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Fighting among Taliban allies part of American Strategy

Washington is pitting one war lord against the other even as it pampers the likes of Gulabuddin Hekmatyar. Islamabad is jokeying for the driver's seat in Post -US Kabul either directly or through its chosen Trojan Horses, says the analyst.

Infighting between the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami in Jangal Bagh area of Baghlan on Sunday, the March 7th, left 79 killed, mostly belonging to the latter group.  The attack shows the extent of spread of Taliban and its allies to Northern provinces of Afghanistan, which was once the strong hold of anti-Taliban `Northern Alliance’. The clash seems to have been ignited by attempts to gain control over a village and its taxation
 
Media reports quoting Afghan security agencies said members of Hizb-e-Islami, a key ally of the Taliban and a terrorist group aligned to Pakistan’s ISI, fought pitched battles with the Taliban elements, killing, in the process, over 70 civilians. At least a dozen Hizb commanders and 70 members defected to join the Afghan forces which, till now, were adversaries.
 
Hizb is led by a former Afghan Prime Minister and warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who has for long been ISI’s key asset in Afghanistan and responsible for countless terrorist attacks against the US forces.
 
The violent clash among some key Taliban groups appears to be part of Pakistan’s swift manoeuvrings to retain control over the destiny of Afghanistan where many of its `strategic assets` have turned rogue or increasingly coming on the cross-hairs of the US forces.
 
Perhaps the only tentative hope which these developments forbear is the possibility of a division within the Taliban which might give the Afghanistan and US-led forces the much needed upper hand in the battle for stability. A divided and therefore a weaker Taliban is in the overall interest of the region, including India which has been the target of many terrorist attacks by the Taliban and its allied groups in the past.
 
But such a tenuous hope can in fact turn out to be a wishful thinking, given the character and antecedents of the characters involved in this new phase of war against religious extremism in the region. For one, the move by Hekmatyar to separate himself from the Taliban could be a strategic move to exploit the US’ clear impatience to find an honourable exit from Afghanistan by July 2011. Hekmatyar is not a babe in the woods and has been part of the landscape for several decades and has proved in the past to be a crafty adversary. Switching sides has been his stock in the trade and of course his uncanny acumen to survive and flourish has not been a secret either.
 
For Hekmatyar, the move is part of his overall strategy to consolidate his position in the country. His competitor for the same position, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his network is likely to attract the US retribution, giving Hekmatyar a chance to emerge as the most powerful non-State actor in the days ahead.
 
But for Hekmatyar to succeed, his plans ought to align with that of his benefactor and supporter, Pakistan Army.  It does.  Hekmatyar could prove to be a Trojan Horse for Pakistan Army which has had an eye on Kabul ever since the Afghan Jihad days. Although the Army was quite keen to have the Mullah Omar-led Taliban back in Kabul, it has, going by the recent events, decided to play a different game to protect its stake in Afghanistan. A large part of the Army’s influence in the events in Afghanistan came from its hold over the Haqqani network and Hizb-e-Islami. With the US and its allies increasingly getting wary of the activities of these groups and the support given by the army and ISI, a strategic partition between Hekmatyar and Haqqani could give Pakistan an effective leverage over Afghanistan.
 
The Pakistan Army may not sacrifice the Haqqani Network entirely but asked to disassemble for the time being.
 
The Obama administration is quite willing to go along with the idea of dividing the Taliban house by talking to Hekmatyar and bringing his group around to the negotiating table, far away from the battlefield where the US and its allies have been losing men at a distressingly higher rate than expected. It could well be possible that such manoeuvrings have the blessings of Washington. Hekmatyar, on his part, has been quite keen on negotiating with the US and has been part of the secret dialogue at Male recently.
 
So, the latest Hekmatyar move can be seen as another set of moves by Pakistan to retain its control over the terrorist-criminal groups which are the primary sources of violence in the region and attacks on the western forces.  The idea is to stem such attacks, enable the western forces to plan a `victorious` exit and get Pakistan a strategic position in the new political dispensation in Kabul.  On the face of it, it is a win-win situation for Pakistan, the US, Hizb-e-Islami and even the Karzai government.
 
While Hekmatyar’s strategic moves to align with Karzai to be part of US-backed power-sharing arrangements, American strategists should not forget opportunistic and mercenary motives of the Hizb leader.  Always known to be a protégé of Pakistani ISI, he was seen to be more a liability for US as he had targeted fellow-Mujahideen during anti-Soviet resistance movement.  Later, he found protection in Iran for a while.  He is again known to have been taking instructions from Pakistani agency and claimed responsibility for many attacks on coalition forces in the recent years.  
 
For Afghanistan, its people and the region, such moves offer only a mirage of hope. In fact, it camouflages long nights of despair and violence. The US has made it quite clear that it was not interested in the reconstruction of the State and critical infrastructure for the welfare of the people. Pakistan has never shown any interest in progress and development in Afghanistan; in fact it would rather keep Afghan people subjugated to it’s strategic interests. Terrorist groups like Hizb-e-Islami have always been instruments of terror and destruction and are in fact strongly opposed to a stable and progressive Afghanistan.
 

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