The DWP also mentions a plan to set up “tactical laboratories” for the SAF. This development can also be seen in the light of recent reports on how Pakistan, China’s “all weather friend”, is following the fastest TNW programme in the world. China has been instrumental in making Pakistan nuclear. It supplied short range missiles like M-9 and M-11 which are nuclear capable. One of these missiles is the Nasr which was recently successfully tested by Pakistan.

TNW, as compared to strategic nuclear weapons, have smaller payloads, enable portability and are “counter-force” weapons, which mean knowledge of the enemy orbat is essential for any strike. The current Chinese war doctrine is of “localised warfare under informationised conditions”. Mobility with TNW would blend quite well with such a war doctrine where TNW could be used to gain a quick advantage in a localised battlefield. While actual use of tactical nuclear warheads might be a remote possibility, the proliferation in TNW and the Sino-Pak security alliance may result in another arms race in South Asia.

INFORMATION WARFARE

The next notable feature in the Defence White Paper is the thrust in enhancing China’s Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. This is part of its overall computerisation programme which it calls “informationisation”. Computerisation has rightly pervaded every facet of defence modernisation including IW or network centric warfare. It mentions the progress made in various areas of IW notably the new National Defence Information Network with optical fibre cables as its backbone and satellite and Short Wave as the secondary channels of communication. Areas in which the Chinese plan to focus their IW/computerisation endeavours are recce & intelligence, command & control, battlefield information systems (collectively the C4ISR), the National Defence Information Network, joint warfare, simulated training, development of info-tech management & specialised manpower, workforce for operation & maintenance of new equipment, modern logistics and significantly, nurturing a pool of hi-tech military personnel needed for innovative growth in the IW structure itself.

Military training too would be one area to benefit the most through PLA’s drive for network-centric warfare. The Chinese intend to start broad-based education and training programmes on IW operations through distance education and multiple modes.

IW, quintessentially, involves no bloodshed; costs much less; difficult to detect; has immense damage potential to information, systems and networks and thus can be waged continuously. This has made IW the “in thing” for today’s increasingly networked world. China has invested considerably in IW since 19981  and is believed to have made substantial strides in IW capabilities. Major countries including India have been complaining in the last few years that Chinese hackers have carried out hacking operations on diplomatic, military and strategic installations with varying degrees of success. Chinese authorities expectedly rubbish such charges stating that China itself has been a serious victim of hacking. But the denial has few takers. Whether the renewed thrust on China’s defence computerisation is followed by more complaints remains to be observed.

The Defence White Paper, DWP, has also mentioned other areas which have reaped the benefits of computerisation thus far. These are the policies, laws, strategic planning and management, which govern their IW programme itself, logistics & equipment support services, communications between command & control centres, operational units and support services, and also notably intelligence dissemination.

MILITARY OPERATIONS ABROAD

An area of concern is where the DWP underscores the training of Chinese troops for joint operations in complex alien terrains and climates. For this objective, division/brigade level military exercises would be carried out across China’s seven military regions. This may be interpreted that China is preparing its troops for operations beyond its borders. Till date Chinese troops operating outside the country have done so under the UN banner. That too they have discharged support service roles described as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) by formations smaller than divisions/brigades. Hence, the new training plan indicates that with its overall rise, and increasing economic interests abroad, like in Africa, China getting ready to carry out actual military operations in foreign territories as and when deemed necessary.

JOINT WARFARE

There is considerable emphasis in Defence White Paper on further developing joint warfare capabilities. Current capacity seems to have reached an important threshold which needs further research and production in areas like  combat theories, command regulations for joint manoeuvres/operations and training manuals. Facilities would also be built for building a proper joint operation command system and for developing crack joint troops with multiple skills. Similarly specialised support systems and logistics for joint warfare would also be improved. Noticeable is the thrust behind improving technical intelligence (techint) facilities like UAVs, Early Warning Systems (EWS), reconnaissance, signals, mapping and navigation similar to their plan for developing new ranges of radars for army aviation. Needless to say, facilities like the Beidou satellite navigation system and the recently tested Gaoqing UAV would have potent roles to deliver in their techint operations.

SMARTER TROOPS, SMARTER LEADERSHIP

The section on ‘Reforming Military Training’ and ‘Human Resource Strategic Programme’ of the DWP outlines plans for developing smarter troops and leadership for the Chinese military. Apart from training the troops on joint warfare methods, IW, geographical locations (including space), the young officer and NCO segments would also be trained in specialised hi-tech fields and would be promoted faster. This shows that PLA is trying to bypass the knowledge deficit in the higher ranks by encouraging technical specialisation among its battalion/company level officers and young NCOs who would form a new generation of technically smart personnel in the days to come. Another very interesting feature is a leadership development programme under which 200 personnel would be selected every two years and trained to lead the PLA through scientific and technological innovation.

ELECTRO-MAGNETIC WARFARE

Electro-magnetic (EM) warfare is one area which has been mentioned gung ho in the DWP. It is a relatively new area where directed energy can be used to create natural catastrophes which can turn things upside down for the enemy in a battlefield. The US has revealed an EM warfare project called HAARPS reportedly with such capacities. The Chinese DWP has clearly stated plans to prepare the Navy, Air Force and the SAF for warfare in complex EM environments. Given China’s threat perception of the US in East and South-east Asia, it’s anybody’s guess as to who is on the Chinese EM warfare radar screen.

THREE PHASED PROGRESS: China’s defence modernisation is following a three phased course (san bu zou) of mechanisation and computerisation. The first phase lasted till 2010 during which the PLA met targets of rudimentary computerisation atop basic mechanisation. Thereafter till 2020 the PLA plans to complete the mechanisation task along with significant progress in computerisation. In the next 30 years, i.e. by the middle of the 21st century, the PLA plans to complete the basic computerisation programme. Judging by the rate and nature of growth of the Chinese economy, these targets seem quite achievable under normal conditions.

TAKING STOCK: Despite the peaceful proclamations of the DWP by the Chinese authorities, it is pertinent to point out that much of the new weapon systems, plans and doctrines fall under the category of assault capabilities. These include China’s third generation fighters like the stealth J-20, Hermes space plane, naval strike aircrafts, large marine vessels, submarines, corvettes, short/medium/long range missiles, UAVs, techint facilities, rapid action tactical doctrines by joint warfare troops and army aviation etc.

Whereas, a survey of the core areas of China’s interest, i.e. North-East Asia, East China Sea and South China Sea as well as Tibet and Xinjiang would reveal that the security situation has been largely stable despite some disputes -major and minor alike. The major flashpoints, needless to say, remain the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. Minor ones are mostly territorial disputes and secessionism. These can be resolved with patience, political will, diplomacy and goodwill while maintaining status quo in the near term.

Historically speaking, China has been astute in calculating slim chances of full scale wars and had rightly put its money behind economic growth since 1978. That in turn created a stabilising effect in the disputed neighbourhood creating growth opportunities for all. However, the plans which the Chinese DWP declares may escalate tensions in the region. The mention of the historical mission to reunify Taiwan, unresolved territorial issues and secessionism to justify these aggressive aspects of defence modernisation programme may raise concerns that China is aiming to change the status quo in these regions by force and thereby may trigger developments to meet force with force by other countries in this region. Such a situation would unfortunately be totally antithetical to China’s stated positions on promoting stability, safeguarding harmony and making the most of the strategic opportunity of growth for Asia.