By Raj Rajneesh
The US has formally ended its military operations in Iraq, as promised by President Obama, saying that the goals set by the Bush Jr administration have been met. Broadly, these aims were regime change, Iraq under American sphere of influence, and US military presence in the country for Middle East duty. The Republican administration led by Bush Sr., had carried out a successful military operation in 1991 against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq but didn’t succeed in engineering a regime change, though it found the dictator’s attitude ‘unacceptable’. With UN sanctions and support to anti-Saddam groups not leading anywhere, Bush Jr had set out to complete his father’s `unfinished’ job. Washington seems satisfied with the ‘turn around’ achieved. Obama has announced that some 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq on `advice and assist’ mission.
The new regime in Baghdad, notwithstanding its infirmities, is democratically elected. Even the Sunni hardliners have no reason to complain as “occupying” forces have left the country. They are likely to be drawn into a power sharing arrangement with the Government. Similarly, Shia hardliners like Muqtada Al-sadr may not be averse to join a ruling coalition. None of these stake holders has any reason to complain against the U.S, which has created a democratic atmosphere where they could come to power by choice of the people- something that was beyond the realm of dreams during the Saddam era.
As Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defence during the crucial years of Iraq war from 2001 to 2005, put it in his article in the New York Times, the US presence in Iraq, henceforth, would be on the same lines as that in South Korea. “Although South Korea has assumed principal responsibility for its own defence, there are still 28,500 American troops on the peninsula… Our continued commitment prevented another war (between the two Koreas)”. The American pledge, according to him, is to remain “open to the possibility of a mutually agreed longer-term security commitment or military presence for deterrence and support”. This clearly translates into a long-term American presence in Iraq like in South Korea. An extraordinary achievement’ compared to the situation prevailing a decade ago.
The US troops that are left behind are not very big at 50,000 in number. They will remain confined to the barracks that are spread over several strategically placed military bases around major towns. Some of these bases are closer to the Iranian border. Iran may try instigating the Iraqi Shias but their participation in power sharing arrangements may limit the dividends.
Terrorism pump primed by al Qaeda, will be a major concern in the short run but it is unlikely to pose any serious problem to the U.S presence or the stability of the Government. Indeed, the withdrawal of American forces will work to the disadvantage of the al Qaeda, which sees them as enemy No. I and went on targeting them till almost the last minute, apparently in a bid to either prevent or postpone the pull out.
One of the major causes that have given sustenance to al Qaida and other Islamist radical groups in Iraq was the presence of American “occupation” forces. With the target removed, the Islamists have no raison’detre to engage in their past time; people will also not support them any longer. Historically and culturally, the Iraqis are given to secularism and tolerance in their outlook. These proud people will not allow the radicals to disturb stability, which they badly need now that they are about to embark on a new life.
India, as an old friend, and as an ancient civilisation, has goodwill for Iraqis, and will be more than willing to help the post-American phase. Delhi had excellent ties with Baghdad under the Baathist socialist rule. How much of that warmth remains or will return is a matter of conjecture. It is very unlikely that Delhi will regain political and economic influence that it had enjoyed during Saddam’s days. For the present, however, a matter of relief to India is the waning influence of al Qaeda radicals who had wrecked havoc with the Iraqi society.
Propaganda by Pakistan and Islamist radicals that India has moved close to Israel to the detriment of its commitments to Arab world has caused enormous damage to the Indian image and its long standing commitment to the Palestinian State and the peace process in the region. The voting against Iran in the IAEA, though under pressure from the US, has not gone well on the streets of the Arab world.
Put differently, India has work to regain its image in West Asia. It calls for intense engagement with Arab countries through a reiteration of commitment to a sustainable peace process. It also must adopt a forward looking approach for economic cooperation.
Several leading Indian companies were engaged in Iraq even by the time of the Gulf War, and suffered enormously on account of the war. Major contracts may not come their way but in the changed circumstances, it should be possible for Indian enterprises to take up sub-contracts from western companies working in Iraq. This would give the opening foothold, which can be used to expand and regain the influence that India always enjoyed in Iraq.
Two other areas, where Indian can make a huge contribution, are training Iraqi youth in computer software and hardware, and helping in skill upgradation of the Iraqi defence forces and police. Iraqi Air Force has a long history of training with Indian pilots. New Delhi should consider offering greater number of slots in its military training colleges for Iraqi forces at various levels.
