader is not a politician or a military man, or an ex-military man; he is a religious leader, and religious leaders may have a different set of considerations which may include religious motivation. In other words, the Iranian regime might be rational – but rational in Iranian terms, not necessarily in western or democratic terms. Thus, one should not rule out altogether the possibility that the Iranian leaders might decide to carry out a nuclear attack against Israel, though its probability seems to be low.
And third, even if Iran does not decide to launch a nuclear attack against Israel, one should take into consideration an unintended nuclear confrontation. Until now there have been no communications or dialogue between Iran and Israel, because Iran does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and hence it rejected all the attempts to develop a dialogue between them. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran will create two nuclear players in the Middle East – Iran and Israel – which have no communication between them. The outcome could be a rapid deterioration, even a nuclear confrontation, due to misunderstanding, miscalculation and other mistakes. It should be emphasized that such a complete lack of dialogue between nuclear players in the same neighborhood has never existed before in other parts of the world.
Israel is not alone in the front against nuclear Iran. Yet since Israel is in a unique position, the dangers involved in the nuclear Iran scenario will require Israel, together with other governments, to make any effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, Israel and other Middle East countries will have to prepare themselves for a scenario whereby Iran acquires nuclear weapons, and strengthen their deterrence toward Iran. Such a scenario will require also special efforts by the United States and other powers to make sure that Iran will never use nuclear capabilities.
Finally, the best solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is probably a change of the Iranian radical regime. The potential of such a change exists already. Many Iranians want a different kind of regime – a regime which would open the political system, reduce the intervention of the government in the daily life of its citizens, conduct a better economic policy and improve the economic conditions and eliminate the corruption which characterizes the current regime. The hundreds of thousands of Iranians which marched in the streets of the large cities in June 2009, shouting “death to the traitor” are reflecting the desire to change the regime. At this stage the regime has managed skillfully to crush the demonstrations and contain the unrest. Even the so-called "Arab Spring" has not affected Iran until now. Yet the opposition to the regime is still alive, and sometime in the future it will come to the surface again. If the regime changes, it will affect the nuclear issue. Of course, if a moderate regime will come to power in Iran before it goes nuclear, it might open the gate for an agreement on the nuclear issue. Yet even if a regime change takes place after Iran had acquired nuclear weapons, it might present a different approach towards the nuclear issue, and nuclear weapons in the hands of a moderate regime might be perceived as less threatening.
—-Based on Ephraim Kam’s paper at a seminar.
( He is Deputy Director, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv)
