67.    Messrs. Mirza and Durrani drew volunteers from the PPP’s student and youth
wings and organized them into the “Jaan Nisaar Benazir” (JNB) 2.  The JNB’s main
task was to form a human chain around Ms Bhutto to stop suicide bombers from
reaching her, but they also performed additional security duties.  According to the
organizers, the JNB numbered around 5,000 of whom about 2,000 were uniformed
and formed the human chain around Ms Bhutto’s truck on 18-19 October.  Mr Mirza
said that he and some of the JNB volunteers were armed.  The remaining 3,000 were
and posted at key points along the procession route to deter potential trouble.  
Combined with the Sindh police security cover, the PPP security arrangements
formed a formidable barrier.  Despite this, two blasts hit the procession. Most of those
killed were the JNB volunteers.  In her posthumously published book, Reconciliation,
Ms Bhutto credited the JNB with saving her life in the Karachi attack.  

68.    Messrs. Mirza and Durrani described the Karachi police cooperation as initially
lukewarm but it improved as Ms Bhutto’s arrival date neared.  They also described
Sindh government security deployment on 18-19 October as inadequate, but they
credited the deployed policemen with doing a commendable job.  The PPP’s Sindh
security committee and the Karachi police worked closely on all aspects of security
for Ms Bhutto’s return from exile, including an evacuation plan in the event of just
such an attack.  Messrs. Mirza and Durrani said the evacuation worked as planned.  

69.    After the Karachi attack, the PPP reviewed the security arrangements for Ms
Bhutto.  In light of the threat against her, Messrs. Mirza and Durrani decided that a
core group of 250-300 JNB volunteers would always travel with Ms Bhutto
throughout Sindh.  A smaller number of them were also sent on two occasions to
Punjab Province as added protection for Ms Bhutto, although they did not accompany
her to Liaquat Bagh, the public park in Rawalpindi where Ms Bhutto’s held her last
public meeting on 27 December.

70.    The PPP’s security for Ms Bhutto in Punjab was not as elaborate as in Sindh,
partly due to a lack of leadership and the absence of a JNB-like corps.  Even so, Ms
Bhutto was surrounded by two groups of PPP security throughout her travels in
Punjab.  These groups also accompanied her to Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir.   

71.    One group of PPP security comprised 14 unarmed men under the leadership of
Mr Chaudhry Muhammad Aslam, who coordinated his activities with Major Imtiaz
and Mr Tauqir Kaira, leader of the second group.  These men travelled with Ms
Bhutto’s entourage in Islamabad, Punjab, Peshawar and Jammu and Kashmir.  Their
main task was to form a security cordon around Ms Bhutto.  All were PPP party
activists, and many told the Commission that they had been with Ms Bhutto since
1986.

72.    The other group of PPP security around Ms Bhutto was led by Mr Kaira, whose
men were armed.  This group provided the first line of defense around Ms Bhutto.  
Mr Kaira also had the role of coordinating Ms Bhutto’s convoy, checking the vehicles
and ensuring their place in the convoy.  He coordinated his daily tasks with Major
Imtiaz and Mr Chaudhry Aslam.  The Commission could not establish whom he
reported to on a daily basis, especially as the campaigning picked up in December.
Mr Kaira died on 27 December while trying to protect Ms Bhutto.

73.    Mr Khaled Shahenshah, a PPP supporter since his student days, accompanied
Ms Bhutto on her travels in Pakistan and served as her personal bodyguard.  He was
with Ms Bhutto on the stage in Liaquat Bagh on 27 December and in her car when the
fatal attack occurred. Mr Shahenshah was killed in Karachi a few months after Ms
Bhutto’s death.  Media reports at the time attributed the killing to his alleged links in
the Karachi underworld.  Some people have pointed out to the Commission Mr
Shahenshah’s strange hand gestures while on the stage in Liaquat Bagh and alleged
that he was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Ms Bhutto.  But others, including
several PPP leaders, dismissed such notions.  The Commission did not uncover any
new facts that support the conspiracy theory surrounding Mr Shahenshah’s behaviour.

74.    Ms Bhutto’s convoy included two main vehicles – an armoured white Toyota
Land Cruiser and a bullet-proof black Mercedes-Benz car – and other vehicles for
security staff and senior PPP leaders.  She would choose one of the main vehicles for
a trip, and the other would accompany as the decoy and back-up vehicle.  

75.    Ms Bhutto was acutely aware of the threats to her and had gone to considerable
lengths to protect herself.  Although the PPP had no standard operating procedures
regarding security, she devised ad hoc security drills and, according to her closest
aides, frequently wore a bullet-proof vest.  However, she was also determined to
campaign vigorously and openly, often interacting with crowds, thus exposing herself
to potential attackers.  

76.    Despite considerable and valiant efforts by individual PPP members to protect
Ms Bhutto, the PPP as an orga nization was inadequate to handle the challenges.  
There was no person in overall charge of the PPP’s provision of security.  As a result,
the PPP’s security for Ms Bhutto was characterized by a lack of direction and
professionalism.  However, the Commission reiterates that the responsibility for
failing to protect Ms Bhutto lies with the Government of Pakistan.  

Liaquat Bagh security arrangements on 27 December

77.    A public meeting at Liaquat Bagh, an open park located in Rawalpindi, was set
for 27 December as part of Ms Bhutto’s hectic campaign schedule. Rawalpindi, a city
of some three million people, is located in the province of Punjab about 30 kilometers
from Islamabad.  The Pakistani Army is headquartered there.  Liaquat Bagh is
bordered by Liaquat Road to the north, Murree Road to the east, and Press Club Road
to the south.  Adjacent to Liaquat Bagh, on the Liaquat Road side, an outer gate leads
to a general parking area; a second, inner gate, leads to a VIP parking area.  

78.    The Rawalpindi district administration and police held one formal meeting with
the local PPP committee to prepare for the public meeting. According to the minutes
of the meeting made available to the Commission, it was held on 25 December and
was chaired by the District Coordinating Officer (DCO), Mr Muhammad Irfan Elahi,
the highest-ranking civilian bureaucrat in the district.  The PPP side was led by Mr
Zamurrud Khan, the local PPP committee chair.  A number of senior police officers
were also present.  The participants discussed the Code of Conduct for the Liaquat
Bagh public meeting as well as issues relating to the management of the public
meeting.  

79..    The local PPP committee members said that they understood the local
administration to be responsible for all security measures for the Liaquat Bagh public
meeting.  Nevertheless, the PPP undertook to secure the stage where Ms Bhutto
delivered her last speech and stationed its workers at key entry points to the park to
identify people and assist the police in maintaining security.  

80.    The Rawalpindi District Police prepared a written plan dated 26 December 2007
for security arrangements to cover two political meetings scheduled to take place the
next day (“Security Plan”), one of which was at Liaquat Bagh for the PPP, which Ms
Bhutto was to attend, and the other, at Gujar Khan, organized by PML-N, which Mr
Nawaz Sharif was to attend.  The Security Plan for Ms Bhutto was more complex in
that it envisaged security for Ms Bhutto’s convoy by an Elite Force unit under the
supervision of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Ashfaq Anwar, which was to
establish a box formation around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle during movement.  The police
said that the Elite Force unit formed a box around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle at the
Faizabad junction, which is the jurisdictional limit between Islamabad and
Rawalpindi.  The Commission, however, believes that this did not occur.   

81.    The Security Plan listed a number of police officers responsible for various
sectors in and around Liaquat Bagh. SSP Yaseen Farooq was responsible for overall
supervision and was assisted by SP Khurram Shahzad.  A command post was to be
established at a building on the edge of Liaquat Bagh, called Rescue 15, used by local
emergency services. City Police Officer (CPO) Saud Aziz – the police chief of
Rawalpindi, DCO Irfan Elahi and members of intelligence agencies were present at
the command post during the meeting.    

82.    The Security Plan provided for two security cordons at the PPP event: an inner
cordon securing Liaquat Bagh and an outer cordon covering the area surrounding
Liaquat Bagh, including Liaquat and Murree Roads.  According to the plan 1,371
police officers were to be deployed at Liaquat Bagh.  Three walk-through gates with
metal detectors were placed at the public entrances to the park.  The plan also
provided for the deployment of police constables on the rooftops of the buildings
surrounding Liaquat Bagh.  According to the plan, these constables were supposed to
carry automatic rifles and binoculars.  However, none of the seven constable s
interviewed by the Commission had binoculars; they were not even aware that they
were supposed to have carried them.  The police were also expected to conduct
random searches of people attending the meeting.  According to the police, the park
was closed to the public by the Special Branch, who swept it for explosives and
handed it over to the police at 0700 hours on 27 December.   

83.    The Commission finds that the Security Plan was flawed as it placed inadequate
focus on Ms Bhutto’s protection and concentrated more on the deployment of police
for crowd control.  Furthermore, it was not implemented properly.  Video footage and
photographs examined by the Commission raised questions as to the number of police
officers deployed at Liaquat Bagh.  PPP officials who accompanied Ms Bhutto do not
recall an Elite Force unit box around Ms Bhutto’s vehicle on the way to the event,
only a traffic escort.  These and other matters related to the Security Plan’s
implementation are discussed below.   

C.    Assassination Timeline

84.    In order to ascertain the timeline of the assassination, the Commission reviewed
extensive video footage and hundreds of photographs, obtained from the Government
of Pakistan, open sources and professional photographers.  It also met in London with
members of the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) team that investigated aspects of
the assassination.  The Commission closely reviewed the analysis behind Scotland
Yard’s full report3 and interviewed Scotland Yard officers on their methodology and
forensic analysis.   

85.    On the evening of 26 December 2007, Ms Bhutto arrived in Islamabad by road
from Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province and went to her family’s
residence, Zardari House.  She had a campaign event in neighbouring Rawalpindi
scheduled for the next day.  On the morning of 27 December, Ms Bhutto left Zardari
House for a meeting at the Serena Hotel in Islamabad with Mr Hamid Karzai, the
President of Afghanistan.  She returned to Zardari House in the early afternoon and
remained there until her departure for the event.  

The Day of the Assassination: 27 December 2007

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86.    Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a
convoy of vehicles.  The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by
Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of
Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.  The latter two were a
Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.
Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned
side by side.  A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos.  This Mercedes-
Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms
Bhutto.  The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87.    Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men.  Accompanying Ms
Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major
(ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member,
second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior
PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat).  Seated in
the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi
(senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing
Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right
bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left).  Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side
of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men.  The Vigo pick-up trucks carried
members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team.  Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz
car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and,
in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr
Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88.    Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours,
according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for
security of the convoy.  According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was
to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading
the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks  protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land
Cruiser on three sides.  People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was
no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.  

89.    At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road –
Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh.  Video footage shows Ms
Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner
security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh.  The footage shows Ms
Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the
large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.   

90.    Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and
Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they
accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security
Plan.  However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of
Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles.  The
Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle.  In fact, the Commission has
identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.  
Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around
Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their
duties as specified in the security deployment.  Furthermore, the Commission does
not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.   

91.    At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the
inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms
Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch.  The police and some PPP
members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate.  While the PPP
asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they
did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.  
Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20
minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of
the parking area.  This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police
that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way
out of Liaquat Bagh.  

92.    Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove
through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage.  At least the following three
vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead
vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car.  Temporary wooden stairs had
been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.  
Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat
before addressing the crowd.  

93.    Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP
and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage.  This created tension
between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area.  Accounts given by
PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event
differ significantly.  The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled
immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to
bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally.  They say that the police
felt insulted and became more passive in their security role.  The Commission finds
that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it
unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any
degree as a result of wounded pride.  

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94.    Several thousand people attended the event.  Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage
by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates
from Rawalpindi district.  The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and
activists considered the event to have been a great success.  They say Ms Bhutto gave
a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as
having been radiant that day.

95.    The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended
the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser.  The occupants of the Land Cruiser
and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh.  The
composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96.    The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking
area.  It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of
Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast.  Credible reports range from 100
meters to 250 meters.  Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to
Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast.  Others at the site of the blast have
said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be
seen when the blast occurred.  Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in
the many video images of the exit area it reviewed.  Despite the acknowledgement of
some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission
finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20
minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.  
They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on
Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle
was required.  Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have
been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the
occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97.    Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the
Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of
Mr Kaira’s vehicles.  The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer
parking area located between the inner and outer gates.   

98.    At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate.  Crowds
of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to
turn right onto Liaquat Road.  In addition, many people left the park, swelling the
crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not
allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy.  Ms
Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her
supporters.  When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed
further by the crowd.   

99.    Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he
was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd.  He wanted to call
CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number.  Instead
he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan,
another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served).  The
Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security
arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should
have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.   

100.    Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land
Cruiser.  Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that
they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular
movements among them.  The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members,
however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land
Cruiser to prevent it from moving.  Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it
remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh.  As a
result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.   

101.    The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit
route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy.  The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi
claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and
then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route.  Only in case of an
emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exit ing from the outer gate; a
decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in
charge of security on the scene.  Some local PPP workers who attended the
preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account.  They claim that the
original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided
by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate.  In any event,
photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left-
side drive lane where the left turn would have been made.  As a result, even in an
emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn
and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved.  The
Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi
police officers.  The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were
parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102.    The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force
unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms
Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when
the attack on Ms Bhutto took place.  However, forming the box at this point was
impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who
had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.  In any event, video footage
shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to
create space for the box formation.  Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly
before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit
was not in position to go into a box formation.  The Elite Force unit was in place
neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they
were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103.    Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s
interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate
and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack  

104.    From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto
Liaquat Road.  As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the
crowd began chanting slogans.  There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made
the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so.  Before she stood up, Ms
Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N
leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been
shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day.  It had been reported that the shooting
incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105.    While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and
asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd
using the vehicle’s loudspeaker.  Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared
through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106.    Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd.  The vehicle continued to move slowly into its
right turn onto Liaquat Road.  At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in
the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser.  Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle
continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of
approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto.  According to
video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one
second.

107.    The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which
shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after
the second shot.  However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and
that movement.  After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108.    After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then
detonated the explosives.  At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear
corner of the vehicle.  Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land
Cruiser was still making the right turn.  The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that
it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109.    Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three
gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap.  Ms Khan said that she
felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter.  The right side of Ms Bhutto’s
head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap.  Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding
profusely from the right side of her head.  She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not
moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear.  Makhdoom Amin Fahim
recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.  
According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over
two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110.    No one else in her vehicle was serious ly injured.   

Transfer to the Hospital

111.    After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital
(initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad).  Although all four of its tires were
punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for
approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned
left.  As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult
for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels.  The Land Cruiser made
a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the
Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road
where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located.  The occupants of the Land
Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of
the Land Cruiser.  No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black
Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle.  Following the U-turn, the Land
Cruiser stalled.  The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private
vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the
hospital.

At Rawalpindi General Hospital

112.      Ms Bhutto was received by the Accident and Emergency Department of the
Rawalpindi General Hospital (later renamed Benazir Bhutto Hospital) at around 1735
hours.  In the resuscitation room, she was treated by Dr Saeeda Yasmin.  At this time,
staff was busy in the resuscitation room treating victims of the shooting at the Nawaz
Sharif rally earlier that day.

113.    Dr Saeeda told the Commission that Ms Bhutto was pale, unconscious and not
breathing.  There was a wound to the right side of her head from which blood was
trickling and whitish matter was visible.  Ms Bhutto’s clothes were soaked in blood.  
Dr Saeeda immediately began efforts to resuscitate her.  Dr Aurangzeb Khan, the
senior registrar, subsequently joined Dr Saeeda to assist.  Both doctors said that they
did not observe any other injury.  As there was no improvement in Ms Bhutto’s
condition, she was moved to the Emergency Operating Theatre located on the level
above the ground floor to continue resuscitation efforts.  

114.    At around 1750 hours, Professor Mohammed Mussadiq Khan, the hospital’s
senior physician, arrived and took over.  The doctors still had not detected a pulse. At
1757 hours, Professor Mussadiq opened Ms Bhutto’s chest and carried out open heart
massage. These efforts were unsuccessful.

115.    At 1816 hours, Professor Mussadiq stopped resuscitation efforts and declared
Ms Bhutto dead.  He ordered all the men to leave the room so that the female doctors
and nurses could clean the body.  Only medical personnel had been in the operating
room throughout this process.

116.    Dr Qudsiya Anjum Qureshi cleaned Ms Bhutto’s head, neck and upper body
and checked Ms Bhutto’s body for further injury.  She saw no wounds other than the
one to the right side of her head and the thoracotomy wound.  Ms Bhutto was next
dressed in hospital clothing and her clothes given to her maid. The doctors stated that
they had not seen her dupatta. The dupatta remains missing .   

117.    On three different occasions, Professor Mussadiq asked CPO Saud Aziz for
permission to conduct an autopsy on Ms Bhutto, and the CPO refused each request.  
On the second request, CPO Saud Aziz is reported to have sarcastically asked the
Professor whether an FIR had been filed,4 a matter that the CPO should know, not the
Professor.  DCO Elahi, who was also present outside the operating room, supported
CPO Saud Aziz’s position.  The authorities however deny that the CPO deliberately
refused to allow an autopsy.  They insist that they wanted to get permission from Ms
Bhutto’s family.  As will be discussed below, the police’s legal duty to request an
autopsy does not require permission from a family member.

118.    Because he could not obtain police consent to carry out an autopsy, Professor
Mussadiq called in X-ray technician Ghafoor Jadd, who took two X-rays of Ms
Bhutto’s skull with a portable X-ray machine.  He did this without notifying or
seeking the consent of CPO Saud Aziz.  Though not present at the time, a radiologist
examined the X-rays the next day.   

119.    Ms Bhutto’s death certificate was completed and signed by the senior registrar,
Dr Aurangzeb, who recorded the cause of death as “To be determined on autopsy”.

120.    An ISI officer, Rawalpindi Detachment Commander Colonel Jehangir Akhtar,
was present at the hospital through much of the evening.  At one point, the ISI Deputy
Director General, Major General Nusrat Naeem, contacted Professor Mussadiq
through Colonel Jehangir’s cell phone.  When asked about this by the Commission,
Major General Nusrat Naeem initially denied making any calls to the hospital, but
then acknowledged that he had indeed called the hospital, when pressed further.  He
asserted that he had made the call, before reporting to his superiors, to hear, directly
from Professor Mussadiq that Ms Bhutto had died.   

121.    Ms Bhutto’s body remained in the operating room until it was placed in a
wooden coffin and removed from the hospital at about 2235 hours that evening and
transported to the nearby Chaklala Airbase.  Ms Naheed Khan signed for Ms Bhutto’s
body at the hospital.  At around 0100 hours on 28 December, at the Chaklala Airbase,
the remains were transferred to her husband, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, who had flown
from Dubai and who signed an acknowledgement note to that effect.  Following this,
Ms Bhutto’s body was flown to her home town Larkana, in Sindh Province, for
burial.

The Day after the Assassination:  28 December 2007

122.    On the morning of 28 December, the doctors who treated Ms Bhutto were
convened at the hospital by DCO Elahi who requested that they submit a report
concerning the treatment given to Ms Bhutto.  DCO Elahi instructed the doctors to
bring the original to him directly and further instructed that neither hard copies nor
electronic copies of the report should be retained.  A request for such a report had
never been made before or after this incident.  The report was prepared and submitted
to DCO Elahi.  On the afternoon of 28 December, Professor Mussadiq Khan gave a
brief press conference on the orders of the DCO who received his instructions from
the Home Secretary of Punjab Province.  Senior Punjab officials told the Commission
that this issue was discussed at a cabinet meeting of the government of Punjab.

123.    On the evening of 28 December, a separate press conference was held by the
Ministry of Interior in which the Government, through Brigadier (ret) Javed Iqbal
Cheema, spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior, set out the cause of death as well as
who was responsible for the attack.  The main points of this press conference and the
controversy it generated are discussed below.  

124.    In the afternoon of 28 December, Ms Bhutto was laid to rest in her family’s
mausoleum at Gahri Khuda Baksh in Larkana.  Her death was followed by enormous
grief and anger among her supporters.  There was widespread violence throughout
Pakistan over several days following her death.  

D.    The Criminal Investigations  

125.    This section discusses the criminal investigations into the assassination of Ms
Bhutto and those who died with her.  It also addresses government actions which
impacted on the investigations, including two press conferences, the involvement of
intelligence agencies and the PPP’s interaction with the investigative agencies.  

The hosing down of the crime scene

126.    Soon after the bla st outside Liaquat Bagh on the evening of 27 December, CPO
Saud Aziz left the crime scene for Rawalpindi General Hospital; SSP Yaseen Farooq
followed shortly thereafter.  The most senior Rawalpindi police official remaining at
the crime scene was SP Khurram Shahzad, who continued to take instructions from
CPO Saud Aziz by telephone.  The management of the crime scene and the collection
of evidence by the Rawalpindi police during this time have generated considerable
controversy.   

127.    Video footage immediately following the blast shows shock, fear and confusion
among the people at the scene and little police control.  The crime scene was not
immediately cordoned off.  The police did collect some evidence.  Officers from
intelligence agencies, including the ISI, the IB and MI, were present and also
collected evidence, using, as one Rawalpindi police officer noted, better evidence
collection equipment than the police.  Within one hour and forty minutes of the blast,
however, SP Khurram ordered the fire and rescue officials present to wash the crime
scene down with fire hoses.  He told the Commission that the police had collected all
the available evidence by then.  Police records show that only 23 pieces of evidence
were collected, in a case where one would normally have expected thousands.  The
evidence included mostly human body parts, two pistols, spent cartridges and Ms
Bhutto’s damaged vehicle.   

128.    According to SP Khurram and other senior Rawalpindi police officials,
including some who were not present at the scene, hosing down the crime scene was a
necessary crowd control measure.  They claim that some at the scene, mainly PPP
supporters, were very upset when they learned that Ms Bhutto had died and that some
supporters were dipping their hands into the blood on the ground, believing it to be
Ms Bhutto’s, and rubbing it on themselves.  SP Khurram asserted that the PPP
supporters could have become disruptive.  Therefore, the police needed to wash away
the blood from the scene as a public order measure.  SP Khurram and other police
officials also stated that there were reports of vandalism not far from the crime scene,
requiring the redeployment of the police who were at the scene.  Once the crime
scene was hosed down, they claim, the crowd did disperse, going to Rawalpindi
General Hospital, which permitted the police at the scene to redeploy to those other
crowd control situations.