One is the most obvious – flexing of Pakistan muscles for India to see, a show of strength, a countermove against India’s Cold Start doctrine. The army has been quite keen to brief the media of the exercise. The army has not only been putting out at regular intervals press statements about how the exercise has been validating the counter to Indian doctrine but also quite surprisingly, had even taken a group of Indian journalists to its western border areas where it was battling the renegade elements of the Taliban and other terrorist groups who are no longer under their control.

The second is no less obvious. It is clear from the contours of the exercise and at the almost boastful claims of the Generals for whom the sole raison’detre of Pakistan army has been and will always be India.

The exercise is designed to divert focus away from the vortex of a crisis it is increasingly drawn into and the visible helplessness in extricating itself at this point in time.

The crisis is both in the leadership and public image. The army has managed to retain its hold over Pakistan by its sheer economic and political clout and its image as an institution that works- a saviour. That image received a serious blow when President and Army Chief, Pervez Musharraf, had held the country hostage to his personal whims.

General Ashfaq Kayani came on the scene with Musharraf’s patronage. He has tried to reverse the process, and managed to do so, largely because weak and inept political leadership gave him enough breathing space to recreate an image of invincibility and prestige for the army.  But that was short lived.

Kayani’s moves were counter-productive. He brokered a deal with the Taliban and its allies in the name of containing them as the militants were running amok within the country; he pretended to take counter-offensive against some of them and found to his chagrin that they were now bombing close to his home. The series of attacks on Army and ISI offices and personnel are a clear sign of Kayani’s failure and the army’s traditional duplicitous policies towards terrorist groups.

As the number of attacks in Punjab went north sharply, the General was faced with the challenge he could have done without—if he did not stop the bombings and killings inside Pakistan, it would be seen as a sign of weak and inept Army, an image Kayani would not like to leave as his legacy.

So Kayani did a 60-degree turn around and decided to take on some of the terrorist elements which were targeting Pakistan. It meant two things—kill his own people, Pashtuns largely and seen to be doing Washington’s bidding.

The disclosure that the American drones were being launched not from Texas but from Pakistan soil hardly helped the army chief’s bid to distance himself from being Uncle Sam’s poodle, not much different from what Musharraf turned out to be.

Today, the Pashtun community is in ferment and the Army leadership is not really sure where will the `war on terror` next go and with what effect on Pakistan’s integrity and sovereignty.

Kayani’s decision to grant a year’s extension to his confidant, Ahmed Pasha, as the ISI chief was a sign of a crisis in the chain of command—the all powerful General was not really sure of the new incumbent in the ISI chair whose support was crucial to his plans.

Till now, the Pak army chief, a deeply religious man, has managed to steer himself out of public disgrace by a deft media management and public relations exercise. His outburst against the Kerry-Luger Bill was a case in point although his not so public meetings with the top US military and civilian leaders thereafter settled the dust as quickly as it was kicked up.

Kayani has been projecting himself and the army as the sole arbiter of Pakistan’s destiny, again much on the lines of Musharraf who had described himself as a saviour of Pakistan publicly. But times have changed.

Today’s Pakistan is more divided —Pashtun vs. Punjabis, Judiciary vs. Politician, Politician vs. Army and so on – than any time in the past. So, the question is how far Kayani can keep the pretences…

The 18th amendment and the UN report on the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have only added to the army’s bag of troubles. Under the new statute, the power of appointing the army chief and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) vests with the Prime Minister. The post is falling vacant in another five months, in October 2010 to be precise.

The Prime Minister has an opportunity to upset many an apple cart in the army leadership. By picking up an officer relatively down the line, the PM can effectively force Kayani’s men to retire and leave the door open for his own appointee as the new Chief of Army Staff.

A whole chain of events challenging the army’s supreme authority is about to unfold and Kayani finds himself in the unenviable position of leaving the troubled ship midstream. He has, therefore, picked up the most enduring lesson from the army’s history….fire guns at India, and not let the people forget that it is the army alone which can defend Pakistan from the arch enemy.

The military exercises are a desperate attempt by Kayani and his men to regain the Army’s hold over Pakistan.