Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s announcement last December of a Riyadh-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) received a positive response from Western policymakers. Undoubtedly, the enthusiasm was largely premised on hopes that the oil-rich Gulf Arab states will contain the spread of terrorist groups such as “Islamic State” (Daesh) and al-Shabaab across the Muslim world — from Somalia to Syria and from Libya to Afghanistan.
Yet, the focus throughout has been on the manifestations and symptoms of these organizations’ global terror campaigns. Explicit acknowledgement of geopolitical, religious or ideological leanings of the major proponents of the IMAFT has been lacking within Western discourse.
After considerable initial ambiguity, Pakistan finally welcomed the initiative. Officials in Islamabad confirmed Pakistan’s participation in the IMAFT and stated that the country was waiting for further details in order to decide the extent of its participation in the different activities of the alliance.
When Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm” in Yemen in March 2015, the Pakistani parliament’s vote against Islamabad joining the campaign underscored Pakistan’s ambivalence and preference for “neutrality” in the Yemeni crisis.
Many observers of Pakistani-Saudi reciprocal relations may consider the latter’s position on Yemen somewhat surprising. After all, Pakistan’s military collaboration with Saudi Arabia dates back to the Cold War.
Since the 1970s, Pakistan, with the world’s seventh largest army (made up of more than half a million active troops and the same number of reserves), has signed defense protocols with Saudi Arabia, other GCC members, and Jordan, providing military training and deployment of contingents in advisory positions.
Even today, Pakistani defense personnel remain stationed in Saudi Arabia.
Nonetheless, Pakistan has to prioritize its own foreign policy and internal interests. Situated at the intersection of South Asia, greater Central Asia, Iran, and the Arab world, Pakistan must maintain a delicate balance with regards to the emerging geopolitical environment.
Second, Pakistan’s military posture has traditionally been focused on India. Moreover, dealing with the volatility in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces by means of Operation Zarb-Azb (sharp strike) against militant groups presents a heavy financial burden. Last but not least, the military-political establishment is not convinced of the probable success of the IMAFT.
Pakistan is also experiencing the growing influence of extreme forms of Sunnism and Wahhabism, despite the fact that a significant portion of its population of 180 million is heterogeneous in its sectarian mix.
Indeed, the country is being dramatically radicalized by the influence of the Taliban and, not surprisingly, numerous religious preachers have tacitly pledged their allegiance to Daesh with little resistance from Pakistan’s government.
Accusations of blasphemy are rampant, and there is less and less space for spiritualism, mysticism, and the legacy of the Indus civilization in folk music and literature.
Conversely, the politically conscious masses of the country have so far been abhorrent of the rigidity of the Salafi-inspired landscape against “nominal” Muslims. There is little patience among the general population for the particular criticism of the Shi’ite community, 20-25 percent of the country’s population.
Similarly, the educated elite is exceptionally averse not only to the extremist ideas advocated by Wahhabism against modern institutions and democratic norms, but also to the justification of war against members of the military and security forces in Muslim countries beyond the Arabian Peninsula.
More significant, the Pakistan army, plays a deciding role in the pursuit of Islamabad’s foreign policy objectives.
Consequently, there are few signs of any direct involvement of Pakistan in the widening geo-sectarian cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Last but not least, the intelligence and security establishments, both within and outside Pakistan, are perennially conscious and extremely wary of the specter of nuclear technology falling into the hands of these Saudi-inspired fundamentalists.
In conclusion, there is a lack of clarity concerning IMAFT’s objectives and strategies. The alliance exists thus far as a pronouncement more than anything else. At the same time, non-Arab members of IMAFT are likely to find themselves co-opted in this sectarian initiative.
Hence, this delusionary coalition may persist until a re-shaping of power configurations stabilizes the traumatized Middle East.
– By Dr. Sulaiman Wasty
(Advisor at Gulf State Analytics and the CEO of Sharakpur, Ltd, a Washington, DC based consultancy)