For some time now calm prevailed in most parts of the north-east region which were until recently been marked by intermittent violence. This does not, however, mean the insurgency is over. What could be interesting to most observers is to monitor how the current calm is being handled. Its mishandling could lead to a situation where older insurgent groups and their leaders, are replaced, partly or entirely, by new groups and new leaders. Thus this is a tricky situation.
The demands of various insurgent groups varied from some form of autonomy acceptable to the Indian laws to the secession from the Indian Union. As a result the society and polity of the region have long been the victims of a sustained culture of violence. Over 322 people have lost their lives in insurgency-related violence in the region in 2010– as much as 92 per cent of these incidents occurred in Assam and Manipur. This figure is positive one as compared to the previous years.[1] With the exceptions of Assam and Manipur, there has been a marked improvement in the overall insurgency situation in Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura. The rest––Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Sikkim––remained almost unaffected and hence can be included among the list of the peaceful states in the country.
Recent months have witnessed the arrest of Rajkumar Meghen, the chairman of the Manipur-based United National Liberation Front (UNLF) as well the release of some top leaders of the Assam-based ULFA including its chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa. There is a reason to argue that the developments could change the course of the insurgency in these two states and beyond. But, there are challenges ahead.
Firstly, none of the active Manipuri groups are willing to give up their liberation struggle. The arrest of few leaders or ceasefire with few groups is unlikely to have significant impact on the ground given the large number of active groups in the state. As expected the current suspension of operations involving several smaller groups did not have decisive impact on the ground. Secondly, the release of few Assamese rebel leaders was to facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the Government and ULFA. Being the most influential group in the region ULFA deserves special attention; however, in the absence of its powerful commander-in-chief Paresh Barua the proposed dialogue is unlike to be a smooth affair. Barua has been steadfastly opposing the dialogue even though most of his colleagues intended to do so.
Thirdly, currently several active and not-so-active groups have been officially holding dialogues with the Government to seek resolution of their grievances within the framework of the Indian laws.
Unfortunately, most of these talks are yet to formally start. The only marked outcome has been the decisive decline in the numbers of violent incidents. The high profile talks involving the NSCN-IM and Government have so far been unable to arrive at any major breakthrough to resolve the Naga conflict. This delay has been a cause of concern to its aging leaders and cadres who often alleged lack of sincerity on the parts of the Government. Any breakthrough in the near future is also unlikely because both the insurgent leaders and Government representatives are clueless. On the contrary, some groups have taken advantage of the long-drawn ‘peace talks’ to continue with rampant extortion and organizational expansion. Finally, the Government including the ruling class is not so sincere in trying to find a lasting solution because they are well aware that insurgency is well under control and so ‘nothing to worry’. Therefore, the situation is not so conducive for durable peace despite the prevailing calm.
Amidst this there are conflicting reports over the alleged external support and patronage enjoyed by some groups of the region. But, how they got the patronage is highly speculative given the shaky quality of the available information. For instance, a lot has been written and talked about their Chinese connections and some even constructed the story as a new kind of security problem. Some however argued that the issue appears to have been grossly exaggerated simply by the agenda of those reporting. Therefore, the quality of such information raises concerns over the conclusion drawn including the recent media reports of Rajkumar Meghen claiming to have met Paresh Barua in China[2], and the later was believed to have been based somewhere around the Yunnan province of China and Kachin state of Myanmar. However, the fact of the matter is that insurgent groups used Chinese-made arms and ammunitions, probably procured from the clandestine arms dealers.
Lastly, recent development ought to be encouraging to the Indian policy (security)-planners, but this is not likely to be easy going. Are they ready to exploit the development for durable peace in the region? Are they sincere enough to take the initiative forward? This is doubtful given the past experiences. Mishandling of the situation could quickly return to the heydays of the insurgency of the 1990s because old groups and leaders are likely to be replaced by new groups and their leaders. This has already been manifested with the emergence of little known groups and actions willing to take up the task of sidelining the older generations and to pursue the armed struggles forward. Indian policymakers should mind the generation gap.
— M. Amarjeet Singh, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore
Sources:
[1] This information is derived from the data available at the South Asia Terrorism Portal (www.satp.org).
[2] “ULFA military chief in China: top UNLF leader” (Indian Express, 09.01.2011), and this has been extensively reported by the media.
