This is where the question marks begin appearing. How come Headley appeared on the horizon almost a year after the Mumbai attacks and that too by sheer accidental questioning at the Chicago airport?  If Headley had played such a key role in the Mumbai attacks, then how, and why, did some of the best intelligence agencies in the world (India, US, UK and Israel) failed to detect him? More intriguing is how come all the intelligence agencies in the US—FBI, CIA, New York Police Department and other agencies—missed to detect a US national visiting LeT camps in Pakistan between 2002-2003?

There are other missing gaps in the information available in public domain so far which calls for attention. Who and how was Headley recruited into LeT?  And what was so special about Headley that LeT decided to entrust him with planning some of the most audacious terrorist attacks—one which never took place in Denmark and the other which saw 10 fully armed and trained terrorists laying siege on India’s financial capital for over 60 hours in November 2008?  

There is no information on the recruitment of Headley. There could be some clues to a possible answer in the way LeT has been recruiting its foreign cadre in the past. The group adopted two ways—one direct and another indirect through internet or supporters in the immediate neighbourhood of the recruit.  Since Headley had not walked into Muridke to be recruited as a LeT member, it is certain that he was enlisted through indirect means. Like many other foreign recruits to LeT, Headley could have been indoctrinated in the local mosque and chose LeT camps for training. He could have used LeT’s web to establish links with the leadership in Pakistan. Or he could have been approached by a local sympathizer or supporter of LeT. There is no mention of either of these possibilities in the FBI case. There has not been any additional arrest in Chicago or anywhere else in the US either, except for Tahawwur Rana who facilitated Headley’s frequent travels.

Then, what was so special about Headley that LeT not only trained him on several occasions but also decided to incorporate him in the Mumbai attack planning? There is nothing about Headley which offers any clue. Headley has been characterized more as a play boy, quite adept at enjoying all possible pleasures of life and not as a hardcore radical LeT member. LeT on the other hand has never allowed an `outsider` any say in the decision making. Foreign recruits have always been used to infiltrate the target country or set up cells or scout for targets of attack.

It would be therefore quite logical to believe that Headley could have been at best a scout for LeT in India. But that too begs a question—LeT has enough resources in Pakistan and in India to recce potential targets, and in any case, technological tools like Google map and wikimapia are quite useful in mapping such a target line. If Headley was more than a scout, then what was he doing in India?

Interestingly, although the Indian security agencies have managed to track down Headley’s travels across the country, there have been no significant arrests. Instead, there have been some important arrests in Bangladesh where Headley had not gone even once. At least one of the clerics arrested in Bangladesh, termed as a LeT coordinator, said he was in regular touch with Headley and Hafiz. The question is how did the cleric knew Headley when the latter had never met him. What adds to the puzzle is the absence of Headley’s trail in Pakistan except about his travels to the LeT training camps which too has been left vague. For instance, did he train at Muridke or Baitul Mujahideen?

These questions do create a bigger interrogation mark—Is FBI telling the entire truth? Or is Headley a red herring to divert attention from the real culprits of the Mumbai attack—Pakistan Army and ISI?

Going by the FBI documents, Headley was dealing with Saeed, Zaki-ur Rahman Lakhvi and Illyas Kashmiri, all closely aligned with the security apparatus in Pakistan. Barring a retired Major, there is no mention of any other retired or serving military officer in the Mumbai terror attack plot. It is quite well known that Lakhvi and Kashmiri worked with senior ISI officers of the rank of Brigadiers and Major Generals. Likes of Saeed get invited to gatherings hosted by Lt. Generals. With such clearly visible linkages between LeT and Pakistan Army, it is rather surprising that FBI failed to locate Headley’s handlers in the army, even after his partner-in-crime, Rana, had admitted to either having known or related to  two serving Brigadiers.

Where does Headley fit in this jigsaw puzzle created by anonymous sponsors of terror?