The Obama administration’s policy in Afghanistan is quite simple: leave before it is too late. A Vietnam in Afghanistan is the last thing President Barak Obama, and his Democratic Party, want on their platter as they begin their journey for next presidential election.
The critical anchor of this exit policy is Pakistan and its leverage with the Taliban leadership. It is expected that Pakistan would control the Taliban guerillas fighting the US forces in exchange for a leadership role in Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that it has full control over the forces that are the cause of violence in the region.
Such a policy of hopes and expectations is riddled with holes and vulnerabilities which need a careful scrutiny. The pawns in the game must be laid out on the ground before deciding who is playing the game and how. Eight sets of interested parties can be identified. First is the Afghanistan government and its people, second is Pakistan, third is Taliban, fourth is al Qaida, fifth is the US and its allies, sixth is China and likeminded parties, seventh is India and other do-gooders and eight is the fence-sitters like Russia and Iran.
All of them have different perspectives and objectives in Afghanistan. For the Hamid Karzai government, a peaceful and progressive Afghanistan is the ideal goal. Pakistan wants a Taliban-controlled government in Pakistan. The Taliban wants an independent control of the country. Al Qaida sees Afghanistan as the sanctuary for the long war to establish Caliphate. The US wants a strategic hold over the region without getting its hands dirtied or bloodied. China wants a finger in the pie, wants the US to bloody its nose, wants to keep its hands clean and remain a force to reckon with. India wants to keep a toe-hold in the area. The fence sitters are waiting for the losers to seek them out.
Add to this conundrum few realities. Pakistan, even if given the freedom to play out its game in Afghanistan, it is incapable of doing anything substantial except to pay obeisance to the new masters of Taliban. The new Taliban is strictly not the group which Pakistan spawned after the Soviets, and the Americans, left Afghanistan—it is much more divided, more ruthless and is closely aligned with al Qaida and its Arab leadership. So even if the US-Pak strategy is to divide the Taliban into two groups—one which is pro-al Qaida and another which is in control of Pakistan—there is no guarantee that such a group will be capable of keeping al Qaida and its other numerous surrogates in the region at bay. A Taliban in need of al Qaida support in Afghanistan will be the worst case scenario for Pakistan as well as the US.
For al Qaida, the Taliban’s re-emergence can be projected as a victory against the `infidel` western forces, thereby strengthening its networks across the world. It will also give the group a chance to find a safe and secure sanctuary and become an influential non-state actor in the region in the short term. In long term, al Qaida’s goal is to intrude into Pakistan which not only has one of the largest concentrations of Muslim population sympathetic to Osama bin Laden and his ideology but also nuclear weapons. No less a temptation for al Qaida is the presence of officers and men sympathetic to radical causes in the security and intelligence agencies, including Pakistan Army. A Taliban in Afghanistan is therefore bound to draw al Qaida to Pakistan, weakening its moorings further, making its nuclear assets vulnerable to terrorists and sending it further down the road to instability and danger.
Obama’s Afghanistan policy might very well end up in unraveling Pakistan, a far more bigger tragedy for the region and the world.
