131.    Many senior Pakistani police officials have explained to the Commission that in
law and practice, the ranking police official at the scene of the crime takes decisions
relating to crime scene management.  SP Khurram asserted that he made the decision
to hose down the scene.  Before issuing the order to the rescue and fire services, SP
Khurram called his superior, CPO Saud Aziz, to seek permission, which was granted.
Sources, including police officials familiar with the case, have questioned the veracity
of SP Khurram’s claim that the decision was his initiative.   

132.    CPO Saud Aziz’s role in this decision is controversial.  Many senior Pakistani
police officials have emphasized that hosing down a crime scene is fundamentally
inconsistent with Pakistani police practice.  While they acknowledge that there is no
uniformity of practice in crime scene management in Pakistan, the hosing down of a
crime scene is considered extraordinary.  Indeed, with the exception of some
Rawalpindi police officials, nearly all senior Pakistani police officials have criticized
the manner in which this crime scene was managed.  One senior police official has
argued that hosing down the crime scene amounted to “criminal negligence”.  Several
senior police officials who know CPO Saud Aziz were troubled that an officer with
his many years of experience would allow a major crime scene to be washed away,
thereby damaging his reputation.   

133.    Sources informed the Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act
independently in deciding to hose down the crime scene.  One source, speaking on the
basis of anonymity, stated that CPO Saud Aziz had confided in him that he had
received a call from Army Headquarters instructing him to order the hosing down of
the crime scene.  Another source, also speaking on the basis of anonymity, said that
the CPO was ordered to hose down the scene by Major General Nadeem Ijaz Ahmad,
then Director General of MI.  Others, including three police officials, told the
Commission that CPO Saud Aziz did not act independently and that “everyone
knows” who ordered the hosing down.  However, they were not willing to state on the
record what it is that “everyone knows”.  This is one of the many occasions during
the Commission’s inquiry when individuals, including government officials,
expressed fear or hesitation to speak openly.  

134.    Some senior Pakistani police officials identified further factors suggesting that
CPO Saud Aziz was not acting independently.  They point out that, while the
deliberate hosing down of a scene is unheard of in police practice, it has occurred on
a few occasions, in each case when the military has been the target of such attacks
and the crime scene was managed by the military directly.  Even CPO Saud Aziz,
when asserting to the Commission that there were precedents for hosing down a
crime scene, acknowledged that all the incidents which he posited as precedents
actually involved a military target.  The police officials who point out this pattern saw
it as further indication that the military was involved in having the crime scene hosed
down.    

135.    Some media reports tied the hosing down of the Rawalpindi crime scene to the
alleged washing of the crime scene in the October attack in Karachi.  However, in
Karachi, the need to put out fires in the vicinity of the blast led to the presence of
water at the crime scene.  The police collected debris from the crime scene and did
not in fact hose it down.  The Karachi police actions, while flawed, led to better
preservation of the crime scene and better evidence collection, ultimately permitting
investigators from the FIA to recover the suicide bomber’s striker sleeve.

136.    The extraordinary nature of the hosing down of the crime scene generated such
controversy that Punjab provincial officials recognized that some response was
necessary.  A committee of inquiry was set up by the Chief Minister of Punjab, to
look into the washing down of the crime scene. The committee was composed of
three senior Punjab officials. The Commission requested meetings with these
individuals, which the facilitation committee was not able to arrange. No credible
reason was provided.

137.    The Punjab committee’s mandate was limited to the following:
a.    Inquire into the circumstances leading to the washing down of the scene;
b.    Determine whether it was done with any male fide intention; and,
c.    Determine whether it posed any difficulty in reaching a conclusion on the
cause of death.

138.    The committee started work on 14 February 2008 and concluded its work the
next day on 15 February.  While acknowledging that a crime scene should in
principle be preserved “at least till a detailed search and thorough forensic
examination” has been carried out, it accepted the Rawalpindi police explanation that
the decision to hose down the crime scene was formed by the investigating police
officer at the scene, SP Khurram, with permission from CPO Saud Aziz, on grounds
of public order.  It further found that the decision was not made with any male fide
intention and that washing the crime scene did not negatively impact on the
conclusion as to the cause of death.   

139.    Several senior Pakistani police officials told the Commission that they did not
consider the Punjab committee’s findings credible.  Indeed, it is difficult for the
Commission to credit the committee’s work.  The terms of reference cast doubt on
that committee’s independence.  The objective of crime scene manage ment is the
collection and preservation of evidence with the overall aim of solving the crime.  By
limiting its inquiry to the narrow question of whether washing the crime scene
impeded the reaching of a conclusion as to cause of death, the committee inexp licably
failed to consider the impact that hosing down the scene had on the broader criminal
investigation.  It was only because of the persistent efforts of FIA investigators that
critical evidence was found in the sewers near the blast scene.   

140.    The very brief time spent by the Punjab committee in the conduct of its inquiry
further compels the Commission to question its findings.  In short, the Punjab
committee constituted a whitewash of the actions of the Rawalpindi police in failing
to manage the crime scene and destroy evidence.  Not surprisingly, the work of the
Punjab committee was counterproductive in that it further deepened the suspicion of
many in Pakistan over the conduct of the police on 27 December 2007.

Preservation of evidence

141.    Even after the hosing down of the crime scene, questions continued to arise
over the preservation of evidence by the Rawalpindi police, particularly in the period
before investigators from the JIT started their work.   

142.    Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser was initially taken to the City Police Station by
Inspector Kashif Riaz some time after midnight early on 28 December and then taken
to Police Lines.5  In the early hours of 28 December, CPO Saud Aziz went to see the
Police Lines, together with others, including ISI officers, who were the first to
conduct a forensic examination of the vehicle.  An investigating police officer on the
orders of the CPO, removed Ms Bhutto’s shoes and took them to the City Police
Station.  Sometime thereafter, the shoes were ordered back into the car.  This
wasclearly interfering with the integrity of the evidence.  Furthermore, while the vehicle
was parked at Police Lines, it was not properly preserved.  The Commission was told
that during a visit by some JIT members, people were seen in the vehicle cleaning it
even though investigations were still on-going.  When the JIT carried out its physical
examination of the vehicle, they did not find any hair, blood or other matter on the lip
of the escape hatch.  Forensic analysis of swabs of the lip of the escape hatch later
carried out by the JIT and Scotland Yard also found nothing.  It is impossible to
establish whether the interference with the vehicle resulted in the elimination of any
matter that may have been present on the lip, or whether there was no such matter in
the first place.  It is clear, however, that such interference would have damaged any
forensic evidence present.

On the decision not to carry out a post-mortem examination  

143.    The Commission was told that CPO Saud Aziz on three occasions refused the
request of the doctors for permission to carry out a post-mortem examination on Ms
Bhutto’s remains.  Pakistani law provides that in the case an unnatural death, the
police must have a post-mortem examination report as part of their investigations.
This requirement places the responsibility for initiating the examination on the police
and not the hospital authorities.  Indeed, hospital authorities must get a request from
the police before proceeding.  Numerous people interviewed, including all doctors
and nearly all senior police officers, have reiterated this rule.  Even CPO Saud Aziz
himself acknowledged that this is the law in Pakistan.6  Only a District Magistrate
may waive the need for a post-mortem examination.  If the family of a deceased
person does not wish to have a post-mortem examination carried out, it must apply to
a judge for an order waiving the requirement.  

144.    Some people have suggested to the Commission that the practice is different
from the legal requirement.  Due primarily to religious considerations, permission
from the family might be sought.  There are sensitivities around conducting a post-
mortem examination of a woman in Pakistani culture.  However, due to the forensic
importance of the examination, the police might take steps to overcome any religious
or cultural objections.  One senior police officer explained that, in his experience,
when family members have been reluctant to have a post-mortem examination, the
police have taken time to convince them to change their position because the post-
mortem examination is so central to the conduct of any investigations  

145.    While denying that the doctors requested his authority for a post-mortem three
times, CPO Saud Aziz told the Commission that because of the importance of the
person of Ms Bhutto, he could not just have a post-mortem examination without first
seeking her family’s consent.  He first sought the approval of the President of the
PPP, Makhdoom Amin Fahim for a post-mortem examination.  Mr Fahim told him
that he was not in a position to give such approval and asked him to wait for Mr
Zardari who was on his way to Pakistan from Dubai.  When Mr Zardari arrived at
Chaklala Airbase, the request for permission was made to him and he declined.  

146.    The Commission does not find that there are credible reasons for failing to carry
out an autopsy on Ms Bhutto’s.  The body had already undergone invasive medical
procedures when the open heart massage was undertaken.  Moreover, a post-mortem
examination limited to a complete external examination and not involving any
invasive surgery could have been carried out.  Even that limited exam was not
conducted in this case.  While one doctor did take a general look over the body, the
doctors admit that this did not constitute a proper external post-mortem examination.     

147.    It is odd that Ms Bhutto’s remains were moved to the Pakistan Air Force base
(Chaklala Airbase) in Rawalpindi before Mr Zardari’s arrival from Dubai.  According
to sources, the body was taken from the hospital around 2300 hours, on 27 December.  
The note signed by Mr Zardari accepting his wife’s remains is timed 0110 hours on
28 December.  If the police were genuinely waiting for Mr Zardari’s permission
before requesting a post-mortem examination, they should have left Ms Bhutto’s
remains at the hospital.  Instead they moved her remains to Chaklala Airbase, thereby
rendering such an examination more difficult.  When questioned about this, senior
Punjab officials stated that the plan was to carry out the examination at the base
which also had medical facilities.  However, the fact that Ms Bhutto’s coffin was not
taken to the medical facilities, but placed in a room at the base makes this assertion
doubtful.

148.    There was a series of memos from CPO Saud Aziz and his superiors regarding
the absence of a post-mortem examination.  The CPO wrote a memo to his immediate
superior, the IGP of Punjab, dated 27 December, but actually written in the morning
of 28 December, in which he reported that an autopsy could not be conducted because
her husband had refused to authorize one.  The IGP then sent a memo, also dated 27
December (and written on 28 December), to the Home Secretary of Sindh Province
reporting Mr Zardari’s refusal and suggesting that the matter be taken up by the
Home Department of Sind h Province.    On 28 December, a letter was written from the
Punjab Additional Secretary, Internal Security, to the Sindh Home Secretary,
requesting that the latter seek Mr Zardari’s permission to conduct a post-mortem
examination on Ms Bhutto’s remains prio r to burial.  

149.    The Commission finds the letter written by CPO Saud Aziz to be fundamentally
misleading.  Nothing in the letter explains why the autopsy had not been carried out
earlier, during the preceding five hours while Ms Bhutto’s remains were at RGH.
Rather, the letter focuses solely on Mr Zardari’s refusal to approve an autopsy – and
portrays even that refusal in misleading terms.  The letter is clearly intended to hide
CPO Saud Aziz’s fundamental failure to carry out his legal obligation regarding the
autopsy and, instead, to redirect blame for this failure to Mr Zardari.  The effort to pin
responsibility for this failure on Mr Zardari is unacceptable.  No autopsy had been
carried out even though five hours had passed since Ms Bhutto had been declared
dead.  The body had been placed in a coffin and brought to the PAF airbase.  CPO
Saud Aziz placed Mr Zardari in an impossible situation – one which almost
compelled Mr Zardari to refuse the request for an autopsy.   

150.    The subsequent letter by the IGP, Punjab reiterating the misleading summary of
events set out in CPO Saud Aziz’s letter reflects the willingness of his administrative
superior to further this shift of responsibility and perpetrate a cover-up of the true
reason behind the lack of a post-mortem examination.   

151.    In short, CPO Saud Aziz did not fulfil his legal obligation to order an autopsy.  
Having failed in that regard, he sought to cover up his failing by putting Mr Zardari in
a situation designed to elicit his refusal of an autopsy.  CPO Saud Aziz’s further effort
to cover his failings by writing a memo pinning blame on Mr Zardari was highly
improper.  On their face, these factors taken together strongly suggest a preconceived
effort to prevent a thorough examination of Ms Bhutto’s remains.

152.    CPO Saud Aziz, an experienced senior police officer, refused to allow a post-
mortem examination.  He certainly knew the requirements of the law and the practice
of law enforcement in such cases.  He need not have waited for Mr Zardari.  He was,
furthermore, aware of the importance and status of the person involved.  All these
factors together support the view held by many Pakistanis that CPO Saud Aziz did
not act independently in this matter.  CPO Saud Aziz’s insistence on justifying his
actions has made it difficult for the Commission to inquire any further and attempt to
unearth who might have been behind the decision.  

On whether Ms Bhutto was shot

153.    Although a number of PPP members asserted publicly and in private shortly
after the assassination that Ms Bhutto had been shot, none of the many PPP members,
both senior and low-ranking, interviewed by the Commission could confirm that
assertion.  Some PPP members told the Commission that at least one of the doctors
had initially stated that Ms Bhutto had suffe red gunshot injuries, implying that the
doctors must have deliberately altered their findings subsequently.  The Commission
was unable to find any basis to support this view, however honestly held.  Rather,
some doctors do indeed acknowledge that they openly discussed the possibility of
gunshot injuries early in their efforts to resuscitate Ms Bhutto, but excluded that
possibility in their final assessment.  There is one doctor who arrived during the
evening at Rawalpindi General Hospital who continues to assert that there was a
gunshot wound.  He was not, however, an examining doctor and does not base his
views on direct observation of a gunshot injury.

154.     The Commission also interviewed some PPP supporters who had been injured
in the blast.  None had received any bullet wounds, as previously reported in some
media reports.  According to the police, over 25 people were also interviewed in the
immediate aftermath of the incident, and none received bullet wounds.  They were
injured by ball bearings, but not bullets.

155.    The Commission has not been provided with any credible, new information
showing that Ms Bhutto had received bullet wounds.  A senior PPP official, who had
earlier publicly asserted that she had seen Ms Bhutto’s gunshot injuries, retracted that
statement when interviewed by the Commission.  In fact, she had not seen Ms
Bhutto’s head wound and had been told to tell the media that she had seen bullet
wounds.  The Commission found that, although her supporters may have justifiably
assumed that Ms Bhutto had been shot in the confusion surrounding the assassination,
the continued assertion that she had been shot, without evidence, as well as the
assertion of untrue eyewitness accounts, was and remains misleading.  The
Commission recognizes that the confusion and urgency at Rawalpindi General
Hospital when Ms Bhutto was brought there would naturally have generated some
discussion among the staff there about the possibility of a gunshot wound.  Such
discussions may have been misinterpreted by some as a medical finding

The Government Press Conference:

156.    At about 1700 hours on the day following the assassination the government
held a televised press conference, conducted by Brigadier Cheema, the spokesperson
of the Ministry of Interior at which he announced that:

a.    Ms Bhutto died from a head injury sustained when from the force of the
blast she hit her head on the lever of the escape hatch; and,  
b.    Mr Baitullah Mehsud linked with Al-Qaida was responsible, presenting an
intercepted telephone conversation between Mr Mehsud and one Mr
Maulvi Sahib in which Mr Mehsud was heard congratulating Mr Maulvi
on a job well-done.  

157.     The decision to hold the press conference was made by General Musharraf,
during a meeting on the morning of 28 December at a facility in General
Headquarters known as Camp House.  That meeting, at which General Musharraf was
briefed on the intercept and on medical evidence, was attended by the Directors
General of the ISI, MI and the IB.  Brigadier Cheema was summoned to a subsequent
meeting at ISI Headquarters and directed by the Director General of the ISI to hold
the press conference.  In attendance at this second meeting, in addition to Brigadier
Cheema, were Interior Secretary Kamal Shah, Director General of the ISI, Director
General of the IB, Deputy Director General of the ISI and another ISI brigadier.  

158.    The Musharraf government asserted that the evidence for the cause of death
was clear.  According to the government, video footage showed that the shooter’s
bullets did not hit Ms Bhutto.  Based on the medical report indicating that she died of
heavy bleeding from a head wound on the right side of her head, the Musharraf
government set out its conclusion, through Brigadier Cheema, that she must have hit
her head on the lever of the vehicle’s escape hatch.

159.    The press conference was met with widespread public scepticism and media
outrage in Pakistan.  The PPP and others accused the government of a cover up.  Many
questioned the sudden and timely appearance of the telephone intercept as well
as the speed with which its contents were analyzed and interpreted.  Many also
challenged the view that Ms Bhutto had not been shot and questioned how quickly
that purported analysis had been done.  Furthermore, many senior PPP officials
believed the government was suggesting, in an effort to demean Ms Bhutto, that she
had caused her own death by emerging from her vehicle.  In short, the press
conference not only failed to provide credible answers to essential questions arising
from the assassination, it triggered widespread suspicion that government authorities
would not be conducting a genuine search for the truth.

The First Joint Investigation Team (Punjab-led)

160.    On 28 December, Punjab authorities set up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) for
the assassination.  The JIT declared its work finished on 17 February 2008.  This
section will provide an overview of the constitution, internal dynamics and focus of
the first JIT established shortly after Ms Bhutto’s assassination.  It does not seek to
set out in detail the JIT’s findings.  

161.    Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, when a terrorist offence has been committed, the
establishment of a JIT is mandatory.  The relevant provision is broad, defining a JIT
as an investigation involving one law enforcement agency working together with
other agencies, either law enforcement or intelligence.  With other types of crimes, it
is usually the provincial police that has primacy in the investigation of a crime, and
for the Federal Capital Territory of Islamabad, the Federal Government takes the lead.
But in terrorism cases, either the provincial police or the Federal Government can
initiate a JIT.  When initiated by a province, the provincial government takes the lead
in selecting the team members.  Due to the expertise of the Special Investigations
Group (SIG) of the Federal Investigation Authority (FIA), the FIA generally assigns
some of its officers from that section to the JIT.7  When a JIT is set up by a province,
a notification is sent to the FIA inviting the assignment of SIG staff to the team.

162.    The JIT was headed by Mr Abdul Majeed, Additional IG (AIG) for Punjab.  In
addition to police officials from Punjab, the JIT included three senior members of the
FIA, including an explosives expert, a senior CID police officer at the rank of DIG,
an expert on forensic photography and nine middle ranking police officers.  At the
time the JIT was established, AIG Majeed was out of the country and, for the first two
days, the JIT was headed by the next most senior police officer on the team, the
DIG/CID in Lahore, Mushtaq Ahmad Sukhera.  DIG Sukhera and his team started
work on 28 December 2007.

163.    On the evening of 28 December, members of the JIT went to Police Lines
where they met CPO Saud Aziz.  Rather than proceeding directly to the crime site,

CPO Saud Aziz laid out tea for the JIT investigators in a conference room.  While the
JIT members were still in the conference room, the television aired the press
conference given by Brigadier Cheema.  According to a credible source, at the end of
the press conference, the CPO rhetorically asked the JIT members what they intended
to investigate, since the perpetrator had been identified.  When the JIT members
pressed to visit the crime scene, CPO Saud Aziz, noting that it was already dark,
stated instead that he would arrange for a visit to the scene in the morning.  The
source noted above interpreted these actions as a means of hindering the JIT
investigators’ access to the crime site.   

164.    On 29 December, the following day, the JIT investigators returned to Police
Lines where they were able to inspect Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.  They discovered early in
their inspection that there was no blood or tissue on the escape hatch lever that would
be consistent with the gaping injury to Ms Bhutto’s head, suggesting strongly to the
investigators that Ms Bhutto had not hit her head on the lever.

165.    Following that inspection, rather than taking the investigators directly to the
crime scene, CPO Saud Aziz hosted a lunch that went into the late afternoon, at the
end of which he again, according to the same source cited above, indicated that it
would be dark by the time the team arrived at the crime scene.  It was only at around
1700 hours that the JIT investigators were taken to the crime scene at Liaquat Bagh.  
The Commission finds it inexplicable that the investigators were not in a position to
conduct on-site investigations until two full days after the assassination.  Such
conduct further hampered the gathering of evidence and, at the very least, was
contrary to best practices.   

166.    Once at the scene, the investigators could see that it had been hosed down.  
Despite the late hour, they spent seven hours there.  They followed the water current,
including wading through the drainage sewer and collected evidence from the debris.  
They were able to recover one bullet casing from the drainage sewer, later established
through forensic examination to have been fired from the pistol bearing the bomber’s
DNA.  The JIT members left the scene around midnight.  The Rawalpindi police
provided security for them, and the road was cordoned off during the entire time.  The
next day, the team returned to continue the search.  Upon their request, the scene
remained cordoned off and the road closed.  They eventually recovered other
evidence in the course of their crime scene examination, including the partial skull of
the suicide bomber from atop one of the buildings near the site.

167.    On 31 December, AIG Majeed returned from his trip and took over the
leadership of the JIT.  This change at the JIT’s helm result ed in a shift in the internal
dynamics of the investigation.  Mr Majeed effectively sidelined the senior and more
experienced officers who had started the investigations and dealt directly with the
most junior investigators of the JIT.  Two senior officers invited into the JIT from the
Sindh police decided to return to Sindh after only two days with the JIT.  Much of the
work carried out by the JIT from this point was led by information Mr Majeed
received from the intelligence agencies, which retained sole control over the sharing
of information with the police, providing it on a selective basis.

168.    The scientific analysis of the suicide bomber’s remains by the Scotland Yard
team established that he was a teenage male, no more than 16 years old.  According to
the JIT’s investigations, this young man was named Bilal also known as Saeed from
South Waziristan.  This was established through the links that the accused persons
admitted having had with the bomber and the ISI telephone intercept of Baitullah
Mehsud’s conversation with Maulvi Sahib.

The accused persons

169.    Five persons were arrested by the JIT: Aitezaz Shah, Sher Zehman, Husnain
Gul, Mohamad Rafaqat and Rasheed Ahmed.  In addition, the JIT charged Nasrullah,
Abdullah, Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Sahib as “proclaimed offenders”.  Baitullah
Mehsud was killed in a drone attack in August 2009, and Nasrullah is reported to
have been killed in an attack in FATA.  

170.    The Commission will not address in any detail the case against these
individuals.  It notes generally, however, that the accused are alleged to have served
as handlers and logistics supporters of the suicide bomber, or as persons who were
knowledgeable about the plans to assassinate Ms Bhutto but failed to provide such
information to the police.  The charges against them include aiding and abetting
terrorism, murder and concealing information about the commission of a crime.

171.    The JIT focused its efforts on investigating the alleged role of these low-level
individuals.  Little to no focus was placed on investigating those further up the
hierarchy in the planning and execution of the assassination.  In particular, the JIT did
nothing to build a case against Mr Mehsud, treating the contents of the intercept
presented to the public by Brigadier Cheema as determinative of his culpability.  AIG
Majeed told the Commission that he saw no need to establish the authenticity of the
intercept or the basis for its analysis, including the voice identification and the
interpretation of the conversation as a reference to the Ms Bhutto’s assassination.  
The Commission finds this approach to the investigation contrary to best practices
and inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.   

172.    The Commission notes also with some concern the discrepancy in the detention
record of some of the accused persons, particularly in light of the well-known
controversy over extra-judicial detention by intelligence agencies prior to their arrest
by law enforcement agencies.  

Baitullah Mehsud

173.    The then-government’s assertion that Baitullah Mehsud was behind the
assassination of Ms Bhutto was premature at best.  Such a hasty announcement of the
perpetrator prejudiced the police investigations which had not yet begun.  Other flaws
in the JIT’s approach to investigating Baitullah Mehsud’s alleged role in the
assassination are also inconsistent with a genuine search for the truth.  

174.      The communication intercepted by the ISI is purported to be a telephone
conversation between Emir Sahib (said to be Baitullah Mehsud) and Maulvi Sahib.  
In it, the two speakers congratulate each other on an event which Brigadier Cheema
asserted was the assassination.  The ISI asserts that they already had the voice
signature of Baitullah Mehsud and were in a position to identify his voice on the
intercept.  In the English translation of transcript of the intercept, Emir Sahib at some
point asked Maulvi Sahib: “who were they?”  Maulvi Sahib replied: “There were
Saeed, the second was Badarwala Bilal and Ikramullah was also there.”  Mehsud
asked: “The three did it?” Maulvi Sahib replied: “Ikramullah and Bilal did it”.  The
conversation did not mention Ms Bhutto by name.  The Commission is not in a
position to evaluate the authenticity of the purported intercept.  Any further
investigation into Ms Bhutto’s assassination must include steps for such
authentication.   

175.    It is not clear how or when the intercept from the ISI was recorded.  A former
senior ISI official told the Commission that the ISI had been tracking Baitullah
Mehsud’s communications closely and was, therefore in a position to identify his
voice.  Furthermore, he asserted that the ISI had been tracking Taliban-linked terrorist
cells that were closely pursuing Ms Bhutto, targeting her at a series of successive
public gatherings.  According to this ISI official, it was one of these cells which
finally assassinated Ms Bhutto in Rawalpindi.   

176.    The ISI was highly confident of the accuracy of its investigations, much of
which were based on the analysis of intercepts, through which it was possible to
identify each cell and also the link of each of these cells to Baitullah Mehsud.  On the
basis of its investigations, the ISI detained four persons for involvement in the
Karachi bombings within two weeks of that attack.  According to the former ISI
official cited above, int errogations confirmed their intercepts analysis.  The
Commission is not in a position to assess the credibility of this information from the
ISI.  However, this information does raise important questions, which are addressed
further below.   

177.    There are media reports that Mr Mehsud denied responsibility for the
assassination.  Mr Saleh Shah Qureshi, Senator from South Waziristan, told the
Commission that Mr Mehsud had categorically denied any involvement in the
assassination attempt of 18-19 October and the subsequent assassination of Ms
Bhutto on 27 December, questioning also the authenticity of the telephone intercept
ascribed to Mr Mehsud.  The JIT took no steps to investigate the veracity of any such
denial.  Rather, some government officials from that time told the Commission that
any such denials would have no credibility, implying that such investigative steps
would not be worthwhile.   

178.    After the arrest of the five accused persons, the JIT essentially ceased
investigating the possibility of other perpetrators, particularly those who may have
been involved in planning or directing the assassination by funding or otherwise
enabling the assassination.  The JIT even ended its efforts to identify the suicide
bomber.   

Persons accused by Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 16 October 2007

179.     On 16 October 2007, Ms Bhutto writing from Dubai to General Musharraf,
identified three people she considered a threat to her security: (i) Brigadier (ret) Ejaz
Shah, Director General of the IB at the time of the assassination, (ii) General (ret)
Hamid Gul, a former Director General of the ISI, and (iii) Mr Chaudhry Pervaiz
Elahi, Chief Minister of Punjab until 22 November 2007.

180.    The Ministry of Interior responded to Ms Bhutto in a letter dated 6 November
2007, stating that the threats she related had “neither tangible basis nor is there any
evidence to support the perception” contained therein.  The Commission spoke with
two of those named in the letter and others close to them, all of whom hold the view
that the letter was baseless and politically motivated.  With respect to Ms Bhutto’s
close aides, none of those who met with the Commission affirmed having seen the
letter before it was written, and they had varying interpretations of its contents and
intentions.  One believed that the letter was intended to put political pressure on
General Musharraf by naming two people closely associated with him and putting
him on notice of her concerns.  Other sources, including a former high-ranking
foreign official, thought the men posed genuine threats to her security, linking them
to the Establishment and its long-standing enmity towards the PPP and the Bhutto
family.  The Commission received no information of specific threats that they may
have directed against Ms Bhutto.   

181.    In the course of their investigations, neither the Karachi nor the JIT
investigators interrogated or interviewed any of these people.  Karachi and JIT
investigators explained that they could not summon and interrogate them on the basis
of Ms Bhutto’s accusations, without more information.  Ms Bhutto made indirect
reference to these individuals in the FIR she filed in Karachi after the attack on 18-19
October.  However, while the FIR referred to the 16 October letter, it did not provide
the names, nor was a copy attached.  Nor did any PPP member provide the names to
the investigators.  These factors were raised by Karachi and JIT investigators in
explaining to the Commission why they declined to approach these three men.    

182.    While recognizing that Ms Bhutto and other PPP members were not
forthcoming with the police on this issue, the Commission believes that police
investigators should nonetheless have invited the three individuals to meet with them,
on a voluntary basis.  The names of the three individuals had been widely circulated
in the press, as Karachi and JIT investigators acknowledged.   

PPP interaction with the investigations

183.     The relationship between the PPP and the Pakistani police was characterised
by mistrust on the part of the PPP.  This was evident in their lack of co-operation with
the Karachi police following the attack of 18-19 October 2007, and their lukewarm
attitude towards the Rawalpindi investigations. ( More in Part IV)