i.    After nine years in exile, former Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto
returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, during an exceptionally violent year,
marked by sharp increases in violence carried out both by Islamist extremists
and by the state.  She returned in the context of a tenuous and inconclusive
political agreement with General Pervez Musharraf, as part of a process
encouraged and facilitated by the governments of the United Kingdom and the
United States.  While their discussions included the issue of an eventual
power sharing arrangement, the final terms were never agreed.  Indeed, the
Commission received no compelling evidence that, by the time of her
assassination, either Ms Bhutto or General Musharraf believed that she or he
still needed the support of the other to achieve their ultimate political goals.

ii.    Ms Bhutto was murdered on 27 December 2007 when a 15 and a half
year-old suicide bomber detonated his explosives near her vehicle as she was
leaving the PPP event at Liaquat Bagh.  No one believes that this boy acted
alone.  A range of government officials failed profoundly in their efforts first
to protect Ms Bhutto and second to investigate with vigour all those
responsible for her murder, not only in the execution of the attack, but also in
its conception, planning and financing.

iii.    Responsibility for Ms Bhutto’s security on the day of her assassination
rested with the federal Government, the government of Punjab and the
Rawalpindi District Police.  None of these entities took necessary measures to
respond to the extraordinary, fresh and urgent security risks that they knew
she faced.

iv.    The federal Government under General Musharraf, although fully aware
of, and tracking, the serious threats to Ms Bhutto’s security, did little more
than pass on those threats to her and provincial authorities and were not
proactive in neutralizing them or ensuring that the security provided was
commensurate to the threats.  The federal Government failed in its primary
responsibility to provide effective protection to Ms Bhutto on her return to
Pakistan.

v.    The federal Government lacked a comprehensive security plan for Ms
Bhutto, relying instead on provincial authorities, but then failed to issue to
them the necessary instructions.  Particularly inexcusable was the
Government’s failure to direct provincial authorities to provide Ms Bhutto the
same stringent and specific security measures it ordered on 22 October 2007
for two other former prime ministers who belonged to the main political party
supporting General Musharraf.  This discriminatory treatment is profoundly
troubling given the devastating attempt on her life only three days earlier and
the specific threats against her which were being tracked by the ISI.

vi.    Ms Bhutto’s assassination on 27 December 2007 could have been
prevented if the Rawalpindi District Police had taken adequate security
measures.  The security arrangements for Ms Bhutto by the Rawalpindi
District Police were ineffective and insufficient.  The police’s security plan, as
written, was flawed, containing insufficient focus on Ms Bhutto’s protection
and focusing instead on the deployment of police for crowd control purposes.
In many respects, the security plan was not implemented.  Although the plan
called for deploying 1,371 police officers, the actual deployment did not
approach that number.  Among other failings: the police co-ordinated poorly
with the PPP’s own security; police escort units did not protect Ms Bhutto’s
vehicle as tasked; parked police vehicles blocked the emergency route; and,
the police took grossly inadequate steps to clear the crowd so that Ms Bhutto’s
vehicle would have safe passage on leaving Liaquat Bagh.  The performance
of individual police officers and police leadership was poor in areas of
forward planning, accountability and command and control.

vii.    The additional security arrangements of the PPP lacked leadership and
were inadequate and poorly executed.  The Commission recognizes the
heroism of individual PPP supporters, many of whom sacrificed themselves to
protect Ms Bhutto.  However, Ms Bhutto was left vulnerable in a severely
damaged vehicle that was unable to transport her to the hospital by the
irresponsible and hasty departure of the bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz which, as
the back-up vehicle, was an essential part of her convoy.

viii.    The Rawalpindi District Police’s actions and omissions in the immediate
aftermath of the assassination of Ms Bhutto, including the hosing down of the
crime scene and failure to collect and preserve evidence, inflicted irreparable
damage to the investigation.  The collection of 23 pieces of evidence was
manifestly inadequate in a case that should have resulted in thousands.  The
one instance in which the authorities reviewed these actions, the Punjab
committee of inquiry into the hosing down of the crime scene was a
whitewash.  Hosing down the crime scene so soon after the blast goes beyond
mere incompetence; it is up to the relevant authorities to determine whether
this amounts to criminal responsibility.  Furthermore, CPO Saud Aziz
impeded some Joint Investigation Team investigators from conducting on-site
investigations until two full days after the assassination.  The failure of
provincial authorities to otherwise review effectively the gross failures of the
senior Rawalpindi police officials and deal with them appropriately
constitutes a broader whitewash by Punjab officials.

ix.    The deliberate prevention by CPO Saud Aziz of a post mortem
examination of Ms Bhutto hindered a definitive determination of the cause of
her death.  It was patently unrealistic for the CPO to expect that Mr Zardari
would allow an autopsy on his arrival in Pakistan at Chaklala Airbase nearly
seven hours after his wife’s death and after her remains had been placed in a
coffin and brought to the airport.  The autopsy should have been carried out at
Rawalpindi General Hospital long before Mr Zardari arrived.

x.    The Commission is persuaded that the Rawalpindi police chief, CPO Saud
Aziz, did not act independently of higher authorities, either in the decision to
hose down the crime scene or to impede the post-mortem examination.

xi.    The Government press conference conducted by Brigadier Cheema on 28
December 2007, the day after the assassination, was ordered by General
Musharraf.  The Government’s assertion that Ms Bhutto’s death was caused
when she hit her head on the lever of her vehicle’s escape hatch and that
Baitullah Mehsud and Al-Qaida were responsible for the suicide bomber were
made well before any proper investigation had been initiated.  This action pre-
empted, prejudiced and hindered the subsequent investigation.

xii.    An unequivocal determination as to the cause and means of Ms Bhutto’s
death would have required an autopsy.  The Commission has uncovered no
new evidence to suggest a gunshot injury to Ms Bhutto.  Instead, a senior PPP
official who publicly purported soon after the assassination to have seen
indications of a bullet injury admitted to the Commission that she did not have
direct knowledge of such an injury.

xiii.    Ms Bhutto faced serious threats in Pakistan from a number of sources;
these included Al-Qaida, the Taliban and local jihadi groups, and potentially
from elements in the Pakistani Establishment.  Notwithstanding these threats,
the investigation into her assassination focused on pursuing lower level
operatives allegedly linked to Baitullah Mehsud.  The Commission finds it
disturbing that little was done to investigate Baitullah Mehsud himself, Al-
Qaida and any individuals or organizations that might have worked on,
supported or otherwise been involved directly or indirectly in the planning or
execution of the assassination.  Investigators also dismissed the possibility of
involvement by elements of the Establishment, including the three persons
identified by Ms Bhutto as threats to her in her 16 October 2007 letter to
General Musharraf.

xiv.    The Commission has identified other significant flaws in the Joint
Investigation Team investigation led by the Punjab Additional Inspector
General Abdul Majeed.  It lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from
a lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice.  
This delay further hampered the gathering of evidence.  Despite indications
that there are links between the Karachi and Rawalpindi attacks, there has
essentially been no communication between the investigators on those two
cases.

xv.    The investigation was severely hampered by intelligence agencies and
other government officials, which impeded an unfettered search for the truth.  
Despite their explanation to the Commission that they do not have a mandate
to conduct criminal investigations, intelligence agencies including the Inter-
Services Intelligence agency (ISI) were present during key points in the police
investigation, including the gathering of evidence at the crime scene and the
forensic examination of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle, playing a role that the police
were reluctant to reveal to the Commission.

xvi.    More significantly, the ISI conducted parallel investigations, gathering
evidence and detaining suspects.  Evidence gathered from such parallel
investigations was selectively shared with the police.  What little direction
police investigators had was provided to them by the intelligence agencies.  
However, the bulk of the information was not shared with police investigators.  
In fact, investigators on both the Karachi and Rawalpindi cases were unaware
of information the ISI possessed about terrorist cells targeting Ms Bhutto and
were unaware that the ISI had detained four persons in late October 2007 for
the Karachi attack.

xvii.    More broadly, no aspect of the Commission’s inquiry was untouched by
credible assertions of politicized and clandestine action by the intelligence
services – the ISI, Military Intelligence, and the Intelligence Bureau.  On
virtually every issue the Commission addressed, intelligence agencies played
a pervasive role, including a central involvement in the political negotiations
regarding Ms Bhutto’s return to Pakistan and the conduct of the elections.

xviii.    The Commission believes that the failures of the police and other officials
to react effectively to Ms Bhutto’s assassination were, in most cases,
deliberate.  In other cases, the failures were driven by uncertainty in the minds
of many officials as to the extent of the involvement of intelligence agencies.  
These officials, in part fearing involvement by the intelligence agencies, were
unsure of how vigorously they ought to pursue actions that they knew, as
professionals, they should have taken.

V. Concluding Remarks

260.    It is essential that the perpetrators of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto be
brought to justice.  The Pakistani authorities should ensure that the further
investigation into the assassination of Ms Bhutto is fully empowered and resourced
and is conducted expeditiously and comprehensively, at all levels, without hindrance.

261.    The Commission found that the performance of the Pakistani police was
severely inadequate to the task of investigating the assassination of Ms Bhutto and
lacking in independence and the political will to find the truth, wherever it may lead.  
The Pakistani authorities should consider conducting an independent review that
would fix responsibilities and make those individuals found seriously wanting
accountable for their actions or inactions.

262.    The Commission found that security arrangements for Ms Bhutto were fatally
insufficient and ineffective.  In this regard, as well, the Pakistani authorities should
consider conducting an independent review to determine responsibilities and hold
accountable those individuals who seriously failed in their duties.  In addition, the
Government of Pakistan may wish to consider a review of its security arrangements
for all persons who require the highest level of security and consider measures to
assign responsibility, with accountability, to an office at the federal level that would
work with local police to implement the standing order and standard operating
procedures.

263.    In light of the deeply flawed performance and conduct of many of the police
officials involved in the events addressed in this report, the Commission believes it
would be appropriate for the Government of Pakistan to consider undertaking police
reform measures consistent with the principles of democratic policing and operating
in a structure of accountability for protecting the rights of the individual, as set out in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

264.    Pakistan, like any other state, needs strong and effective intelligence agencies.  
However, the autonomy, pervasive reach and clandestine role of intelligence agencies
in Pakistani life underlie many of the problems, omissions and commissions set out in
this report.  The actions of politicized intelligence agencies undermine democratic
governance.  Beyond the recent steps that have reportedly been taken to curb the
involvement of intelligence agencies in political matters, the democratic rule of law in
Pakistan could be greatly strengthened with a thorough review of intelligence
agencies based on international best practices in this area.

265.    The assassination of Benazir Bhutto occurred against the backdrop of a history
of political violence that was carried out with impunity.  To address this issue, Pakistan should
 consider establishing a transitory, fully independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission
 to investigate political killings, disappearances and terrorism in recent years and to provide
 victims of political assassinations and terrorism material and moral reparations.  The United
Nations principles for the protection and promotion of human rights to combat impunity provide
 guidelins for such a commission.

266. It is difficult to overstate the effect on the Pakistani people of the shock of the assassination
 of Benazir Vhutto and the loss to her country. these events have been variously described to the
 Commission by Pakistanits as earth shattering and traumatic, and the loss as incalculable. The
Commission hopes that this report will help shed light  on the truth behin d this heinous crime
and support steps towards ending impunity. It is solelty up to the competent authorities to make this happen.

Signed: Heralo Mufizo Valenzuela
               Marxuki Darusman
               Peter FitzGerald
New York, April 15,. 2010