Pakistan has been ruled by military dictatorships for more than 32 years of its independent history, with the country’s last ruler, Pervez Musharraf, ending his reign in power as a widely unpopular individual. The circumstances under which Musharraf took over and subsequently vacated his office left Pakistan’s military having to battle a PR war to regain credibility and respect which had been lost following the 8 year rule by the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS).
The arrival of the democratic government in March 2008 led by President Zardari, gave rise to much optimism for a more stable future under the guidance of a civilian leadership. A little over two years down the line there are increasing signs that Pakistan’s Army is looking to re-establish its position at the helm of political affairs. However, unlike his predecessor, COAS Kayani has been markedly more cautious, giving rise to the notion, that while he might be looking to reassert the dominance of the military in political affairs, the move will not come at the expense of the military’s public image.
The recently concluded US-Pak Strategic Dialogue showed that Washington acknowledged the growing clout of Pakistan’s army in the country’s affairs. Kayani’s visible presence at the helm of the talks was also indicative that Washington was looking towards army headquarters to play a key role in shaping the political outcome of Afghanistan’s affairs – a matter which had thus far been relayed at the governmental level.
n addition, the repeated assertions by US officials of the need to have COAS Kayani and DG-ISI Pasha present at the ministerial talks, was a further indication of Washington’s desire to have Pakistan’s military play an integral role. On their part, Kayani and his delegation pulled off a virtual PR coup, suggesting that the corridors of power had officially shifted back to GHQ in Rawalpindi.
There are reasons to believe that Pakistan’s agenda at the foreign secretary level talks with India were dictated by the army. The insistence of Salman Bashir to give precedence to the long pestering Kashmir and the newly brewing water row over all else, suggests that Islamabad was pressured by GHQ on what matters to address with their counterparts in New Delhi. Kashmir has been figuring regularly in Kayani’s statements for a while. He has reiterated his intention to support the Kashmir cause, reaffirming the state’s importance as the jugular vein of the country. With the Zardari led government giving mixed signals with regards to the Kashmir issue, there is reason to believe that the final decision would have been made in Rawalpindi.
Unlike President Musharraf, COAS Kayani appears to be more of an introvert and a conservative military leader. He has made a conscious decision to maintain a safe distance from the media – avoiding the need to make political statements, other than on the Kashmir issue. His decision to not intervene in domestic political affairs has served him well, with the blame for the current economic and social conditions falling squarely on the Zardari-Gilani government.
However, his reluctance to take to the public stage should not be mistaken as a decision to focus solely on military affairs. Kayani, as with other military leaders, is an individual looking to stamp his authority, although the means by which he is able to achieve his aims are more likely to ensure his longevity, rather than his demise.
Large scale unemployment, inflation and load shedding in virtually every corner of Pakistan have made the civilian government hugely unpopular, and created a situation for which the military will be reluctant to step into – particularly given the bad publicity it received during Musharraf’s tenure. In addition, the diminishing popularity of the democratic government and opposition parties has placed the army in an enviable position, whereby the common man’s respect for the establishment is far greater than it was two years prior.
Given that the military is involved in operations in NWFP and that it is looking to secure its stake in Afghanistan, there is likely to be a certain degree of caution, so as to avoid stretching the resources of the army beyond a manageable point. From the military’s perspective, the Afghan situation presents itself as a long term strategic goal, and as such assumes greater importance than seeing to the revival of the country’s domestic affairs.
In so far as the military’s position is not threatened in Pakistan, it is unlikely to deviate from its current path of securing its position in Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and, continuing with its proxy war against India. Taking over the country at the present time does not suit the interests of Kayani or the military – both in terms of the burden it would place on the military, and with regards to possibly jeopardizing the army’s strategic goals.
While there is unlikely to be a military dictatorship in Pakistan in the immediate future, there are growing indications that the international community has accepted a larger, more visible role for the army. The extension in tenure of DG-ISI Pasha is likely to be followed by an extension for COAS Kayani – meaning that both men will remain at the forefront of the ‘war against terrorism’ for a couple of more years. The latest developments would suggest that while the civilian government of Pakistan remains the voice of the country, the decision makers are the military – meaning that the army will enjoy greater political clout in the months ahead.
There is much debate over whether a return to military dictatorship in Pakistan is being avoided for the fear of losing out on US military and civilian assistance. However, this argument appears to be a fallacy. The US is showing signs of being increasingly dependent on Pakistan for its military success in Afghanistan – a fact to which Rawalpindi has quickly appreciated. As such, a hypothetical takeover is unlikely to result in any long term decisions of consequence against Pakistan, meaning that should Kayani decide to take over the reigns, Pakistan will be able to withstand the implications. Washington’s growing dependence on Pakistan means that both countries are likely to maintain relations should a dictatorship return. However, given the domestic situation, this scenario is unlikely to arise.
Future Scenario
There is a high possibility that Pakistan’s military will continue to enjoy its current passage – whereby it is allowed to assume a greater role in political affairs, while not having to take on the responsibilities of a deteriorating domestic situation. Kayani would have learned from his predecessor’s mistakes and will be content to remain behind the visible face of a civilian, democratic government, while the decisions of consequence are made by GHQ. However, this is not to say that Kayani will not assume a greater role should it be thrust upon him.
A ‘call’ by the Pakistani public for the military to assume a more significant role in domestic affairs, could, in fact, be met by Kayani; nevertheless he will not make any move without being sure that he has support of the public and that the military’s image remains intact. In the medium to long term, there is a definite possibility of military takeover, though it is unlikely to happen before Zardari government completes its term.
