At the ground level, the Taliban recruits in much the same way as the Punjab based groups – relying on public sympathy and madrassas as their mainstay. But its goal of targeting US and Western interests is beginning to draw educated professionals from within and outside Pakistan, particularly the West – as the arrest of Faisal Shahzad in New York and five North Virginia (USA) youth in Sargodha of Punjab shows. This section, which can neither relate to Pakistan’s poor strata and the growing middle classes or to the Western culture, is attracted and motivated to fight against ‘an oppressive force that is challenging Islam and killing innocent civilians’. Foreigner jihadis entering Pakistan usually pass through Peshawar or Karachi and stay in safe houses located along the border areas.   

The Taliban have a steady stream of volunteers willing to engage in jihad; yet they resort to kidnapping of local youth and foreigners from the tribal areas – a tactic which is not common with the Punjab based groups. Furthermore, the Taliban are Internet savvy and use the medium in a big way than their Punjab counterparts, who also have a vibrant technological network. Years of institutional failure and State neglect in terms of socio-economic development and a clamp down on the growth of militant organisations have resulted in Pakistan becoming the home of modern jihad.          

For the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on the Punjab groups which look to carry out attacks in Kashmir and India. It is imperative, however, to appreciate that there is considerable  fluidity and a certain degree of ideological overlap between both the ‘branches’, as this analysis shows.

CURRENT SCENE

South Punjab is the hub of recruitment for main groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba.

Each group has an intricate and well defined recruitment network, with the larger organisations having a growing presence overseas. At the heart of local recruitment, and acting as a major driver for jihad, is the condition of extreme poverty. Lack of development in Punjab and Sindh is compounded by few employment opportunities. Organisations such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) are known to send delegations of religious scholars to rural areas to entice youth with promises of free food, free education and free lodging.  . In addition, enlisting for the ‘cause’ is associated with honourable living and honourable death, both of which culminate in ‘martyrdom’ for Allah.   

South Punjab’s economic stagnation and sense of hopelessness has given religious extremists a fertile ground to plant and spread their ideology. On its part, the government’s presence is no more than symbolic and it is unable to meet the basic needs of the people. JeM and JuD make no attempts to camouflage their presence in Bahawalpur and Muridke respectively. Numbers also indicate that JeM and LeT (a JuD off-shoot) are dominant entities. Between January and June 2003, for instance, JeM is said to have recruited 3,350 youth while LeT, took under its wings an estimated 2,235 teenagers . During this period, terrorist groups operating in Kashmir recruited more than 700 youngsters (18-25 age bracket) from various parts of Pakistan.

MADRASA TEACHINGS

Traditionally, a madrassa is attached to local mosque and is intended to provide elementary education while enhancing an individual’s understanding of the Qur’an. It doesn’t teach mathematics or science. Over the years, several madrasas in Pakistan have become intermediaries between the extremist groups and impressionable youth – with the clerics preaching an extremely orthodox interpretation of Islam, which calls for a return to the “pure seventh century Islam of the Prophet Muhammad”.   

One such institution is Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa, which is located on a remote strip of Pakistan’s Grand Trunk Road.  Its students are as young as 5 years old, and they are taught to memorise all the 77,934 words of the Qur’an. The school, which has more than 3,000 students, produces some of the most radical thinkers in the country; its alumni include Taliban leader Mullah Omar. The school premises are adorned with pictures of Osama Bin Laden and other high profile terrorists.

‘The purpose of my school’, says Headmaster Syed Yousef Shah, ‘is not to train militants but Islamic scholars’ but in the same breath he admits that several of his students have joined militancy and that some have even become suicide bombers.

Darul Uloom Haqqania classes on Islamic constitution start at 4 am. It is madrassas such as this that are dotting the landscape of Pakistan that have come to provide an almost escapist route for poor families.    

The total number of madrassa students in Pakistan has since crossed one million. Capital city, Islamabad, alone is believed to have 305 madrassas with approximately 28,000 students mostly from tribal areas, and their number continues to grow.

Historian Tahir Kamran offers a fascinating account of the madrasa phenomenon in Punjab. According to him, the province registered about 140 per cent increase in a decade. The state had 1,320 religious schools in 1988. By the year 2000, their number went upto 3,153.

Furthermore, Bahawalpur is the hometown of JeM leader Masood Azhar; his institutions alone enrolled 36,000 students. By 2001 end, the Bahawalpur trained militants were estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000.

MODUS OPERANDI

While the madrassas represent a prime recruitment base, it is important to analyze the incentives offered by the jihadi leaders, which ensure that their find perform the given task faithfully.

The initial attraction is, undoubtedly, free education, free food and free lodging the madrasas offer and the prospect of better life. It means parents do not have to worry about the costs of raising their children – an issue of extreme importance in Pakistan. Economic opportunities are very few in urban and rural areas alike. As the boys are fed well and given better living conditions than they are used to, the jihadi groups make them harbour a sense of indebtedness.

While Arabic, Urdu and English are compulsory subjects, teaching is modified to suit the Islamic interpretation of science .  In several madrasas education often is indistinguishable from radical teachings, with students given lectures on the philosophy of jihad. In cities such as Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, it is common to find the clergy preach rather openly radicalism. Such teaching received a booster dose after 26/11 Mumbai attacks, according to reports, particularly in the JuD affiliated schools.

Local prayer leaders and teachers play a key role in the indoctrination. Students are regularly told that the “world is immaterial and temporary [and that] the real world is hereafter and a Muslim can achieve it only through martyrdom.” In addition, students are advised that the “obvious way to do so is to go to Kashmir and embrace shahadat.”   

Since most terrorist groups, particularly the large ones, are closely associated with madrassas, there is a clearly defined path by which young men grow to become jihadis. While the debate as to why the Pakistan government refuses to clamp down on these institutions continues to rage, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry sources have an interesting take.

‘How can we penalize families who want to donate their children for jihad’, these officials, whose task is to check spread of jihadi culture, ask, adding that if one does so, then they would have to stop people from offering prayers and keeping fasts. The sources were quoted as saying that “…jihad is an integral part of Islam, so you can’t reject it.”  And ‘stopping the boys from going to join jihad is like asking people to stop going to the Mosque and observing fasts’.

Is this an attitude of indifference, complicity or haplessness?  It, in fact, is a combination of all the three facets on the part of government officials and political leadership. It has contributed significantly towards the growth of radical teachings at educational institutions across Pakistan.

The terrorist groups and organisations have an extensive ‘marketing’ network of their own, enabling them to tap the impressionable youth directly. Studies have shown that approximately 60% of the young men recruited by jihadi groups are school dropouts – a vast majority of them have run away from home to escape the wrath of family members or poverty or both. More often than not, a poor youth who quickly becomes a jihadi commander sees an upward mobility on the social ladder- and that cements his ties with jihad . He would not have achieved the feat had he remained a part of his familial socio-economic system.  His feat pump primes the aspirational quest of fellow youth.

Recruits to groups such as the LeT and JeM have a daily regime of indoctrination classes, rest, prayer and military training .  A Shaheed trained to fight in Kashmir or against Indian interests is often told that he will be offered 70 hoors (virgins), a queen hoor (virgin queen), a crown of jewels and forgiveness for 70 additional people.   Such promises are attractive for young men who would have otherwise lived in a world of despair.

A major instrument of jihadi recruitment is publications that are circulated free of cost. These publications feature jihadi ballads, interviews and profiles of young jihadis with big pictures, verses from the Qur’an, and letters from readers designed to inspire youth .  The jihadi groups have also taken to the cyber-world in a big way – nearly all of them have own websites to promote their ideologies and convey their message. Several of these websites have wallpapers and audio files on jihadi themes for free download, allowing interested youth to delve into the lives of jihadis.

Just as these Jihadi groups are allowed to operate in full view of the public, their publications are allowed to thrive, despite the provocative nature of the literature. The authorities have resisted clamping down on the publications even after the terrorist group that brings them is banned under international pressure. A case in point is of ‘Zarb-e-Taiba’, publication of the LeT. Their offices in Lahore are approximately seven minutes away from the Punjab secretariat and the Police Headquarters . LeT also continues to publish material to recruit people for jihad in Kashmir.  

FOCUS ON SOUTH PUNJAB

South Punjab, according to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, accounts for more than 7,000 of the 12,000 registered seminaries in Punjab .  The popularity of Tableeghi Jamaat has been integral to rapid growth of jihadi culture in the area. Anywhere between 5,000 and 9,000 youth from South Punjab are fighting in Afghanistan and Waziristan. According to Tariq Parvez, the head of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority, seminars in South Punjab invariably serve as hideouts or ammunition storage facilities . So, South Punjab’s emergence as a terrorist hub is a natural corollary.

In May 2010, following repeated terrorist strikes on Lahore, Interior minister Rehman Malik has equated South Punjab with Swat. It is a frank admission of the presence of elements wanting to challenge the supremacy of the State. Yet, the Pakistani government has been instrumental in supporting the growth of jihadi culture – with a certain degree of understanding evident between the Punjab based groups and political parties.

Before Malik speak, officials routinely denied the presence of radical elements in South Punjab, a fact that could be attributed to the notion that they have never attacked within Pakistan and continued to serve as a strategic tool against India. More over, admitting to the presence of militants could have invited unwanted US pressure and attention on the region.

There are clear indications of a continuing nexus between the State and terrorist groups. The official ban on JeM has not stopped truckloads of weapons from arriving at the organisation’s headquarters. Reports indicate that JeM continues to invest in real estate in Masood Azhar’s hometown area of Bahawalpur, with Chowk Azam, the latest purchase, to be used as a training site. Police claim to have seen tunnels being dug inside the premises; the site is strategically located along the Lahore-Karachi national highway.   

Government asserts that Masood Azhar has not visited his home town in the last three years, but local reports say he was in the town on April 28, 2008 to formally launch his book, ‘Fatah-ul-Jawad: Quranic verses on Jihad’.

Furthermore, there are telltale marks of close relations between intelligence agencies and the jihadi groups; the sleuths present outside the offices of JeM and LeT are tasked with the job of chasing away probing news hounds.

Within South Punjab, there are three prominent hubs – Cholistan in Bahawalpur, the Rekh in Dera Ghazi Khan and the Kacha area in Rajanpur. The first two areas are known for their poverty and underdevelopment; Lal Masjid clerics hail from the third place.

The Lashkar-e-Toiba, which is popular amongst Punjabi and Urdu speaking Mohajir settlers, has a large number of recruits from Bahawalpur, Multan and the areas bordering Central Punjab. Lately, it has started to recruit women from Punjab; they are given 21-days of rigorous ideological and military training and kept as reserves ready to run in the moment men jihadis go out on ‘missions’ to take on the ‘enemy’ attacking Pakistan.   

FUNDS FLOW

Jihadis have four main sources of funds. These are official sources, the Middle East and the Gulf States (not necessarily official), donations by middle classes, mostly traders in urban Punjab, Islamabad including.  For the traders, donation to the jihadis is a way of atonement of their worldly sins besides meeting social, moral and political obligations.

Development in rural Pakistan has not kept pace with raising aspirations and growing access to technology. As a result, people are disillusioned with government institutions and the State’s welfare system, and they look unto the militant groups to bridge the gap. Groups like the JuD have become darlings of the masses with their charity work and the access they provide to free health clinics.  This public face of the militants helps them gain external donations and get liberal aid flows.    

The growth of the jihadi culture has prompted larger organisations to look for recruits from overseas. A logistical and recruitment hub as also a major source of funding for Lashkar-e-Taiba is the Gulf, with Salafi contributors constituting the largest segment, followed by the Kashmiri diaspora. More than two decades ago, LeT created charity fronts to facilitate donation drives. The Director, US Senate Intelligence Committee, Dennis Blair, identified LeT as a potential threat. ‘It could challenge western interests outside of South Asia’, he says.

The Gulf has proved to be a secure location for LeT leaders and operatives. It is also their transit point to traffic resources into India .  Recruitment in the Gulf is reported to focus on Indian Muslims, with terrorist handlers often looking to make contact with them at mosques and other spiritual centres. Such contacts are often made in India itself through local networks (sleeper cells as they are called) before the potential target sets out, and are followed up in the Gulf.

These new recruits to Jihad are divided into two groups; one group is sent to Pakistan for training; after they learn the three R’s of jihad, they are pushed into India  to join sleeper cells; the second group becomes part of the LeT support networks in Bangladesh, Nepal and the Gulf that  facilitate movement of men, money and material. Over the years several prominent overseas LeT operatives have been arrested. They include Ali Abdul Aziz al-Hooti from Muscat in 2009. He is believed to be the main LeT interface with Indian Mujahideen.

KIDNAPPINGS FOR TERRORISM
Kidnapping of youth for terrorism in Kashmir has not been as prominent a feature as it is with the Taliban. Terrorist groups are known to ‘pick up’ devout Muslim youth, who, in their world view, are easy prey for suicide bombing missions. Such enterprises are primarily confined to South Waziristan, Balochistan and tribal areas. Reports say that the ‘missing Balochistan’ youth are not sent out on missions to Kashmir.     
      
The kidnapped youth are subjected to great ordeal- physical and mental. Indications are that they are beaten and made to starve as the first step towards submission; they also undergo a great deal of brainwashing to imbibe the virtues of suicide attacks for the sake of Islam.  Studies show that most boys kidnapped are of below average intelligence and come from poor backgrounds, with several of them reported to be as young as 7 –year- old.    

FUTURE SCENARIO

The ease at which jihadi groups are able to recruit young men in the interiors of Punjab and Sindh is unlikely to change as the state and non-state elements compliment each other. Madrassa character is also unlikely to change as education and health are two low priority areas for the government in Islamabad.