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Al Qaeda not a spent force

Al Qaeda is not a spent force, argues an Israeli expert on terrorism, saying that it is preparing for key role in global jihad behind the ISIS smokescreen. A considerable proportion of the jihadi fighters currently with ISIS may eventually choose to join its ranks, he opines.

The formation of a broad international coalition comprising about 40 Western and Arab countries, with varying levels of involvement, is indicative of ISIS’s success in positioning itself as a global threat. This coalition is already operating in Iraq and Syria, mainly through aerial attacks and providing aid to the forces fighting on the ground. In Iraq, its activity is well defined due to the clear distinction between friend and foe.

The situation in Syria, on the other hand, is more complex, since massively attacking the Salafi-Jihadist organizations including ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Jabhat al-Nusra, may contribute to the survival of the Assad regime, therefore contradicting the essence of coalition formed against those organizations. These organizations, especially Jabhat al-Nusra and its partners from the “Khorasan Army” directed by the Al Qaeda headquarters, have consolidated their position in Syria, gaining control of extensive areas and using them to prepare attacks in neighbouring countries and the West.

In this context, a September 28 statement by Jabhat al-Nusra leader Mohammed al-Julani, condemning the coalition strikes in Syria, should be noted, as he referred to them as “a Western crusade against Islam.” He also threatened of have severe consequences, hinting at possible retaliation in Western countries. Later, threats were reiterated by Al Qaeda’s partners in Hejaz and the Maghreb’s spokesmen.

In his statement, Al-Julani was also critical of ISIS, thereby giving rise to doubt as to feasibility of reconciliation and rapprochement between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, Al Qaeda. The poisonous verbal exchanges between ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi and his spokesmen on the one hand and Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Julani’s patron, on the other, have for months been accompanied by battles between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra over control of large areas in Syria.

Recently, however, senior religious figures in the global jihad camp have appealed to al-Baghdadi, asking him to avoid a fitna (internal discord), considered a grave sin in Islam. This appeal was designed to test the possibility of an alliance against what they consider a “total war” declared by the West against Islam.

The main obstacle in the way of an alliance between the  jihadist organizations is al-Baghdadi’s provocative step of appointing himself as Caliph, placing him above all other Muslim leaders, regardless of their identity, including heads of state, and, of course, leaders of the other Salafi-Jihadist organizations. This self-appointment may prevent cooperation with other leaders.

Nevertheless, the possibility of ad hoc cooperation between field operatives belonging to Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria or other countries cannot be ruled out. In Lebanon, for instance,  Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS operatives cooperated in fighting against Hezbollah and the Lebanese military in the Arsal area where three of the captured Lebanese soldiers were executed: two beheaded by ISIS and one shot to death by Jabhat al-Nusra.

Al-Zawahiri, whose status as leader of Al Qaeda and the global jihad movement has been severely challenged by al-Baghdadi’s actions, is striving to leverage international focus on ISIS in order to divert attention from his organization’s preparations to take advantage of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of this year. Al Qaeda operatives have acquired combat experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan; together with the Afghan Taliban and other local forces, they had also used the Syrian theatre to identify and recruit new volunteers, in order to expand its manpower and train operatives for future operations. That was apparently, the purpose of the “Khorasan Army,” whose existence and objectives were recently unveiled, following the bombardment of its camp in Syria.

These preparations are also reflected in the establishment of the “Al Qaeda in the Indian Sub-continent” (AQIS), whose founding was announced by al-Zawahiri last month (September 2014). The declared purpose of the organization is to reinforce jihadist activity in Pakistan, India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. It has already tried to carry out an ambitious and daring attack designed to damage a Pakistani warship and to attack an American destroyer.

Action on this scale, had it succeeded, as planned, would have caused great damage and cost many lives. Furthermore, the planning of such attacks indicates that Al Qaeda is not resting on its laurels, and is not a spent force as senior American administration officials appear to think.

Although the world’s attention is focused on the effort to stop ISIS, it is clear that there will also be consequences regarding Al Qaeda’s ability to resume its key role in global terrorism. It stands to reason that a considerable proportion of the cadres of fighters on the various jihad fronts around the world, headed by those currently in Syria and Iraq may eventually choose to join Al Qaeda.

This is particularly an option if ISIS proves unable to fulfil its pretentious promises to institute an Islamic Caliphate. Some are liable to find a new home in Al Qaeda in order to fulfil their militant aspirations and desire to take part in the global jihad.

It is also quite clear that Al Qaeda is preparing for a renewal of its activity under the smokescreen of the terror inflicted by ISIS that is blinding the world. Thus the West is liable to find itself again facing an enemy it had already considered past its peak. (Edited version of an article, “Behind the ISIS Smokescreen”, published on INSS Insight, Oct 23, 2014)
 

Yoram Schweitzer
       Head, Programme on Terrorism & Low Intensity Conflict,
       The Institute for National Security Studies,(INSS), Tel Aviv
 

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