.The TTP is said to be hit by internal dissensions with the chief Hakeemullah Mehsud and his deputy Wali-ur-Rehman at each other’s throats, as a local media report puts it. TTP is never known as a homogenous organization. It is a loose confederation of different groups who have come together under a single umbrella for a ‘just cause’. TTP has safe havens beyond the Durand Line and these are provided by the Afghan Taliban, who, are widely known to be close to the Pakistani military establishment.
Pakistan obviously loves myth making but it will do well to straighten things vis-à-vis the Taliban because a double game is a doubled edged weapon as the experience with TTP must have made it to realize by now. There can be no real good or bad Taliban. Either Taliban is bad or Taliban is good. It cannot be both things
PIPS’s report is significant for another reason. It correctly diagnosed the ground realities and lists a number of measures that ‘remain persistently lacking’. These are better coordination among intelligence agencies, capacity building of law enforcement agencies, effective prosecution of suspected terrorists, a confidence-inspiring witness protection program, curbs on terrorism financing and, most importantly, preventing banned militant groups from operating across the country.
The increasing trend of abductions for ransom by the militants and criminals poses another threat, which security experts believe will increase in the coming months. The failure to check growing ethno-political and sectarian intolerance and the influence of militants in Karachi as well as the continuing alienation and radicalization of a largely young and poor population in South Punjab have compounded the problem. As the report observes, ‘Peace in Pakistan would be hard to achieve without considerably improved cooperation among the military, the political government and the people’. And this failure will remain as much systemic as endemic because political and military will appears to be at a premium.
The snags that have hit the Swat Initiative bear this out. The army had taken upon itself the task of rehabilitating ‘thousands of militants and their supporters’ who had surrendered, or were arrested or turned in by their families during the operation in Swat in 2009. Most of these militants remain still in the army’s custody. The programme is a key part of the government’s strategy to safely introduce militants-on-the-mend back into society. But as the Security Report 2011 brings out clearly, the army has very little to show by way of achievement. In fact the Rs 4.4 million Initiative became a victim of funds crunch as adequate budget was no provided for the rehabilitation of the detained militants.
Another ‘snag’ in the programme was ‘too narrow in focusing’ only on lower-cadre militants. The rehabilitation of this segment is important but the programme needs to be expanded to the mid-level militant cadre which has more political and ideological tendencies towards radicalization, as the report points out.